

# LECTURE XXXIX.

## MEDIATOR OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

### SYLLABUS.

1. What the meaning of the word Mediator? Why needed in the Covenant of Grace?

Lexicons. Turretin, Loc. xiii, Qu. 3. Dick, Lect. 51.

2. Is Jesus of Nazareth the Promised Mediator? Against Jews.

Turretin, Qu. 1, 2. Horne's Introduction, Vol. i, (Am. Ed.) Appendix, § 6.

3. What is the constitution of Christ's person? State the doctrine of the Gnostics, Eutychians, Nestorians and Chalcedon hereon. What the results, in the mediatorial person and acts, of this hypostatic union?

Hill's Div., bk. iii, ch. 8. Turretin, Qu. 6, 7, 8. Church Histories, especially Gieseler's, Vol. i, § 42-45, and 86-88. Neander's, Vol. ii, p. 434, &c. Torrey's Tr. Dick, Lect. 53. Conf. of Faith, ch. 8. Ridgeley, Qu. 37. Dr. Wm. Cunningham's, Hist. Theology, ch. 10.

4. Was Christ's human nature peccable?

Plumer, "Person and Sinless Character of Christ." Hodge, Theol., Vol. ii, p. 457. Schaff's Person of Christ. Dorner's Hist. Prot. Theology.

5. Does Christ perform His mediatorial offices in both Natures? Why was each necessary?

Turretin, Qu. 3, and Loc. xiv, Qu. 2. Calvin's Inst., bk. ii, ch. 12. Dick, Lect. 51, 53. Ridgeley, Qu. 38-40. Turretin, Loc. xiii, Qu. 9.

6. What the Socinian view of the necessity of Christ's Prophetic Work?

Turretin, Loc. i, Qu. 4. Stapfer, ch. 12, § 18-25, and 122, &c.

**T**HE word mediator is in the New Testament *μεσότης* middle man. The phrase does not occur in the Old Testament,

except in the Sept. translation of Job ix : 33, (Engl. v : "days-man,") and then with the sense of umpire, not of mediator. Its idea in the New Testament is evidently of one who intervenes to act between parties, who cannot, for some reason; act with each other directly. Thus, Moses was (Gal. iii : 19) the mediator of the Theocratic covenant. But in this, he was no more than *internuncius*. Christ's mediation included far more, as will appear when we prove His three offices of prophet, priest and king; which are here assumed.

No mediator was necessary in the Covenant of Works between God and angels, or God and Adam; because, in unfallen creatures, there was nothing to bar direct intercourse between them and God. Hence the Scripture presents no evidence of Christ's performing any mediatorial function for them. On the contrary the Bible implies always, that Christ's offices were undertaken, because men were sinners. Matt. i : 21 ; Is. liii ; Jno. iii : 16. But, man being fallen, the necessity of Christ's mediation appears from all the moral attributes of God's nature; His truth, (pledged to punish sin,) His justice, (righteously and necessarily bound to requite it,) His goodness, (concerned in the wholesome order of His kingdom,) and His holiness, (in-

Why Needed in Covenant of Grace?

trinsically repellent of sinners). So also, man's enmity, evil conscience and guilty fear, awakened by sin, call, though not so necessarily, for a mediator.

It has been objected that this argument represents God's will as under a constraint; for else what hindered His saving man by His mere will? And that it dishonours His wisdom by making Him go a roundabout way to His end, subjecting His Son to many humiliations and pangs. The answer is: the necessity was a moral one, proceeding out of God's own voluntary perfections. Note. To sustain our argument we must assert that God's mere will is not the sole origin of moral distinctions. See Lect. x : on that point.

