

# LECTURE XLI.

## SYLLABUS.

11. Prove that Christ is truly a Priest. What the several Parts of a Priest's Functions? What the Peculiarities of Christ's priesthood?

Turretin, Loc. xiv, Qu. 8, 9. Dick, Lect. 56. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, pt. i, ch. 12, and 13. Ridgley, Qu. 44, § 1, 2. "The Atonement," by Rev. Hugh Martin, ch. 3. Hodge's Theo., vol. ii, pt. iii, ch. 6.

12. Prove against Socinians, &c., the Necessity of Satisfaction, in order to Remission of Sin.

Turretin, Loc. xiv, Qu. 10, with Loc. iii, Qu. 19. Thornwell, Vol. ii, Art. 5. Dick, Lect. 56. Hill, bk. iv, ch. 3, § 1. Hodge's Theo., pt. iii (Vol. ii), ch. 7. Ridgley, Qu. 44, § 3. "Magee on Atonement." A. A. Hodge on Atonement, chs. 5, 6. Watson's Theo. Inst. ch. 19, bk. ii, ch. 8.

**T**HE proof that Christ is a true and real Priest, would begin with texts such as Ps. cx : 4; Heb. v : 5; viii : 1, *et pas-*

11. Christ the True Priest. *sim.* Were there no Socinian evasion, these would end the debate. But their plea is that Peter (Epistle 1, Ch. ii : 9), and John (Rev. i : 6, call Christians generally Priests. But since the name is thus applied to persons who only render to God the oblation of their thankful service and devotion, its application to Christ does not prove any more. Hence, they assert, it is vain for Calvinists to quote texts which call Christ a Priest, as proof that he was properly so, in the strict sense of the Hebrew  $\text{כֹּהֵן}$  or Greek  $\text{ἱερεὺς}$

And they attempt to further their evasion by saying that Christ is a Priest only in heaven, where He performs the intercessory function. If they can gain assent to this, since there is no suffering in heaven, they effectually exclude Christ's proper sacrifice and expiatory work. To meet these cunning subterfuges then, we must proceed farther, and show that Christ is called Priest in wholly another sense from believers, and that He literally performs the two peculiar functions of that office—sacrifice and intercession.

This argument leads us to anticipate the evidences by which Christ's sufferings are shown to be truly vicarious. The points will therefore be briefly stated here. In Heb. v : 1, we have an exact definition of a priest, as a person "ordained for men, from among whom he is taken, in things pertaining to God, that He may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins." Such, we may add, is precisely the meaning attached to the word by all men, including pagans. The priestly office is a mediatorial one. Its necessity arises out of man's sin and guilt, which exclude him from immediate access to a holy God. The priest is the intermediary who goes for him. Hence, he must have a sacrifice with which to expiate sin and propitiate God; and he must found his plea for his clients on this as the

ransom price. No Jew, Pagan, or Christian (not perverted by Socinian views) ever conceived of a priest as anything else than this. But it is far more conclusive to say, that the Epistle, after this definition of a priest, immediately asserts that Christ was made our high priest. The subsequent chapters assert that He was formally and solemnly ordained to the office; that He acted for others, and not for Himself in that office; that He transacted for us with God; and that He offered a vicarious sacrifice. These traits are conclusive of His real priesthood. He was appointed priest (Heb. vii : 20) with peculiar emphasis. He made His soul a sacrifice for sin by dying; while Christians, when described as metaphorical priests, only make their services a thank-offering by living. See Rom. xii : 1. That the Christian's oblation is only metaphorical, the apostle expresses by a beautiful paradox; He is a "living sacrifice." But a sacrifice proper is a thing that dies! It is a very strong evidence that, while the official name, priest, was so familiar to Jews, it is never once applied to gospel-ministers in the New Testament. They are "teachers," "presbyters," "ministers," "angels of the Churches," "ambassadors," "servants," but never ἱερεῖς! Finally, Christ is the antitype to a long line of typical priests. See Heb. viii : 4, 5; ix : 11. That these Levitical officers represented in type, the very idea of the priesthood proper, is demonstrated by every feature of their service. The animals they slew died vicariously. Every act was mediatorial, and their whole function began and was continued with expiation. Now, by the rule that the body must be more substantial than the shadow which it casts before, Christ's work, as antitype, must at least be as priestly as that of the prefiguring emblems.

