

# LECTURE LVII.

## SANCTIFICATION AND GOOD WORKS.—Concluded.

### SYLLABUS.

5. What is the Subject of Sanctification; man's fallen Nature, or something else? And are Sanctification and mortification of sin progressive?  
"Notes on Genesis," by C. H. M. of Dublin, p. 200, &c. "Waymarks in the Wilderness," by Jas. Inglis, Vol. i, p. 10; Vol. iii, pp. 75-332; Vol. v, pp. 29, 37, &c., Dr. Jno. Owen, on Indwelling Sin.
6. What constitutes an Evangelical Good Work? Are any works of the natural man godly works?  
Turretin, Loc. xvii, Qu. 4. Dick, Lect. 76. Hill, bk. v, ch. 4. Hodge's Theol. pt. iii, ch. 18, § 4.
7. Can man merit of God, by works? What the Doctrine of Rome concerning congruous and condign Merit?  
Turretin, Qu. 5. Hill, as above § 2. Knapp, § 108, 125. Hodge as above.
8. State and refute the Popish Doctrine of *Concilia Perfectionis*, and Supererogation.  
Th. Aquinas, *Part Prima Secunda*, Qu. 108. Suppl. Qu. 13. Turretin, Loc. xi, Qu. 4. Knapp, § 125. Hill as above. Hodge as above.
9. What the standard for our sanctification? Show the value and relation of Christ's example thereto.  
Dick. Lect. 75. Knapp, 117. Chalmer's Theol. Inst. Vol. ii, ch. 10.

**T**HE relation between regeneration and sanctification has been stated: The first implants a life which the second nourishes and develops. It is the heart of man, or his soul, which is the seat of the first. It is, of course, the same heart, which is the seat of the second. The latter is defined in our Catechism (Qu. 35), as a "work of God's free grace, whereby we are renewed in the whole man after the image of God, and are enabled more and more to die unto sin, and live unto righteousness." See also Larger Catech., Qu. 75, and Conf. of Faith, ch. 13, § 1. We regard sanctification then as advancing that renovation of man's heart, which regeneration begins. The process of sanctification and that of the mortification of sin are counterparts. The more we live unto righteousness, the more

Sanctification is Progressive.

we die unto sin. Grace and indwelling sin are complementary quantities, if a material illustration may be borrowed, such that the increase of the one is the corresponding decrease of the other. But in opposition to this established view of the

Plymouth Doctrine. Reformed Churches, the Plymouth Brethren's theology asserts that both the ideas of the mortification of the "old man" and of progressive sanctification are false. They ascribe the same completeness to sanctification from its inception, as to justification; if they do not quite combine them. Thus: ("Waymarks in the Wilderness," vol. iii, pp. 342, 343), regeneration is defined: "It is a new birth, the imparting of a new life, the implantation of a new nature, the formation of a new man. The old nature remains in all its distinctness; and the new nature is introduced in all its distinctness. This new nature has its own desires, its own habits, its own tendencies, its own affections. All these are spiritual, heavenly, divine. Its aspirations are all upward. It is ever breathing after the heavenly source from which it emanated. Regeneration is to the soul what the birth of Isaac was to the household of Abraham. Ishmael remained the same Ishmael, but Isaac was introduced." On p. 80th, "Be warned that the old nature is unchanged. The hope of transforming that into holiness is vain as the dream of a philosopher's stone, which was to change the dross of earth into gold." . . . "On the other hand, never be discouraged by new proof, that that which is born of the flesh is flesh. It is there; but it is condemned and crucified with its affections and lusts. Reckon it so, and that therefore you are no longer to serve it. It is just as true, that that which is born of the Spirit is spirit, and remains uncontaminated by that with which it maintains a ceaseless conflict." So. vol. v, p. 302. "Thus, two men there are in the Christian: so hath he evil; and so hath he not evil. If therefore he purge out the evil, it is his new man purging out his old man. Now these two men, within the control of the personality of the Christian, are real men, having each his own will, his own energy, and his own enjoyment."