Against the Jews we assert that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah and Mediator of this Covenant. Of an argument so comprehensive, and containing so many details, only the general structure can be indicated. In this argument the standard of authoritative reference assumed is the Old Testament, which the orthodox Jew admits to be inspired. (As for the Rationalistic, they must first be dealt with as other skeptics.) Second. In this argument no other authority is claimed for the New Testament in advance, than that it is an authentic narrative. As such, it is substantiated by the profane and Jewish history. We then make two heads :

The promised Mediator of the Old Testament must have already come. For the time has passed. (See Gen. xlix : 10 ; Dan. ix : 24-27). He was to come while the second temple was standing. (Hag. ii : 6-9 ; Mal. iii : 1-3). He was to come while the Jewish polity subsisted ; (Gen. xlix : 10,) and while Jerusalem was still the capital of that theocracy. (Hag. ii : 6-9 ; Is. ii : 3 ; lxii : 1, &c.) This polity and city have now been overwhelmed for nearly 1,800 years : so that the very ability to give genealogical evidence of the birth of Christ from David's stock is now utterly gone ! The Messiah's coming was to be signaled by the cessation of types. (Dan. ix : 27). Last : the Messiah's coming was to be marked by the accession of multitudes of Gentiles to the religion of the Old Testament. (See Is. ii : 3 ; xlii : 1-6 ; xlix : 6 ; lx : 3, &c.)

Jesus of Nazareth is the Person ; because all the qualities and incidents foretold in the Old Testament, wonderfully tally with Him and His life. (See Acts iii : 18.) The strength of the argument is in the completeness of this correspondence. In fairly estimating this proof, reference must be made to the doctrine of probabilities. The occurrence of one predicted trait in a person would prove nothing. The concurrence of two would not be a demonstration ; because that concurrence might be fortuitous. But, when three independent and predicted traits

Jesus the Mediator of the Old Testament.

(a) Because the Time is Passed.

(b.) Because He has the appointed Traits.

concurrent, the proof would greatly strengthen; because the likelihood that chance could account for all three, is diminished, in a multiplying ratio. So, as the number of coincident, predicted traits increases, the evidence mounts up, by a multiplying ratio, towards absolute certainty. Jesus, then, answers the prophetic description in the time of His birth. (See above.) In the place; Micah. v : 2. In His nativity of a virgin; Is. vii : 14. In His forerunner; Mal. iii : 1, &c. In His lineage; Gen. iii : 15, xviii : 18, xlix : 10; Is. xi : 1; Ps. cxxxii : 11; Is. ix : 7, &c. In His preaching; Is. lxi : 1-3. In His miracles; Is. xxxv : 5-6. In His tenderness and meekness; Is. xlii : 3. In the circumstances of His end, viz., His entry into Jerusalem; Zech. ix : 9. Betrayal; Zech. xi : 12, 13. Rejection and contempt; Is. liii : 3. Death; liii : 8. Mockings therein; Ps. xxii : 8. Vinegar; Ps. lxix : 21. Piercing; Zech. xii : 10. Yet no bones broken; Ps. xxxiv : 20. Death with malefactors; Is. liii : 9. Honourable burial; Is. liii : 9. Resurrection; Ps. xvi : 9, 10; lxviii 18. Spiritual effusions, Joel. ii : 28. Again: the Messiah of the Old Testament was to have a wondrous union of natures, offices and destinies, which was mysterious to the Old Testament saints, and absurd to modern Jews; yet was wonderfully realized in Jesus. He was to be God, (Ps. ii : 7; Is. ix : 6); yet man, (Is. ix : 6.) The history of Jesus, taken with His words, shows Him both human and divine. The Messiah was to be both priest and victim. (Ps. cx; Is. liii.) He was to be an outcast, (Is. liii,) and a king, (Ps. ii.) So was Jesus. He was to conquer all people, (Ps. xlv and lxxii : 110); yet, without violence. (Is. xlii : 3; Ps. xlv : 4.) He was to combine the greatest contrasts of humiliation and glory. These contrasts are so hard to satisfy in one Person (to all unbelieving Israel it seems impossible,) that when we find them meeting in Jesus, it causes a very strong evidence to arise, that He is the Mediator.