The peculiarities of Christ's priesthood are: 1. The dignity of His person. 2. The solemnity of His appointment, by an oath. 3. His combining royalty and priesthood like Melchisedec. 4. His having, like him, neither predecessor nor successor; because, 5. His oblation had such infinite value and complete efficacy, that, 6. It grounded at once an everlasting and all prevalent intercession; and that, 7. Not only for one man, or race, but for all the Elect.

The argument for the necessity of an atonement proceeds chiefly on the question, whether distributive justice is an essential moral attribute of God; or whether, as Socinians assert, there is nothing in His nature which renders it less natural and proper for Him to remit guilt without satisfaction, than to create, or leave uncreated, a given thing. The Socinians, as we have seen, in order to evade the doctrine of a vicarious atonement, deny both the necessity of it, and the essential justice of God.

Bear in mind, then, that in this whole argument we attribute to God all the perfections which make Him an immutable

12. Necessity of Satisfaction argued from God's Perfections.

and infinite Being. We shall not pause to argue these against Socinians, but refer you to your previous course of theology.

But the necessity which we assert for God's punishing guilt is only moral. It is not a physical necessity like that which ensures that fire will burn, supposing the presence of fuel, and that water will wet, supposing its application. Here, then, falls the cavil of Socinus, that if retributive justice be made an essential attribute of God, its exercise must be conceived of as inevitable in every case, because of God's immutability, (as we call it,) so that mercy in every case would be impossible. Divine immutability does not imply that God must ever act in modes mechanically identical; but that His acting must always be consistent with the same set of essential attributes. As circumstances change, His very immutability requires a change of outward actings. Again; for God to effectuate a given part of His decrees of mercy, when, in time, the conditions of that execution are first in existence, is no change of purpose in Him. When God passes from wrath to reconciliation, as to a given sinner, it is no change in Him. The change is in the sinner. The same attributes which demanded wrath before, now demand peace; because the sinner's guilt is gone. The proper view of God's immutable perfections, therefore, leads us to conclude, that without an atonement they would render pardon of sin absolutely and universally impossible: but that, an atonement being provided, they offer no obstacle to pardon.

Again, it is another perversion to carry the idea of pecuniary debt so far, in our conceptions of guilt, as to conceive of a vicarious atonement as legal tender. When a security comes forward, and offers to pay the whole debt of the poor insolvent in jail, with principal and interest, cost and charges, the creditor must accept this legal tender; if he does not, he cannot claim payment afterwards. And the insolvent demands his release as of right. Now, guilt is not a mere debt, in this sense. It is a personal obligation to penalty; because the responsibility violated was strictly personal; and strict justice would entitle the ruler to hold the guilty party to endure that penalty in himself. Therefore, when the personal relation to law is waived by the ruler, and a substitute accepted, there is an act of grace, of mercy. This is the answer to the objection, that "if the necessity of the atonement be asserted, God the Father performs no act of grace, and deserves no thanks for letting the transgressor go free. He has exacted the last penny, and the release is a mere act of justice." To our Surety it is; but not to us. Besides, was there no grace in giving us the surety to pay for us?

Socinians clamorously object, that we who teach the neces-

Socinian Objections.  
 Ans. by 4 Distinctions.

sity of an atonement, strip God of those qualities which in all others would be most noble, generous and admirable; a willingness to overlook His own resentment, and magnanimously forgive without payment of the injury, where penitence was expressed. That we represent God as an odious and cruel being, who would rather see His erring creatures damned, no matter how penitent, than sacrifice His own pique; and who is determined to pour out His revenge somewhere, if not on the sinner, on his substitute, before He will be satisfied. These cavils are already answered by the above view. For a private man to act thus would be unamiable; he is himself a sinner. God has told him, "Vengeance is Mine;" and the supreme rule of the man's life is, that he shall do everything, forgiving injuries among the rest, for God's pleasure and honour. But God is Himself the supreme End of all His doings, as well as Chief Magistrate of the Universe. Turretin, Hill, &c., also appeal to other distinctions, to rebut these objections. Four things may be considered in a transgression, viewed as against a human ruler. The debt contracted thereby, the wrath or indignation excited, the moral defilement contracted by the transgressor in the eyes of the injured party, and the guilt, or obligation to legal penalty, incurred. Now, the plausibility of the Socinian cavil arises wholly from regarding the first three elements of sin, and studiously averting the eyes from the fourth. So far as the injury done me, as a magistrate, was a personal debt of wrong, humanity might prompt me to release it without satisfaction rendered; for that element of debt being personal, I have a personal right to surrender it if I choose. So far as I have had a personal sense of indignation and resentment excited by the wrong, that also it might be generous and right in me to smother, without satisfaction, in compassion to the wrong doer. I conceive that a certain element of moral defilement has come on him by his evil act, which constitutes a reason for punishing. If he amends that moral defilement by sincere penitence and reform, that obstacle to an unbought pardon is also removed. But it is far otherwise with the debt of guilt to law, of which I am the guardian. That is not a debt personal to me; and therefore I, as lawgiver, may not remit it without satisfaction. If I do, I violate my trust as guardian of the laws. Such is their arguing, and it is just. But it applies to God, as against sinning creatures, far more than to human lawgivers. And the same reasonings which show that the human ruler ought to surmount the first, second, and third elements of offence in order to pardon, do not apply to God. The human lawgiver is but a man, and the transgressor is also a man, his brother, and nearly his equal in God's eye. In the other case, the offended party is infinite, and the offender His puny, absolute property,