In answer to this exaggerated view, we assert, first, that while the Apostle, Rom. vii : 23, speaks of  
 The New Nature  
 What? "another law in his members, warring against the law of his mind," the Scriptures nowhere say that regeneration implants a "new nature; or that the Christian has in him "two natures;" much less, two "real men." Shall I be reminded of Gal. v : 17, where the "Spirit" and "flesh" lust against each other? The "Spirit" is the Holy Ghost. So judges Calvin; and so the scope of Paul's context, in verses 16th and 18th, decides. So, in that chapter, it is a violence to the Apostle's meaning, to represent the "works of the flesh," verse 19th, &c., and the "fruits of the Spirit," verse 23d, as occupying the same man, in full force,

cotemporaneously. The 24th verse shows, that the latter extrude and succeed the former; and that this result is the evidence of a state of grace. Our popular language sometimes uses the word "nature" in the sense of moral *Habitus*; and we speak of grace as "changing the nature," or "producing a new nature." But in strictness, the language is neither philosophical, nor scriptural. A "nature" is the *essentia*, the aggregate of essential attributes with which the creature was *natus*. Were this changed, the personal identity would be gone, and the whole responsibility dissolved. The fall did not change man's *essentia*; nor does the new creation; each changed the moral *habitus* of man's powers: the fall to depravity, the new creation back towards holiness. The notion of two personalities also, in one man, is preposterous. Here the appeal to consciousness is decisive. If there were either two "natures" or two "real men," every Christian must have a dual consciousness. But I need not dwell on the truth which every man knows, that, while there is a vital change, consciousness is as much one, as in the unrenewed state. The explanation given in the last lecture solves this whole confusion. While the will is one, motives are complex. Regeneration works a prevalent, but not absolute revolution, in the moral disposition regulative of the Christian's motives. Amidst the complex of subjective states which leads to any one volition, some elements may be spiritual and some carnal. As regeneration established a new and prevalent (though not exclusive) law of disposition, so sanctification confirms and extends that new law in introducing more and more of the right elements, and more and more extruding the wrong elements.

Let us, second, bring the matter to the test of Scripture.

Scripture Argument. The thing which is renewed is the sinful soul. Eph. iv : 23 : ii : 1-5; 1 Cor. vi : 11; Col. i : 21, 22. Both the sanctification of the soul, and the mortification of sin are expressly declared to be progressive processes. Let the student consult the following references: 2 Cor. i : 22; v : 5; Acts xx : 32; 2 Cor. iii : 18; Eph. iv : 11-16; Phil. iii : 13-15; 1 Thess. v : 23; 2 Cor. vii : 1, Heb. vi : 1; 1 Peter, ii : 2; 2 Peter, iii : 18; Rom. viii : 13; Col. iii : 5. So, the Bible compares the saint to living and growing things; as the vine, the fruit tree, the plant of corn, the infant; all of which exhibit their lives in growth. Grace is also compared to the "morning light, waxing brighter and brighter to the perfect day;" and to the leaven, spreading through the whole vessel of meal: and to the mustard-seed, the smallest sown by the Jewish husbandman, but gradually growing to the largest of herbs. Is not the rhetoric of the Word just? Then we must suppose the analogy exists; and that spiritual life, like vegetable and animal, regularly displays its power by growth. These innovators borrow the Popish plea, that "the new-creation, being God's

work, must be perfect." I reply; The infant is also a work of God's power and skill; but he is designed to grow to an adult.

We find this idea incompatible, in the third place, with the laws of a finite rational creature. These All Principles are Progressive. ordain, that every faculty, affection, and habit must grow by their exercise, or be enervated by their disuse and suppression. Depravity grows in sinners, (2 Tim. iii : 13) as long as it is unchecked. So, holiness must grow by its exercise. Even the pagan Horace understood this,—*Crescentem sequitur cura pecuniam, majorumque fames*. This being the law of man's mutable nature, it must follow, that, as exercise increases the principles of holiness, so the denial of self and flesh must enervate and diminish the principles of sin.