The doctrine of the constitution of Christ's person, is purely one of Revelation, and involves a mystery (1 Tim. iii : 16,) as great, perhaps, as that of the Trinity itself. But though inexplicable, it is not incredible. The nature of the scriptural argument by which this twofold nature in one person is established, is analogous to that establishing a Trinity in unity. The text nowhere defines the doctrine in one passage, as fully as we assert it. But our doctrine is a necessary deduction from three sets of Scriptural assertions. First. Jesus Christ was properly and literally a man. (See, e. g., Jno. i : 14; Gal. iv : 4; Jno. i : 51; Is. ix : 6; Heb. ii : 17; Matt. iv : 2; Luke ii : 40, 52; Matt. viii : 24; Mark xiii : 32; Jno. xi : 35; Matt. xxvi : 37, &c.) Second. Christ is also literally and properly divine. (See, e. g., Jno. i : 1; Rom. ix : v 1 John v : 20; Is. ix : 6; Phil. ii : 6; Col. ii : 9; Heb. i : 3; 1 Tim. iii : 16, &c.) Yet this Man-God is one and

the same ; in proof of which we need only allude to the fact, that in every text speaking of Him, oneness of person, and personal attributes, are either asserted or implied of Him. In many passages the same proposition asserts both natures in one person, (e. g., Jno. iii : 13 ; I Tim. iii : 16.)

To Socinians, and other errorists, these passages seem contradictory, because being unwilling to admit the "incarnate mystery," they insist on explaining away one class of them. The true explanation is, that both are true, because of the hypostatic union. By these means such seeming paradoxes are to be explained, as those in Mark xiii : 32, compared with John v : 20 ; Matt. xi : 27, &c. The first of these verses asserts that even the Son does not know the day and hour when the earth and heavens shall pass away. The others ascribe omniscience to Him. The explanation (and the only one) is that Christ in His human nature has a limited knowledge, and in His divine nature, an infinite knowledge.

The opinions of Gnostics are sufficiently narrated by Hill, (*loc cit.*) As they have no currency in modern times, I will content myself with briefly reminding you of the distinction between the other Gnostics and those called Docetai. Both parties concurred in regarding matter as the source of all moral evil. Hence, they could not consistently admit the resurrection and glorification, either of the saints or of Jesus' body. The Docetai, therefore, taught that Christ never had a literal human body ; but only a phantasm of one, on which the malice of His persecutors was spent in vain. The others taught that the Aion, who they supposed constituted Christ's superior nature, only inhabited temporarily in the man Jesus, a holy Jew constituted precisely as other human beings are ; and that, at the crucifixion, this Aion flew away to heaven, leaving the man Jesus to suffer alone.

The historical events attending the Nestorian controversy, and the personal merits of Nestorius, I shall not discuss. The system afterwards known as Nestorianism was apprehended by the Catholic Christians, as by no means a trivial one, or a mere logomachy about the *θεοτοκος*. The true teacher of the doctrinal system was rather Theodore of Mopuestia, (a teacher of Nestorius) than the latter prelate. In his hands, it appears to be a development of Pelagianism, which it succeeded in date, and an application to the constitution of Christ's person of the erroneous doctrines of man's native innocence. Theodore set out from opposition to Apollinaris, who taught that the divine Reason in Christ substituted a rational human nature, leaving Christ only a material and animal nature on the human side. According to Theodore, Christ is a sort of impersonated symbol of mankind, first as striving successfully against trial, and second, as rewarded with

The Nestorian view.

Gnostic Theory of Christ's Person.

glory for this struggle. He supposed Christ the Man to exercise a self-determining power of will, which, he taught, is necessary to moral merit in any man. Christ, the man, then, began His human career, with the Word associated and strengthening His human nature. As Christ the man resisted trial and exhibited His devotion to duty in the exercise of His self-determination, He was rewarded by more full and intimate communications of divine indwelling, until His final act of devotion was rewarded with an ascension, and full communication of the Godhead. The process in each gracious soul offers an humble parallel. The indwelling of God the Word in Jesus, is not generically unlike that of the Holy Ghost in a saint: but only closer and stronger in degree. There are, indeed, three grades of this one kind of union, first, that of the Holy Ghost, in sanctification; second, that of the same person, in inspiration; third, that of the Word in Christ. And the Nestorians preferred rather to speak of the last, as a *συνάφεια* than a *ένωσις*, the preferred term of Cyril.

This view seemed to involve two Pelagian errors; first, that grace is bestowed as the reward of man's right exercise of moral powers, (in his own self-determined will,) instead of being the gratuitous cause thereof; and second, that inasmuch as the human purity of the man Jesus went before, and procured the divine indwelling, it is naturally possible for any other man to be perfect, in advance of grace. Again, from the separation of the nexus between the two natures in Christ, there seemed to the Catholics to be a necessary obscuring of the communication of attributes; so that Christ's sacrifice would no longer be divine and meritorious enough to cover infinite guilt. And thus would be lost the fundamental ground of His substitution for us. The whole scheme goes rather to make Christ incarnate rather a symbolical exemplar of the work of God in a believer, than the proper redeeming purchase and Agent thereof. Its tendencies, then, are Socinian.