whom God may and ought to dispose of for the sovereign gratification of His own admirable and excellent perfections.

We shall not say, as Hill incautiously does in one place, that the fact that God is a Lawgiver is the first principle on which the doctrine of satisfaction rests; although we shall, in its proper place, assign it due importance. The importance of God's justice being protected, does not arise only or chiefly from the fact that the order of His universal empire is concerned therein. God Himself, and not His creature's well-being, is the proper ultimate end of His own actings, as well as of our deeds of piety; a doctrine repugnant indeed to all Socinian and rationalistic views, but founded in reason and Scripture. If the perfections and rights of God are such that it is proper all other beings should love and serve Him supremely, by what argument can it be proved that He should not do so likewise? Again: He being before all things, and having all the motives and purposes for making all things from eternity, while as yet nothing was, must have found those motives only in Himself. He being the only Thing existent, there was no where else to find them. Third: If creatures ought to render the supreme homage of their powers and being to God, ought not He to receive it? I Cor. x : 31. Last, to make any thing else the ultimate End of the universe, deposes God, and exalts that something to the true post of deity; to which God is made to play the part of an almighty convenience. Let human pride be pulled down. As for Scriptures, see Prov. xvi : 4 ; Is. lxi : 3 ; Rom. xi : 36.

God ought, therefore, to regard transgression, which outrages His holy attributes and excites His wrath, in a very different way from that proper for us creatures, sinners ourselves, when our fellow-sinners offend us. It may be very true that it is good, magnanimous, for one of us to forgive injury without satisfaction, and to extirpate our indignation for the sake of rescuing our fellow-creature from suffering the punishment; but the reasoning does not hold, when applied to the Supreme. The executing of His good pleasure, the illustration of His perfections are, for Him, more proper ends than the continued well-being of any or all sinful worlds, bestowed at the expense of His attributes. It is a more proper and noble thing that God should please Himself in the acting out of His own infinitely holy and excellent attributes, than that He should please His whole creation by bestowing impunity on guilty creatures. And, therefore, not only do reasons which arise out of God's moral relations to His creatures as their Ruler, but yet more reasons arising directly out of His own supremacy and righteousness, require Him to punish guilt without fail.

(a) The Scriptures ascribe to God holiness, righteousness, and justice, in a sense which shows them to be essential attributes. See Is. vi : 3 ; Ps. lxxxix : 14 ; v : 4 ; Gen. xviii : 25 ; Exod. xxxiv : 7 ; Hab. i : 13 ; Rom. i : 18-32 ; ii : 6-11 ; iii : 6, &c., &c. Some of these passages bring to view His *justitia universalis*, or the general rectitude of His nature ; and some His administrative justice, as dealing with His moral creatures. Now, we argue from the former, that since God is immutable, and this perfection is essential, He will not, and by a moral necessity cannot, be affected by moral evil as He is by good. It is impossible that His feeling and will can confound the two, can fail to be opposed to sin, and favourable to rectitude. But God, while His will is governed by His own perfections, is absolutely free ; so that no doubt His conduct will follow His will. God's distributive justice we naturally conceive as prompting Him to give every one His due. As naturally as well being is the just equivalent of obedience, just so naturally is suffering the equivalent of sin ; and justice as much requires the punishment of sin, as the reward of merit. To fail in apportioning its desert to either, is real injustice. Now, does not God assert that His ways are equal ? Shall not the like rule guide Him which He imposes on us ? See, then, Prov. xvii : 15 ; Rom. ii : 6-11.