I object, in the last place, to the antinomian tendencies which are, at least latently, involved in this scheme. If one believes that he has two "real men," or "two natures" in him, he will be tempted to argue that the new man is in no way responsible for the perversity of the old. Here is a perilous deduction. But the next is worse, as it is more obvious. If the new nature is complete at first; and the old nature never loses any of its strength until death; then the presence, and even the flagrancy of indwelling sin need suggest to the believer no doubts whatever, whether his faith is spurious. How can it be denied that there is here terrible danger of carnal security in sin? How different this from the Bible which says Jas. ii : 18, "Show me thy faith without thy works; and I will show thee my faith by my works." If then any professed believer finds the "old man" in undiminished strength, this is proof that he has never "put on the new man." If the flesh is reviving, spiritual life is just to that extent receding; and just in degree as that recession proceeds, has he scriptural ground to suspect that his faith is (and always was) dead.

There is a gospel sense, in which the Scriptures speak of the acts and affections of Christians as good works. By this, it is not meant that they are perfect, that they could stand the strictness of the divine judgment, or that they are such as would receive the reward of eternal life under the Covenant of Works. Yet they are essentially different in moral quality from the actions of the unrenewed; and they do express a new and holy nature, as the principle from which they spring. There is also a certain sense in which God approves and rewards them. How are these evangelical actions of the soul defined? We conceive that the Scripture characterizes them thus: 1. They must be the actions of a regenerate soul; because no other can have the dispositions to prompt such actions, and feel such motives as must concur. See Matt. xii : 33, or vii : 17, 18. 2. The

6. A Good Work,  
What ?

action must be, in form, regulated by the revealed will of God; for He allows no other rule of right and wrong for the creature. No act of obedience to rules of mere human or ecclesiastical device can claim to be a good work; it is more probably an offence unto God. See Deut. iv : 2; Is. i ; 12; xxix : 13; Matt. xv : 9. As God's will is to us practically the fountain of authority and obligation, it is obviously unreasonable that the debtor should decide for the creditor, how much or what the former sees fit to pay. And moreover, such is the distance between God and man, and the darkness of the sinful mind of man, we are no suitable judges of what service is proper to render God. Man's duty is simply what God requires of him. Can we err in defining good works as the right performance of duty? 3. In order for that performance to be a good work, its prevalent motive or motives must be holy: and among these, especially, must be a respectful, righteous, and filial regard, either habitual or express, to the will of God commanding the act. See 1 Cor. x : 31; Rom. xi : 26, and xii : 1. No principle of common sense is plainer, than that the quality of the act depends on the quality of the intention. An act not intended to please God is, of course, not pleasing in His sight, no matter how conformed in outward shape to His precepts.

Such works are not perfectly, but prevalently holy. I have more than once remarked, that the motive of a given act; and yet it may be short of that fulness and strength which the perfect rectitude and goodness of the heavenly Father deserve. It may also be associated with other lower motives. Of these, some may be personal, and yet legitimate; as a reasonable subordinate regard to our own proper welfare. (The presence of such a motive in the complex would not make the volition sinful.) But other motives may, and nearly always do, mix with our regard for God, which are not only personal, but sinful: either because inordinate, or impure, as a craving for applause, or a desire to gratify a spiteful emulation. Remembering the views established in the last lecture, you will perceive that in such a case, the volition would be on the whole, right and pious, and still short of perfect rightness, or even involving, with its holiness, a taint of sin.

But the best natural virtues of the heathen, and of all unconverted persons, come short of being gospel good works. See, for instance, Gen. vi : 5, and Rom. viii : 8. This truth recalls the assertion made of the total depravity of the race, and its grounds. It will be remembered that we did not deny the secular sincerity of the social virtues, which many pagans and un-renewed men possess. Nor did we represent that their virtues

A Work not perfectly Holy may be prevalently so.