The Alexandrine theologians generally leaned the other way. Cyril was fond of quoting from the great Athanasius; that while "he allowed Christ was the Son of God, and God, according to the spirit, but son of man, according to the flesh; but not two natures and one son; the one to be worshipped and the other not; but one nature of God the Word incarnated, and to be worshipped by single worship along with His flesh." They loved to assert the *ένωσις* (unification) of the natures, rather than the *συνάφεια* (or conjunction,) of Theodore. They preferred to conceive of Christ as so clothing Himself with human nature, as to assimilate it, by a species of subsumption, with His divinity. Hence the error of Eutyches was prepared; that while the mediatorial person was constituted from two natures, it existed

Doctrinal Consequences.

only in one, the divine. This error is as fatal to a proper conception of Christ's mediatorial work, as the Nestorian. By really destroying the humanity in Christ, from the moment of His birth, it gives us a Redeemer who has no true community of nature with us; and so, does not render a human obedience, nor pay the human penalty in our room and stead. The creed of Chalcedon, intermediate between these two extremes, is undoubtedly the scriptural one, as it has been adopted by all orthodox churches, ancient and modern, and is the basis of the propositions of the Westminster Assembly on this point. You have these symbols within your reach; and I shall not here repeat them.

For Orthodox creed of Chalcedon, see Mosheim, vol. i, p. 366. For our own, see Confession of Faith, Orthodox Views. ch. 8, § 2. This doctrine, however inexplicable, is not incredible; because it is no more mysterious than the union of two substances, spirit and body, into one human person, in ourselves. Yet, who is not conscious of his own personality? That the infinite Creator should assume a particular relation to one special part of His creation, the man Jesus, is not impossible, seeing He bears intimate relations (e. g., as providential upholder,) to all the rest. That an infinite spirit should enter into personal union with a man, is surely less mysterious than that a finite spirit should constitute a personal union with a body; because the infinite and almighty possesses, so to speak, more flexibility to enter into such union; and because the intimate union of spirit to spirit, is less mysterious than that of spirit with body. (A perfect analogy is not asserted.)

This Hypostatic union is the cornerstone of our redemption. The whole adaptation of the Mediatorial person to its work depends on it, as will be shown in the discussion of heads 5th, 6th. The general result of the Hypostatic union is stated well in the Confession of Faith, Ch. 8, § 7, last part. This is that *κοινωνία ιδιωμάτων* which we hold, in common with the early Fathers, repudiating the Lutheran idea of the attributes of Divinity being literally conferred on the humanity; which is absurd and impossible. Apt instances of this *κοινωνία* may be seen in John iii: 13; Acts xiii: 15, xx: 28, xvii: 31; Mark ii: 10; Gal. iv: 4; and Rom. i: 17, or iii: 21; 1 Cor. ii: 8. Hence, it is, that Mediatorial acts performed in virtue of either nature, have all the dignity or worth belonging to the Mediatorial person as made up of both natures. Socinians do, indeed, object: that inasmuch as only the creature could, in the nature of things, be subjected to the law, and to penalty, the active and passive obedience of Christ have, after all, only a creature worth; and it is a mere legal fiction, to consider them as possessed of the infinite worth of a divine nature, since the divine nature did not especially render

Hypostatic Union  
ground of the Efficacy  
of Christ's work.  
Socinian objection  
quashed.