Again God has pledged His Truth to the execution of penal sanctions. He has threatened. See Numbers xxiii : 19. The argument is enhanced by the repetitions, energy, and oaths, with which He has said and sworn, the wicked shall not enter into His rest. Hence His essential attribute of truth is engaged to require satisfaction for guilt.

(b) The argument from God's moral perfections is confirmed by observing His administration towards man. In the first revelation made to man, that of paradise, justice was declared as clearly as grace. Was goodness displayed in the bounties to man, and was the adoption of life offered to Him on easy terms ? Yet justice added the threat, " In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." As soon as innocent man fell, and a religion for sinners was to be revealed, the foremost point of this creed was the necessity that sin must be punished, for the satisfaction of divine justice, truth and holiness. The chief aim of God, in every institution of the Old Testament religion was obviously, to make this prime truth stand out to the apprehension of sinners. What was the prominent addition made to the worship of paradise ? Bloody sacrifice ; and that, undoubtedly, ordained by God ; as we have seen. And this remained the grand characteristic of the religion for sinners, until the " Lamb of God " came to meet the great demand of satisfaction. Wherever the Patriarchs approached the throne of grace, there the altar must

Holiness, Justice, and Truth.

His Actual Government.

Perpetual Sacrifice Designed to Teach this.

be raised, from the Jay Abel worshipped before the gates of the lost Eden, until Christ rent the veil of the sanctuary. The orisons of faith and penitence must be accompanied with the streaming blood of the victim and the avenging fire of the altar. Prayer could only rise to heaven, as the way was opened for it by the smoke of the sacrifice. God was thus teaching all ages, this foundation-truth of the theology of redemption that, "with out the shedding of blood, there was no remission." Thus impressively are we introduced to the Levitical argument.

The necessity of atonement is taught in all the Old Testament sacrifices (as the Gentile sacrifices are the testimony of man's conscience to the same truth). The Apostle Paul, as already intimated, makes a grand induction of the ritual facts of the Old Testament, in Heb. ix : 22. "And without shedding of blood was no remission." It is literally true, that the ceremonial law remitted no trespass, sin, or uncleanness, without a substitutionary animal death; save in the exception for the very poor, of Levit. v : 11. Search and see. The theological principle thus set forth is just my thesis; the necessity of satisfaction in order to pardon. Now, there is no idea which is inculcated, in the whole of Revelation, so constantly, so early, so carefully. It was the first truth, in the religion of redemption, taught to Adam's family. The awful, bloody symbol of it was ever present in all the worship of the Old Testament Church. With God's mind, it is ever the first and strongest thought. With man's unbelieving mind, it is the last and least. Indeed, the contrast here is amazing; and the stupidity of the human mind in apprehending this first rudiment, is one of the strongest proofs of its natural deadness in sin. God's example, in perpetually obtruding on sinners the impressive sacrificial symbol of this truth, should be instructive to pastors. They must constantly urge the necessity of satisfaction.

This obstinate obtuseness is manifested at once by the crude notions of the people and the refined speculations of the scholar. Even the convicted sinner is stubbornly oblivious of the claims of God upon his sins, and assigns anything rather than the true ground, his repentance, his reformation, his anxieties, for the title to his pardon. When these "refuges of lies" are swept away, and the soul is left desperate and cowering before its righteous doom, the pastor may hold up the gospel doctrine of satisfaction, and the convicted man will turn from it stolid and blind, until God shines into his heart. Carnal philosophy is equally prejudiced. It proposes any inconsequent scheme rather than the true one, to account for the punishment of sin, and the call for a sacrifice from Christ. One tells us, that suffering has no penal significance, but is the regular and unavoidable effect of natural law upon creatures organized and finite.

Argument from Sacrifices.

Obstinate Errors of Sinners.

as though that law were anything else than the expression of God's moral will : and as though He had not told us, "death came by sin." Another tells us, that primitive justice is nothing but "benevolence guided by wisdom," that as Love is God's only moral attribute, the only ends of penalty must be philanthropic, that it is but a prudent expedient to protect men from the miseries involved in sin. So, when they come to explain the sacrifice of Calvary, they give any other than the true account of it. Says one : It was designed to attest the divine mercy offered us in the gospel promises. Another : It was to set us a splendid example of long-suffering. Another : It was to break our hearts by the spectacle of dying love. And others : It was to make a wholesome exhibition of the evil of sin. The Scripture saith it was all this : but because it was more, because it was primarily designed to make satisfaction for our guilt.