No True Good Works done by Unconverted or Heathen.

were equal to the vices of the wicked. But what we mean is, that while nearer right than the open vices, they are still short of right; because they lack the essential motive, regard to God's revealed will and the claims of His love. "God is not in all their thoughts." Now, as our relation to God is the nearest and most supreme, an act which ignores this, however right it may be in other motives, still remains prevalently wrong in the sight of God. It does not reach the level of Bible holiness at all, though it may rise much nearer towards it than the sins of the reprobate. We do not, then, represent God as judging the amiable and decent transgressor equal to a monster of crime, nor condemning all secular virtues as spurious and worthless between man and man.

The proposition, that even the good works of believers do not earn eternal life by their intrinsic merit, has been found very repugnant to human pride. Rome consequently seeks to evade the omission of it, by her distinction of congruous and condign merit. (*Meritum de congruo de condigno.*) The former she makes only a qualified kind of merit. It is that favourable quality which attaches to the good works done by the unrenewed man before conversion, which properly moves God to bestow on him the help of His grace. The condign merit is that which attaches to evangelical good works done after conversion, by the help of grace, which, by its proper value and force, entitles the believer to eternal life. True, Bellarmine and the Council of Trent, with the most of Romanists, say that eternal life comes to the obedient believer partly by the merit of his own works, and partly by virtue of Christ's promise and purchase; so that, were there no Saviour, human merit would come short of earning heaven. But they hold this essentially erroneous idea, that, in the gracious works of the justified man, there is a real and intrinsic merit of reward.

To clear up this matter, let us observe that the word merit is used in two senses, the one strict or proper, the other loose. Strictly speaking, a meritorious work is that to which, on account of its own intrinsic value and dignity, the reward is justly due from commutative justice. But when men use the word loosely, they include works deserving of approval, and works to which a reward is anyhow attached as a consequence. Now, in these latter senses, no one denies that the works of the regenerate are meritorious. They are praiseworthy, in a sense. They are followed by a recompense. But in the strict sense, of righteously bringing God in the doer's debt, by their own intrinsic moral value, no human works are meritorious. The chief confusion of thought, then, which is to be cleared away, is that between the approvable and the meritorious. An act is not meritorious, only because it is morally approvable.

7. Merit, Rome's  
Distinction into Con-  
gruous and Condign.

Merit, strictly  
What?

Note further, that it is wholly another thing to do works which may fall within the terms of some covenant of promise, which God may have graciously bestowed. If the king is pleased, in his undeserved kindness, to promise the inheritance for the doing of some little service utterly inadequate to the reward, and if any creature complies with the terms exactly, then the king is, of course, bound to give what he has engaged. But he is bound by fidelity to himself, not by commutative justice to the service rendered; for that, intrinsically, is inadequate.

In the strict sense, then, no work of man brings God in the doer's debt, to reward him. The work which is worthy of this must have the following traits: It must be one which was not already owed to God. See Luke xvii: 10. It must be done in the man's own strength; for if he only does it by the strength of Christ, he cannot take to himself the credit of it. "It is not he that liveth, but Christ that liveth in him." It must be perfectly and completely right; for if stained with defect, it cannot merit. Last, it must be of sufficient importance to bear some equitable ratio to the amount of reward. One would not expect a large sum of money as wages for the momentary act of handing a draught of water, however cheerfully done. Now, it is plain at the first glance, that no work of man to God can bring Him, by its own intrinsic merit, under an obligation to reward. All our works are owed to God; if all were done, we should only "have done what was our duty to do." No right work is done in our own mere strength. None are perfect. There is no equality between the service of a fleeting life and an inheritance of eternal glory.