them. The answer is: The person possessed of a divine nature, rendered them. If the Socinian would honestly admit the personal union as a thing which (though inscrutable) is real and literal, his objection would be relinquished. For then, many analogies of human persons (not perfect indeed, applicable fairly) would show that this *κοινωνία* is not unnatural even. We shall see that the common sense and conscience of men always estimate the acts and sufferings of a united person (constituted of two natures) according to the dignity of the higher nature, to whichever of them those acts or sufferings may specially belong; e. g. There are many bodily affections, as appetite, pain, which we characterize as distinctively corporeal; and yet, had not our bodies souls in them, these affections could have no place. Why then is it incredible, that the divine substance in the Medatorial person should be the ground of a peculiar value in the human sufferings of that person; though in strictness of speech, the divine could not be the seat of the suffering? Again, corporeal sufferings of martyrs have a moral value, which can only be attributed to the fact that those suffering men were not brutes, but spiritual and moral beings; while yet the soul may have been unconscious of the pangs, through spiritual joy, or other cause. I argue, also, from the fact, that moral character is given to merely physical acts of men, because of the character of the volition prompting those acts. Now, I pray, did not the will of the *Λόγος* prompt all the acts of active and passive obedience performed by the human nature? If when my bones and muscles in my arm go through identically the same functions, with the same stick, to beat a dangerous dog, and to beat my friend, one physical act has the spiritual character of lawfulness and the other physically identical act has the spiritual character of sinfulness, because of the concern of my volition in them, why should it be thought a thing incredible, that the human sufferings of Christ should have a divine character, when prompted by the volition of the divine nature in His person? And is not the bodily pain of a man more important than that of a dog? It is enough, however, to show that the infinite dignity of Christ's divine nature is, in Scripture, given as ground of the infinite value of that work. See Heb. ix : 13, 14, vii : 16, 24; John iii : 16; 1 Pet. i : 18, 19; Ps. xl : 6; Heb. x : 5—14.

4. The old doctrine of the Reformed Churches asserted not only the actual sinlessness, which none but violent infidels impugn, but the impeccability of our Redeemer. In recent days, some of whom better things should have been expected, deny the latter. They concede to the God-man the *posse non peccare*: but deny to Him, or at least to the humanity, the *non posse peccare*. Their plea is in substance, that a being must be peccable in order to experience temptation, to be meritorious for resisting it, and to be an exemplar and encouragement

to us, who are tempted. Thus argue Ullman, Farrar, the author of "Ecce Deus," Dr. Schaff, and even Dr. Hodge; while Dr. Dorner, in his "History of Protestant Theol.," revives the Nestorian and Pelagian doctrine, of a meritorious growth or progress of Christ's humanity from peccability to impeccability, by virtue of the holy use of His initial contingency and selfdetermination of will.

Now, none will say that the second Person, as eternal Word, was, or is peccable. It would seem then, that the trait can only be asserted of the humanity. But, 1st, It is the unanimous testimony of the Apostles, as it is the creed of the Church, that the human nature never had its separate personality. It never existed, and never will exist for an instant, save in personal union with the Word. Hence, (a.) Since only a Person can sin, the question is irrelevant; and (b.) Since the humanity never was, in fact, alone, the question whether, if alone, it would not have been peccable, like Adam, is idle. Second: It is impossible that the person constituted in union with the eternal and immutable Word, can sin; for this union is an absolute shield to the lower nature, against error. In the God-man "dwells the fullness of the God-head bodily." Col. ii: 9; So. i: 19. Third, this lower nature, upon its union with the Word, was imbued with the full influences of the Holy Ghost. Ps. xlv: 7; Isaiah xi: 2, 3; lxi: 1, 3; Luke iv: 21; and iv: 1; Jno. i: 32; iii: 34. Fourth, Christ seems to assert his own impeccability. Jno. xiv: 30. "Satan cometh and hath nothing in me." So Paul, 2 Cor. v: 21, Christ "knew no sin;" and in Heb. xiii: 8. "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day and forever." Jno. x: 36. "The Father hath sanctified and sent Him in the world." Fifth: If this endowment of Christ's person rose no higher than a *posse non peccare*, it seems obvious that there was a possibility of the failure of God's whole counsel of redemption. For, as all agree, a sinning sacrifice and intercessor could redeem no one. There must have been then, at least a decretive necessity, that all his actions should be infallibly holy.