(c) Many minds, like the great jurist Grotius', have deluded themselves by likening God's penal administration to that of the civil magistrate ; which is, in a large degree, an expedient to repress the mischiefs of transgression. They suppose no higher aim is to be imputed to God's justice. But the comparison is partial. God has reserved to Himself the supreme function of retribution, delegating to earthly rulers only the temporary and lower purposes of law. Yea, even if the magistrate loses sight of the true ground of his penalties in the evil desert of the crimes he punishes, they at once sink from the rank of a righteous expediency, to that of an odious and unprincipled artifice.

That the benefit of the culprit is not the true end of penalty may be very quickly decided by the fact, that many of God's most notable penalties summarily destroyed their objects ; as the Flood, doom of Sodom, and the retributions of hell. Of course God has done in these cases, what He meant to do. But they say : God, having seen that the amendment of these sinners was hopeless, and that they were infallibly drawing on themselves the worst mischiefs of sin, made examples of these for the good of others. So His only motive is still benevolence, seeking thus to overrule the unavoidable calamities of the few, to the "greatest good of the greatest number." Having thus placed a fragment of truth in the place of the whole, they sometimes turn on us, with an arrogant contrast between the boasted mildness of their scheme, and what they call the vengeful severity of ours. Our God, say they, is the God of love. Yours is the theology of ancient barbarians, who sanctified their vindictive malice under the name of vindicatory justice, and imagined a God like themselves, pleased with the fumes of His enemies' blood. They say ours is "the theology of the shambles."

But let us see how this declamation will stand the test of

reason and Scripture. Is God any better pleased with a holy creature than with a transgressor? Of course, yes. But for what is He better pleased with the holy? For his righteousness. It is right then in God to love righteousness? Of course, yes: Did He not, He would be Himself unrighteous. But righteousness and sin are the opposite poles of character. Just as the attraction of the one end of the magnet to the North pole is the repulsion of the other end towards the South; so to love holiness is to hate sin. The perfection, then, which prompts God to the amiable work of rewarding good desert, is the same perfection which consistently prompts to punish ill desert. Hear Anselm of Canterbury, reasoning with his imaginary opponent, Boso.

"To remit sin" (without satisfaction) "is nothing else than not to punish it. And since nothing else than punishment is the right adjustment of the sin that has not been satisfied for, if it is not punished, it is left unadjusted."—Boso. "What you say is reasonable."—Anselm. "But it is not becoming for God to leave anything in His kingdom unadjusted."—Boso. "If I wish to assert otherwise, I fear to sin."—Anselm. "So then it does not become God to leave sin thus unpunished."—Boso. "So it follows."—Anselm. "And there is another thing that follows; that if sin is thus left unpunished, it will be just the same with God whether one sins or does not sin; and that does not befit God."—Boso. "I cannot deny it."—Anselm. "Look at this too. Nobody is ignorant, that the righteousness of men is under the law; so that the measure of its recompense is dispensed by God according to its quantity."—Boso. "So we believe."—Anselm. "But if sin is neither paid for nor punished, it is subject to no law."—Boso. "I cannot understand it otherwise,"—Anselm. "Then, unrighteousness, if it be remitted by mere mercy, is freer than righteousness? And that seems extremely unsuitable. This absurdity also is attached to it: that it makes unrighteousness like God, in that, just as God is subject to no law, so unrighteous is not."

This pretended resolution of punitive justice into benevolent expediency is, in its result, impious towards God, and practically identical with the selfish system of morals. We have seen above, that "man's chief end is to glorify God, and enjoy him forever." This humanitarian scheme says that this would make God the supreme egotist. It proposes as a more suitable supreme end, not self, but mankind: the advantage of the greatest number. This they claim, is true disinterestedness. But is not that which is made our highest ultimate end thereby made our God? It is nothing to the purpose that names and titles are decently exchanged, and man still called the creature, and Jehovah the God. Virtually, the aggregate of humanity is made our deity, by being made our moral End; and Jehovah is only retained, if retained

at all, as a species of omnipotent conveniency and Servitor to this creature-God. Further: inasmuch as the benevolent man is himself a part of this aggregate humanity, which is his moral End, he himself is, at least in part, his own supreme end! Here the supreme selfishness of this scheme of pretended disinterestedness begins to crop out. In this aggregate humanity I am an integer, "by nature equal" to any other. What then so reasonable, as that I should deem the humanity embodied in myself, as my own nearest and most attainable moral End? Does not the natural instinct of self-love point to this conclusion; as well as the facts that I cannot, with my limited nature benefit all, that I am more nearly responsible for my own welfare, and that I have more means to promote it with certainty than any other man's? Hence, the properest mode to promote "the greatest good of the greatest number," will be for each one to make his own personal advantage his supreme end! Here the abominable process from these utilitarian premises, is completed. Dr. Samuel Hopkins, the great American inventor of this scheme, has himself carried his system to this result, with a candour which is amusing for its simplicity: Says he: vol. I: p. 475.