We may argue, farther, that the congruous merit of the Papist is imaginary, because nothing the unbeliever does can please God: "Without faith it is impossible to please Him." "They that are in the flesh cannot please God." Every man is under condemnation, until he believes on Christ with living faith. But if the person is under condemnation, none of his acts can merit. Second: There is an irreconcilable contrast between grace and merit. See Rom. xi: 6. The two are mutually exclusive, and cannot be combined. Grace is undeserved bestowal; merit purchases by its desert. This being so, it is vain for the Papist to attempt to excuse his error of a congruous merit subordinated to, and dependent on, free grace, by any false analogies of first and second causes. The human affection or act springing out of grace, may have approvableness, but no sort of merit. The practical remark should be made here, that when the awakened sinner is thus encouraged to claim saving graces as due to the congruous merit of his strivings, tears, reformations, or sacraments, he is put in the greatest peril of mistaking the way of

Hypothetical Merit.

Strictly, no Creature can Merit.

Natural Works have no Merit of Congruity.

salvation, grieving the Spirit, and falling into a fatal self-righteousness. What more insolent and deadly mistake can be made, than this telling of God, on the part of a miserable sinner, pensioner on His mere mercy, that the wretch's carnal, selfish strivings, or expedients, have brought the Almighty in his debt, in a sense, to bestow saving helps? Third; The whole Scripture holds forth the truth, that Christ bestows saving graces, not because of any form of merit, but in spite of utter demerit. We receive them "without money and without price." It was "when we were enemies, that we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son." Even the saint seeking grace always, in the Scripture seeks it purely of grace. Much more must the sinner. See Ps. li : 1-4; Dan. ix : 18; 1 Tim. i : 12-16. In conclusion of this point, it will be instructive to notice the close connection between this claim of "congruous merit," and the value attached by those Protestants who are synergists, to those expedients which they devise, to prepare the way for faith. Awakened sinners are encouraged to use them, and to look to them, not indeed as justifying; but as somehow leading on to more saving graces. Yet, there is a certain relationship of sequence, between the exercisings and strivings of carnal conviction and saving conversion. "They that be whole need not a physician, but they that be sick." The pangs of the sick man have a certain instrumentality in prompting him to send for the physician who cures him. In this sense they may be viewed as useful. But, *per se*, they are not in the least degree curative they are but parts of the disease, whose only tendency is death.

That no merit of condignity attaches even to the good works of saints, is clear from the conditions we have shown to be requisite. (See page 680). The most conclusive passages are such as these: Luke xvii : 9, 10; Rom. vi : 23; v : 15-18; Eph. ii : 8-10; 2 Tim. i : 9; Titus iii : 5, and such like. The first gives an argument by analogy, founded on the Judean husbandman's relation to his bondsman (his *δουλος* not his hireling). The master had legitimate property in his labour and industry—not in his moral personality, which belonged inalienably to God. Hence, when the bondsman rendered that service, the master did not for a moment think that he was thereby pecuniarily indebted to him for a labour which was already his own property: however he might regard the docility and fidelity of the bondsman highly approvable, he never dreamed that he owed him wages therefor. So we are God's property. He has, at the outset of our transacting with Him, ownership in all our service. Hence, if we even served Him perfectly, (which we never do,) we could not claim that we had paid God any overplus of our dues, or brought Him into our debt. He might approve our fidelity, but He would owe us no wages. In

No Condign merit in Works of Regenerate.

Rom. vi : 23, the Apostle actually breaks the symmetry of his antithesis, in order to teach that we merit nothing of God's commutative justice. Death is the wages which sin earns : but eternal life is the gift of God, and not wages earned by the Christian. The remaining passages teach the same.

Turretin sustains this view farther, by showing that the gracious acts, for which Romanists claim merit of condignity, and the eternal life attached to them, are always spoken of as the Father's gifts ; that they are always spoken of as the Redeemer's purchase ; that the Christians who do them are represented in the Bible as acknowledging themselves "unprofitable servants;" and that they always confess the unworthiness of their best works, especially in view of the everlasting reward. The Scriptures which might be collected under these heads would present an overwhelming array of proof.