The pretext for imputing peccability to the Redeemer has been explained: it only remains to prove it groundless. He was certainly subjected to temptation, and was, in a sense, thus qualified to be a perfect example to and sympathizer with us, in our militant state. But this consists with his impeccability. These writers seem to think that if, in the hitherto sinless will of Jesus, there had been no contingency and self-determination when He came to be tempted, He could have had no actual realization of spiritual assaults, and no victory. Does not this amount to teaching that a rudiment at least of "concupiscence" in Him was necessary to this victory and merit. Then it would follow that we shall hold, with Pelagius, that concupiscence is not sin *per se*; for that cannot be sin *per se*, which is essential to

right action, under a given condition assigned the responsible agent by God's own providence.

In fact, the supposed stress of our opponents' plea is dissolved, when we make the obvious distinction between the act of intellection of the natural desirableness seen in an object, and a spontaneous appetency for it apprehended as unlawful. It is the latter which is the sin of concupiscence. The former is likely to take place in any intellect, simply as a function of intelligence, just in proportion to the extent of its cognitive power, and is most certain to take place, as a simple function of intelligence, as to all possible objects, in the infinite mind of the holy God! So far as intellectual conception goes, none conceive so accurately as God, just how "the pleasures of sin which are but for a season," appear to a fallible creature's mind. To say that God feels the sin of "concupiscence" would be blasphemy. This distinction shows us how an impeccable being may be tempted. While the human will of Jesus was rendered absolutely incapable of concupiscence by the indwelling of the Godhead and its own native endowment; He could doubtless represent to Himself mentally precisely how a sinful object affects both mind and heart of His imperfect people. Does not this fit Him to feel for and to succor them? And is His victory over temptation the less meritorious, because it is complete? Let me explain. We will suppose that the idea of a forbidden object is suggested (possibly by an evil spirit,) before the intellect of a Christian. One of two things may happen. By the force of indwelling sin the presence of that idea in conception may result in some conscious glow of appetency towards the object; but the sanctified conscience is watchful and strong enough to quench this heat before it flames up into a wrong volition. This perhaps is the usual case with Christians. And there, our opponents would exclaim, is the wholesome self-discipline! There is the creditable and ennobling warfare against sin! Let us now suppose the other result; which, in the happier hours of eminent saints, doubtless follows sometimes: that when the tempting idea is presented in suggestion, the conscience is so prompt, and holy desires so pre-occupy the mind, that the thought is ejected before it even strikes the first spark of concupiscence; that the entire and immediate answer of the heart to it is negative. Is not this still more creditable than the former case? Surely! If we approved the man in the former case because the state of his soul's moral atmosphere was such, that the evil spark went out before it set fire to the stream of action; we should still more approve, in the latter case, where the atmosphere of the soul was such that the spark of evil was not lighted at all. Will any one say, that here, there was no temptation. This is as though one should say, there was no battle, because the victory was complete and the victor unscathed.

Those who make this difficulty about Christ's impeccability seem to discard another truth, which is a corner-stone of our system. This is the consistency of a real free agency with an entire certainty of the will. They argue that unless Jesus were free in his rejection of temptation, He would have wrought no moral victory. This is true. But they wish us to infer therefrom, that because His will was free, it must have been mutable. This deduction would be consistent only in a Pelagian. Every Calvinist knows that a holy will may be perfectly free, and yet determined with absolute certainty, to the right. Such is God's will. "He cannot lie." Yet He speaks truth freely. The sinner presents the counterpart case, when "his eyes are full of adultery, and he cannot cease from sin." Yet is this sinner free in continuing his course of sin and rejecting the monitions of duty. This case sufficiently explains, by contrast, the impeccability of Jesus. He has every natural faculty which, in Adam's case, was abused to the perpetration of his first sin. But they were infallibly regulated by, what Adam had not, a certain, yet most free, determination of His dispositions to holiness alone. It is useless to argue, whether Jesus could have sinned if He had chosen. It was infallibly certain that He would not choose to sin. This was the impeccability we hold.

The question, whether Christ performs the functions of Mediator in both natures is fundamental. Romanists limit them to the human nature, in order to make more plausible room for human mediators. They plead such passages as Phil. ii : 7, 8 ; 1 Tim. ii : 5, and the dialectical argument, that the divinity being the offended party, it is absurd to conceive of it as mediating between the offender and itself.