"As every person is nearest to himself, and is most in his own view, has opportunities to be better acquainted with his own circumstances, and to know his own wants, his mercies and enjoyments, &c: and has a more particular care of his own interest, than of that of others: is under greater advantage to promote his own happiness than others; his disinterested universal benevolence will attend more to his own interest, and he will have more and stronger exercises of it respecting his own circumstances and happiness than those of others, all things being equal: not because it is his own interest, but for the reason just given." That is to say; his virtue will be to practice supreme selfishness, provided he is not selfish in doing so! Thus this boasted scheme resolves itself into one of selfish expediency.

This theory of penalty receives the following refutation. If

The Effective Expedient would be Just.

it is only a benevolent expedient for reforming sinners and repressing sin, then the expedient which is most effectual is most just. If a case arises in which the criminal and those like him will be more deterred by punishing the innocent than the guilty, it will be more just to do so. The instance may easily arise in actual life. Here, for example, is an outlaw, hardened in crime, desperate, callous to shame, weary of his life, whom it is proposed to curb by punishments. But none of them reach him. Shame has for him no deeper gulfs. The prison is less a hardship than his vagrant and starving life. Corporal pains have little terror for one familiar with misery. Death is rather a welcome refuge than a dread. The expediency fails. But now

there steps forth a policeman, who says that there is yet one green spot in this seared and arid heart; that this desperado has an only child, an innocent and tender daughter, whose purity has shielded her from all taint. Punish her with stripes. Let him stand and see her tender flesh torn with the scourge, and hear her screams; and his rugged heart will relent. He will promise anything to save his beloved child. Does not the success of this experiment justify its righteousness? Every right heart answers, with abhorrence, No. Such a punishment of the guiltless would be a monstrous crime. Then we must reject that theory of penalty.

But further: Expedients are the resort of the weak. Omnipotence has no need of them for it can march straight to its ends. Now, if love is God's whole moral rectitude, as an infinite being, He must be infinitely benevolent. Why then has He not adopted the other plan, to which His omnipotence is certainly competent, of effectually excluding the mischiefs of sin by making and keeping all His creatures holy? Why does He not convert Satan, instead of damning him? Thus a large aggregate of happiness would have resulted; all that, namely, arising out of Satan's innocence minus the penal pangs. Moreover, penalty has turned out but an imperfect and partial preventive, after all, for in spite of it earth and hell are full of sin, and God must have foreseen this failure of the repressive policy. Benevolence must, then, on these principles, have led Him to adopt a system of universal efficacious grace, instead of a policy of penal sanctions.

But especially is it impossible, on this theory of expediency, to account for everlasting punishments under an Almighty God. Here the remedial theory is out of the question; for the culprit is to sin and suffer forever. Nor will the other plea avail; that the penalties in this case are for the benefit of others. For this infliction is to continue everlasting ages after all the penitent shall have been perfected, and the perfect securely enclosed within the protecting walls of heaven. There, endowed as they are, with perfect love and holiness, they need no threatening example, to keep them from sin. He who holds this theory of punishment, must, if he is consistent, go on to modern Universalism, or else he must deny God's omnipotence over free agents.

(d) Resuming the affirmative argument, I make my first appeal to conscience. Every man who believes in a God, believes His justice the same in essence with that imprinted on his own conscience. For two reasons, we must believe this: That we are made in God's rational image. And that Governor and governed must live by the same code of justice in order to under-

Inconsistent with  
Omnipotence.

Eternal punishments  
inexplicable.