But carnal men strongly resent this conclusion ; and urge,

It does not Follow as though it were a self-evident refutation, that because Sin Merits, that as sin and good works are in antithesis, our Works Do.

we cannot hold that man's sin carries a true and essential desert of punishment, and deny that his good work carries an equal desert of reward. To affix the one and refuse the other, they exclaim, would be a flagrant injustice. I reply: Between human rulers and ruled, it would. But they forget here the prime fact, that God is the Maker and sovereign Proprietor of men. The property may be delinquent towards its sovereign Owner, but it cannot make the Owner delinquent to it. If it fails in due service, it injures the rights of its Owner: if it renders the service, it only satisfies those rights; nothing more. But here a certain concession should be made. While a creature's perfect obedience is not meritorious of any claim of reward upon his Lord, in the strict sense, there is a relation of moral propriety between such obedience and reward. We saw that it appeared unreasonable to claim everlasting reward for temporal service. But does not a perfect temporal service deserve of God temporal reward? I would say, in a certain sense, Yes; supposing the creature in a state of innocence and harmony with his Lord. That is, it would be inconsistent with God's rectitude and benevolence, to begin to visit on this innocent creature the evils due to sin, before he transgressed. God would not infringe, by any suffering or wrath, that natural blessedness, with which His own holiness and goodness always leads Him to endow the state of innocence. But here the obligation is to God's own perfections, rather than to the creature's merit.

Some have supposed these views to be inconsistent with

the terms of the Covenant of Works between Did Adam and Elect Angels Merit under God and the elect angels, and God and Adam. Covenant of Works? They say that Paul, Rom. iv : 4, 5; and xi : 6, in drawing the contrast already cited between works and

grace, assigns condign merit to a perfect service done under a Covenant of Works. "To him that worketh is the reward reckoned not of grace, but of debt." I reply: this of course, is true of works done under a covenant of works: but to overthrow the Reformed argument, they must show that it would be true also of works done under the natural relation to God, as Lord before any covenant of promise. When once God has gratuitously condescended to promise, a claim of right for the perfect service rendered does emerge: of course. It emerges out of God's fidelity; not out of commutative justice. And when the creature, as Gabriel for instance, complies with the covenanted terms perfectly, and in his own strength, he gets his reward on different terms from those of the pardoned sinner. There is, in a sense, an earning under compact; such as the sinner can never boast; and this, we presume, is all the Apostle ever meant.

It only remains, on this head, to explain the relation between the good works of the justified believer and his heavenly reward. It is explained by the distinction between an intrinsic and original merit of reward, and the hypothetical merit granted by promise. If the slave fulfills his master's orders, he does not bring the latter in his debt. "He is an unprofitable servant; he has only done what was his duty to do." But if the master chooses, in mere generosity, to promise freedom and an inheritance of a thousand talents for some slight service, cheerfully performed, then the service must be followed by the reward. The master owes it not to the intrinsic value of the slave's acts, (the actual pecuniary addition made thereby to the master's wealth may be little or nothing,) but to his own word. Now, in this sense, the blessings of heaven bear the relation of a "free reward" to the believer's service. It contributes nothing essential to earning the inheritance; in that point of view it is as wholly gratuitous to the believer, as though he had been all the time asleep. The essential merit that earned it is Christ's. Yet it is related to the loving obedience of the believer, as appointed consequence. Thus it appears how all the defects in his evangelical obedience (defects which, were he under a legal covenant, would procure the curse, and not blessing,) are covered by the Saviour's righteousness; so that, through Him, the inadequate works receive a recompense. Moreover, it is clearly taught that God has seen fit, in apportioning degrees of blessedness to different justified persons, to measure them by the amount of their good works. See Matt. xvi: 27; 1 Cor. iii: 8, of which Turretin remarks, that the reward is "according to," but not "on account of" the works. See also, 2 Cor. ix: 6; Luke xix: 17, 18. Not only the sovereignty, but the wisdom and righteousness of a gracious God are seen in this arrangement. Thus a rational motive is applied to educe dili-