Now, it must be distinguished, that ever since the incarnation, the *Logos* may perform functions of incommunicable divinity, inalienable to Him as immutable; such as sitting on the throne of the universe and possessing incommunicable attributes; in which the humanity can no more have part than in that creative work, which Christ performed before His incarnation. So, likewise, the humanity performed functions, in which it is not necessary to suppose the *Logos* had any other concern than a general providential one; such as eating, sleeping, drinking. But these were not a part of the Mediatorship. We assert that, in all the Mediatorial acts proper, both natures *το πρόσωπον θεανθρώπου* act concurrently, according to their peculiar properties. This we prove, 1st, by the fact, that in Christ's priestly work, the divine nature operated and still operates, as well as the human. See 1 Cor. ii : 8 ; Heb. ix : 14 ; John x : 18. Even in this work of suffering and dying, see how essential the concurrent actions of the divine nature were! Else, there would have been none of the autocracy as to His own life, necessary for His vicarious work; nor would there

5. Does Christ mediate in both Natures ?

have been strength to bear an infinite penalty in one day. Only the Omniscient can intercede for all. Hence, we argue *a fortiori*, that if His divinity concurred in His priestly work, the part usually supposed most irrelevant to deity, much more does it concur in His prophetic and kingly. See Matt. xi : 27, xxviii : 18. 2d. If Christ does not perform His Mediatorial work in His divine nature as well as His human, He could not have been in any sense the Mediator of Old Testament saints; because their redemption was completed before He was incarnate. Did Romanists attend to the fact, that it is the very design and result of the Covenant of Grace, that the persons of the Trinity should act "economically," in their several offices of redemption, they would not have raised the inconsistent objection about the Godhead's propitiating the Godhead. The Son, having become man's Surety, now acts economically and officially for him, in his stead propitiating the Father, who officially represents the majesty of the offended Trinity. Besides, unless the Romanists will assert not only two wills, but these two in opposition, in the Mediatorial person, the divine will of God the Son must, on their scheme, have concerned itself with propitiating God; the same difficulty!

One remark applies to all His mediatorial functions also; that the will of both natures concurred in them.

The demands of Christ's mediatorial work required that Christ should be proper and very man. Mankind had fallen, and was conscience-struck, hostile, and fearful towards God. Hence it was desirable that the Daysman should appear in his nature as his brother in order to encourage confidence, to allure to a familiar approach, and quiet guilty fears. To such a being as sinful man, personal intercourse with God would have been intolerably dreadful; (Gen. iii : 8; Ex. xx : 19,) and even an angel would have appeared too terrible to his fears.

Again. The Bible assures us that one object gained by the incarnation of Christ, was fuller assurance of His sympathy, by His experimental acquaintance with all the woes of our fallen condition. (Heb. ii : 17, 18; iv : 15 to v : 2.) The experience of every Christian under trial of affliction, testifies to the strength of this reasoning by the consolation which Christ's true humanity gives Him. It is very true that the Son, as omniscient God, can and does figure to Himself conceptions of all possible human trials, just as accurate as experience itself; but His having experienced them in human nature enables our weak faith to grasp the consolation better.

Another purpose of God, in clothing our Redeemer with human nature, was to leave us a perfect human example. The importance and efficacy of teaching by example, need not be unfolded here. (See 1 Pet. ii : 21; Heb. xii : 2, &c.)

In the fourth place, Christ's incarnation was necessary, in

order to establish a proper basis for that legal union between Him and His elect, which should make Him bearer of their imputed guilt, and them partakers of His imputed righteousness and of His exaltation. (See 1 Cor. xv: 21.) It was necessary that man's sin should be punished in the nature of man, in order to render the substitution more natural and proper. (Rom. viii: 3.) Had the deity been united with some angelic, or other creature, the imputation of man's sin to that Person, and its punishment in that foreign nature would have appeared less reasonable. (See Heb. ii: 14-16.) So, likewise, the obedience rendered in another nature than man's, would not have been so reasonable a ground for raising man's race to a share in the Mediator's blessedness.

And this leads us to add, last, that a created nature was absolutely essential to the Mediator's two works, of obeying in man's stead, and suffering for his guilt. For the obedience, no other nature would have been so appropriate as man's. And none but a creature could come under law, assume a subject position, and work out an active righteousness. God is above law, being Himself the great law-giver. For the other vicarious work, suffering a penalty, not only a created, but a corporeal nature is necessary. Angels cannot feel bodily death, and brutes could not experience spiritual; but both are parts of the penalty of sin. The divine nature is impassible, and unchangeable in its blessedness. Hence, Heb. x: 5; ix: 22, &c.