Affirmative Argument  
from Conscience.

stand each other. Let any man, then, ask himself impartially, why he approves of a just punishment. The answer of his reason will be simply: because the sin deserves it. Our judgment of right and wrong is intuitively accompanied with the conviction of good and ill desert. But, desert of what? Reason answers, of reward or penalty, of well being or suffering. The title to the one is a counterpart to the title to the other. That this judgment is intuitive, is disclosed by the following instances: If any reverent or fair mind is asked how the presence of so much suffering in the world can consist with God's benevolence, the reason turns instinctively to the solution: Because so much sin is here. The presence of the sin justifies the presence of the suffering. Second. Every sane human being who is in his sin, dreads to meet God. Why? Witness the moral fear of death, and the certainty with which the most reckless men apprehend their doom and its justice, when the solemn hour has dissipated vain illusions and recalled the soul from the chase of vanities. The same conviction is familiarly but justly argued from the conscious guilt of pagans, and their desire for expiatory sacrifice. Said Ovid: *Timor fecit Deos*. To this shallow solution Edmund Burke answered: *Quis fecit timorem?* The belief in God and conviction of His punitive justice must be *a priori* to the fear of them. Third. When any right-minded man witnesses the escape of a flagrant criminal from justice, he is indignant. He says: "The gallows is cheated;" and this expression conveys a certain just complaint and sense of moral grievance. Should the escaped man charge this as a malicious thirsting for his destruction, the spectator would indignantly deny this construction. He would say: "My sentiments are not cruelty, but justice." And he would declare that they were compatible with sincere pain at the anguish of a justly punished culprit.

We have seen that the title of the guilty to penalty is the correlative to the title of the righteous to reward.

Title to Penalty Correlative to Title to Reward.

If a benevolent policy may properly suspend the former, why not also the latter?

But we presume that if the consciously righteous man were robbed of his immunity, *pro bono publico*, against his own consent, no picture of the beneficent results would reconcile his soul to the intrinsic injustice. Let the student ponder, in this connection, Prov. xvii: 15; Rom. ii: 9-11. 2 Thess. i: 6. This loose view of punishment thus appears peculiarly foolish and suicidal in those who hold it, in that they, with their Socinian tendencies, rely more or less on their own merits for their acceptance. But if sin carries the same merit of penalty that righteousness does of reward, and if they will have God sever the former tie at the dictate of expediency, they must be prepared to find the latter uncertain also.

The moral law is the transcript of God's own essential perfections. This teaches us to expect that permanency in it, which our Saviour, in Matt. v : 18, claims for it. But is not the penal sanction a substantive part of the statute? The common sense of mankind would certainly answer, yes. What is the object of a penal sanction? To support the law. If then the law is to be immutable, the penal sanction which supports it must be so. There is a curious evidence of the judgment of human legislators on the question, whether the penal sanction is a substantive part of the law; that in their prohibitory statutes, it is the only part they usually publish at all! Now then if the law is irrevocable, the penalty is also inevitable.

The whole of the above argument may be put in a very practical light—thus: Is not judicial impartiality with God “a matter of principle?” The upright human judge who was entreated by the convicted man, or by his counsel, to act as the Socinian expects God to act in pardoning, would be insulted! Now, how does God require us to act, in matters of principle? He literally requires us to die rather than compromise our principles. He requires us to meet martyrdom, rather than yield them. Now does God first command us to seek our complete rectitude in the imitation of Himself, and then act oppositely to His injunction to us? Surely not. In representing the necessity of satisfaction as so high, as to call for the infinite satisfaction of Christ's death in order to make sin pardonable, we conform precisely to the system of morals which the Scriptures commend to us for ourselves. The tendency of Calvinism is wholesome herein.

On the other hand, the looser doctrine is as corrupting to man as it is dishonouring to God. Its advocates flout the obligation to penalty in every sin. They say Calvinism deifies revenge. They declare substitution and imputation immoral fictions. The student may be forewarned that, when he hears one of these “advanced thinkers” thus teaching, if he be not idly babbling, he had best be shunned as a man not to be trusted. It is a confession of indifference to moral obligation. He who is ready so flippantly to strip his God of His judicial rights, will probably not stickle to plunder his fellow of his rights. In this theory of guilt and penalty, he has adopted the creed of expediency. Will he not act on it, when tempted by his own interests? Worse than all, he has fashioned to himself a God of expediency. Saith the Psalmist, (cxv : 8), “They that make them are like unto them; so is every one that trusteth in them.” As man never comes up to his model, a corrupt idol always sinks the votary to a lower degradation than its own. Nor could God repair this consequence by any preceptive stringency. Shall He

The Law Immutable.

Else God's Requirement of us Unfair.