gent obedience. Thus it is evinced that the gospel is not a ministration of indolence or disobedience; and God's verdicts in Christ not inconsistent with natural justice. It is thus, because the grace given on earth is a preparation of the soul for more grace in heaven. And last, good works are the only practical and valid test of the genuineness of that faith, by which believers receive the perfect merits of Christ. This last fact, especially, makes it proper that the "free reward" shall be bestowed "according to their works;" and explains a multitude of passages, which Papists suppose make the reward depend on the works.

It may be said that the Romish Church is indebted to the

8. Works of Super- age of Thomas Aquinas, and most probably  
erogation, Source of to him, for the final theory of "works of  
Heresy. supererogation." He found among the Fath-

ers, the distinction between Christ's *præcepta* and *concilia*. This distinction pretending to find its grounds in certain texts of the New Testament, more probably had its origin in a desire to imitate the exoteric and the esoteric, higher and lower, morals of the New Platonists. The instances of *Concilia* usually quoted are those of Matt. xix: 12 and 21: 1 Cor. vii: 38-40; Acts xxi: 23, 24, and they are usually grouped by them under the three virtues of voluntary poverty, perpetual chastity, and regular obedience. The Church had long held, that while every one must strive to obey all the precepts of Christ, on pain of damnation, he is not expressly bound to comply with the "councils of perfection." If he sees fit to omit them, he incurs no wrath. They are but recommendations. Yet, if his devoted spirit impels him to keep them for the glory of God, he thereby earns supererogatory merit, superfluous to his own justification. Aquinas now proceeds to build on this foundation thus: One man can work a righteousness, either penal or supererogatory, so that its imputation to his brother may take place. What else, he argues, is the meaning of Gal. vi: 2; "Bear ye one another's burdens," etc.? And among men, one man's generous efforts are permitted in a thousand ways to avail for another, as in suretyships. "But with God, love avails for more than with men." Yea, a less penance is a satisfaction for a brother's guilt than would be requisite for one's own, in the case of an equal sin. Because the pure disinterestedness, displayed in atoning for the penitential guilt of a brother, renders it more amiable in the sight of God, and so, more expiatory. If a sinning believer hits himself twenty blows with his whip on his bare shoulders, it may be that a selfish fear of purgatory is a large part of his motive; and God will subtract from the merit of the act accordingly. But when he does it for his brother's sin, it is pure disinterested love and zeal for God's honor, the twenty blows will count for more.

The philosopher then resorts to the doctrine of the unity

Imputation of Super-  
erogatory Merit, and  
Indulgence Thereby  
of Penitential Guilt.

of the Church, and the communion of saints in each other's graces and sufferings, to show that the merit of these supererogatory services and sufferings is imputed to others. There is, in the holy Catholic Church then, a treasury to which all this spare merit flows. As the priesthood hold the power of the keys, they of course are the proper persons to dispense and apply it. But as the unity of the Church is especially represented in its earthly head, the Pope, he especially is the proper person to have charge of the treasury. And this is the way *indulgentia* is procured; the Pope imputes some of this supererogatory merit of works and penance out of the Church treasure; whence the remission to the culprit of the penitential and purgatorial satisfaction due from him for sin. But his confession, absolution, and contrition are necessary; otherwise indulgence does no good, because without these exercises the man's own personal penance would have done no good. Last, this indulgence may properly be given by the Church, in return for money, provided it be directed to a holy use, as repairing churches, building monasteries, etc. (He forgot our Saviour's words: "Freely ye have received, freely give.")