It is of the highest importance to prove that the mediatorial offices could not be performed without the divine nature. (See Is. xlv: 22; Jer. xvii: 5-7, xxiii: 6.) Because this is one of the most overwhelming arguments against Arians and Socinians. We assert that a purpose to save elect men by a mediatorial plan, being supposed in God, the very necessities of the case required that this mediator should be very and proper God. But as this was substantially argued in Lect. xviii, when proving the divinity of the Holy Ghost and the Son, the student is referred to that place.

But the sixth question of our Syllabus raises a point in this direction, which requires fuller explanation. The scope of the Socinian system is to find a common religion, including the fewest possible essential elements. Hence, they like to represent, that virtuous Pagans may belong to this common religion, holding the doctrines of Natural Theology. The consequence is, that the Socinians, while speaking many handsome things of Jesus Christ as a messenger from God, still concur with other Deists and infidels, in depreciating the necessity of Revelation. They say that the Scriptures are valuable, but not essential. We are thus led again to the old question of the necessity of revelation.

Why the Mediator  
must be God.

6. Is Christ's Prophetic work essential, or, as Socinians say, only useful?

Let us not assert this on the usual partial grounds. The case is too often put by our friends as though the fall alone necessitated a revelation; the effects of sin in blinding the mind and conscience are too exclusively mentioned. Thus, there is an implied admission that a revelation is, in man's case, an exceptional expedient, caused by the failure of God's general plan. Thus, the objection is suggested, which Socinians and other enemies of inspiration have not failed to put in form; and which many of us are inclined perhaps to feel, as though the idea of a revelation were unnatural, and hence not probable. The cavil is, that the analogy of all creation discloses this plan: Our wise and good God, in creating each order of sentient beings, surrounded them with all the appointed conditions for their well-being, by the established course of nature. Having made fishes for the water, He made water for the fishes; the grass is for oxen, and the oxen for grass; the birds for the air, and the air for the birds. Every order, by living within the natural conditions provided for it, secures its appropriate end. But according to the orthodox, man, the noblest, the rational creature, cannot fulfil the ends of his being, immortal blessedness, by his natural means. A supernatural expedient must be found, against the general analogy; or else man's existence is a frightful failure. This, they urge, is unnatural, discreditable to God, and improbable.

Now I meet it by asserting that, to make a rational creature dependent on a revelation of God for His spiritual welfare, is not unnatural, or extraordinary: but is, for all spiritual creatures, the universal and strictly natural condition. It does not arise out of man's sin only; the truth holds as well of angels, and all other rational creatures, if there are others. We must remember that none originally had God in their debt, to assure their holiness and bliss; but were naturally under this relation, bound to obey Him perpetually; free from evil as long as they did so; but subject to His wrath whenever they sinned. Now holy creatures were not infallible, nor omniscient. Their wills were right and free, but not indefectible. Bound to an unending career of perfect obedience, they would have been to all eternity liable to mistake, and sin and death. Now, when a finite wisdom and rectitude are matched against an infinite series of duties to be done, of choices to be made, each naturally implying some possibility of a wrong choice, that possibility finally mounts up from a probability to a moral certainty, that all would some day fail. How, then, could an angel, or holy Adam, inherit immutable blessedness forever? Only by drawing direct guidance from the infallible, infinite Mind. Thus we see that the enjoyment of its appropriate revelation by each order, is the necessary condition of its well-being; a

Partial grounds of argument corrected.

Revelation necessary to Holy Creatures.

condition as natural, original, and universal as its own moral nature and obligations. If Gabriel had not his revelation he would not be an 'elect angel.' Do I mean a written document? Do I speak of parchment and ink? No; but of that which is the essence of a Revelation, a direct communication from the infinite Mind, to instruct the finite.

Thus we may, if we choose, admit the analogy which the Socinian claims, and find it wholly against him. Our Bible is not an exceptional providence; it is in strict accordance with God's method towards all reasonable creatures. If our race had none, this would be the fatal anomaly against us.

Revelation not Anomalous.