Other Doctrine is Corrupting.

forbid us to sacrifice principle to expediency, even to save life itself? Shall He exact of us martyrdom itself, rather than we shall tamper with right and truth; and all this under the penalty of His eternal wrath? Shall He charge us, also, that our holiness is to consist in imitation of Him? And shall He then adopt a standard of expediency for Himself, which He has so sternly inhibited to us? The only effect would be to make men hypocrites.

(e) Moreover; does not God bear moral relations to His creatures, as well as they to Him? Gen.

Argument from God's  
Rectoral Justice.

xviii : 25. Surely. As Ruler, and especially as Almighty Ruler, with nothing to hinder Him from doing His will, He is bound to His own perfections to rule them aright, as truly as they are bound to Him to serve aright. This being so, retributive justice will be seen to flow as a necessity from the holiness and righteousness of God. By these attributes God necessarily and intrinsically approves and delights in all right things. Wrong is the antithesis of right. A moral *tertium quid* is an impossibility, as the mere absence of light is darkness. There is no moral neutrality. Hence, it results, that God must hate the wrong by the very reason He approves the right; e. g., if a man feels moral complacency at a filial affection, will he not, *ipso facto*, be certain to feel repugnance at ingratitude? I see not how God would be holy at all, unless His justice were necessary.

Again; were it not so, God would be unjust to His innocent creatures. Sin is injurious; to all but infallible Being contagious, and universally mischievous. God has been pleased to adopt a plan of moral sanctions, to protect the universe from sin. Those beings who kept their covenant with God, have a right on Him, which He, in infinite condescension, gave them, to be protected efficiently. Hence, His righteousness must lead Him to inflict penal sanctions with exactness, for it is well known that uncertainty in this encourages transgressions, confounds moral distinctions, and relaxes government. Should God do thus, He would be sacrificing the well-being and rights of those who deserved well at His hands, to a weak compassion for those who deserved nothing. God's essential justice is the foundation of the rights and order of the universe. Unless its actings are certain and regular, we are all at the mercy of an unprincipled Omnipotence. Even the damned have no interest in making God's justice uncertain; because it is the only guarantee that they shall not be punished more than they deserve. And the wider God's dominions, the greater strength have all these arguments, forcible as they are even in the narrow domain of the family, school or state.

The parallel drawn from acts of pardon without satisfaction, safely and beneficially indulged in by human rulers, is deceptive, because they have not the divine perfections of omnipotence,

Pardons by Magistrates no Precedents.

unchangeableness and omniscience. It might be no dishonour to a human magistrate to modify his purposes; he never professed to be either perfectly wise or immutable. Cases may arise of conviction, where the evidence of guilt is uncertain, or the criminal intention doubtful. In these cases, and these alone, the pardoning power may find a wholesome exercise. Such cases have no existence in the administration of an omniscient God. Once more; the power and authority of human rulers are limited. They must govern as they can, sometimes not as they would. God can do all things.

In a word, God's moral government, in its ultimate conclusion, must be as absolute and perfect as His own nature. For, being supreme and almighty, He is irresponsible save to His own perfections. Therefore, if He is a Being of infinite perfections, His government must be one of absolutely righteous, final results. It will be an exact representation of Himself, for He makes it just what He pleases. If there is moral defect in the final adjustment, it can only be accounted for by defect in God. It must be an absolute result, because the free act of an infinite Being.

(f) The death of Christ argues the necessity of satisfaction. For Socinus admits that He was an innocent Man, God's adopted Son. Surely God would not have made Him suffer under imputed guilt, (He had none of His own), unless it had been morally necessary. In this view, we see that the atonement, instead of obscuring, greatly exalts God's love and mercy; that though He knew the price of pardon must be the blood of His own Son, His pity did not fail.

(h) Last; it is tacitly implied in the admissions of Socinians themselves, that God could not consistently pardon without the repentance and reform of the sinner. For this gives up the point that, in some sort, a satisfaction to the divine honour must be exacted. But, repentance and reform are not satisfactions. Second, we shall prove that repentance is the consequence and result of pardon, so that it cannot be its procuring cause. An injured man, we admitted, might regard repentance as obviating the third element of transgression, the subjective moral turpitude. But, in God's case, it may not, because God must bestow the repentance as truly as the pardon, and as a consequence of the pardon. See Acts v : 31; Jer. xxxi : 18, 19.

We will close with these general Bible testimonies to the necessity of satisfaction: Heb. vii : 27; viii : 3; ix : 7, 12, 22, 23, 28; x : 9, 10, 26, 27 to 29; ii : 10, 14, 17.

Tacit Admission of Adversaries.