The overthrow of all this artificial structure is very easy for the Protestant. We utterly deny the distinction of the pretended "counsels of perfection," from the precepts, as wicked and senseless. It is impossible that it can hold: because we are told that the precepts go to this extent, viz: requiring us to love God with all the soul and heart and mind, and strength. If, then, any Christian has indeed found out that his circumstances are such the refraining from a given act, before and elsewhere indifferent, has become necessary to Christ's highest glory; then for him it is obligatory, and no longer optional. "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Rome's own instance refutes her. In Matt. xix: 23, 24, the rich ruler incurs, by rejecting our Saviour's counsel, not the loss of supererogatory merit, but the loss of heaven! Again: how can he have superfluity who lacks enough for himself? But all lack righteousness for their own justification; for "in many things we offend all." So, the Scriptures utterly repudiate the notion that the righteousness of one man is imputable to another. Christian fellowship carries no such result. It was necessary (for reasons unfolded in the discussion of the Mediator), that God should effectuate the miracle of the hypostatic union, in order to make a Person, whose merit was imputable. "None of them can by any means redeem his brother, or give to God a ransom for him." Nor does the Protestant recognize the existence of that penitential guilt, which is professed to be remitted by the indulgence.

The standard set for the believer's sanctification is the

8. Standard of Sanctification, Law, and Jesus' Example.

character of God as expressed in His preceptive law. This rule is perfect, and should be sufficient for our guidance. But God, in condescension to our weak and corporeal nature, has also given us an example in the life of the Redeemer. And this was a subsidiary, yet important object of His mission. See 1 Pet. ii: 21. (We recognize in its proper place, this prophetic function of the Mediator, which the Socinian makes the sole one.) The advantage of having the holy law teaching by example is obvious. Man is notoriously an imitative creature. God would fain avail Himself of this powerful lever of education for his moral culture. Example is also superior in perspicuity and interest, possessing all the advantage over precept, which illustration has over abstract statement. If we inspect the example of Christ, we shall find that it has been adjusted to its purpose with a skill and wisdom only inferior to that displayed in His atoning offices. Examining first the conditions of an effective example, we find that they all concur in Christ. It is desirable that our exemplar be human; for though holiness in God and in angels is, in principle, identical with man's, yet in detail it is too different to be a guide. Yet while it is so desirable that the example be human, it must be perfect; for fallible man would be too sure to imitate defects, on an exaggerated scale. Man is naturally out of harmony with holiness, too far to be allured by its example; he would rather be alienated and angered, by it. Hence, the exemplar must begin by putting forth a regenerating and reconciling agency. Last: it is exceedingly desirable that the exemplar should also be an object of warm affection; because we notice that the imitative instinct always acts far most strongly towards one beloved. But Christ is made by His work the prime object of the believer's love.

The value of Christ's example may be also illustrated in the following particulars: It verifies for us the conception of holiness, as generally displayed in God. That conception must lack definiteness, until we see it embodied in this "Image of the invisible God," who is "the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His person." See Lect. vii: end. Next, Christ has illustrated the duties of all ages and stations; for the divine wisdom collected into His brief life all grades, making Him show us a perfect child, youth, man, son, friend, teacher, subject, ruler, king, hero, and sufferer. Again, Christ teaches us how common duties are exalted when performed from an elevated motive; for He was earning for His Church infinite blessedness, and for His Father eternal glory, when fulfilling the humble tasks of a peasant and mechanic. And last, in His death especially, He illustrated those duties which are at once hardest and most essential, because attaching to the most critical emergencies of our being, the duties of forgiveness under

Value of Christ's Example.

wrong, patience and fortitude under anguish, and faith and courage in the hour of death. Consult, Rom. xv: 3; Phil. ii: 5; Heb. xii: 2, 3; 1 Jno. iii: 16; Eph. iv: 13; Jno. xiii: 15; 1 Cor. xi: 1.

Some have endeavoured to object, that we must not imitate even an incarnate Christ, because He is God and man, and His mediatorial sphere of action above ours. I reply: of course we do not presume to imitate His divine acts. But was He not made under our law? One end of this was that He might show us a human perfection, adapted for our imitation.

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