

# LECTURE XXVII.

## THE FALL, AND ORIGINAL SIN.

### SYLLABUS.

1. What is sin? Is guilt its essence, or adjunct?  
Conf. of Faith, ch. 6. Cat. Qu. 14. Turretin, Loc. ix, Qu. 1, 3. Knapp, § 73. Muller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," ch. 2, 3. Bp. Butler's Sermons, 11-14. Thornwell, Lect. 14, pp. 347, 389. Dr. Wm. Cunningham, Historical Theol., ch. 19, § 5.
2. What was Adam's first sin? How did it affect his own moral state and relations to God? How could a will prevalently unholy form its first unholy volition?  
Turretin, Loc. xi, Qu. 6, 7, 8. Hill, bk. iv, ch. 1. Dick, Lect. 47. Knapp, § 85. Watson, ch. 18, § 11. Witsius, bk. 1, ch. 8, § 1, 13. Thornwell, Lect. 10, pp. 240-247. Butler's Analogy. Muller, Chr. Doc. of Sin, bk. ii.
3. Who was the tempter? What the sentence on him?  
Turretin, Loc. ix, Qu. 7, § 9, &c. Dick, Lect. 44. Hill and Watson as above.
4. What were the effects of Adam's fall on his posterity, (a) according to the Pelagian theory; (b) the lower Arminian theory; (c) the Wesleyan; and (d) the Calvinistic theory?  
Augustine, Vol. ii, Ep. 899, c., Vol. viii. *De Natura et Gratia*, and *Libri Duo adv. Pelagius et Celestius*. Hill as above. Turretin, Loc. ix, Qu. 9, 10. Dick, Lect. 46, 47. Cunningham, Hist. Theol., ch. 10, § 12, and ch. 19, § 3. Thornwell, Lect. 13. Whithy's Five Points. Knapp, § 79, 10. Watson's Theol. Inst., ch. 18, § 3, 4. Wesley on Original Sin.
5. Are the souls of Adam's posterity directly created or generated? And how is depravity propagated in them?  
Turretin, Loc. ix, Qu. 12, and Loc. v, Qu. 13. Baird's Elohim Revealed, ch. 11. Sampson on Hebrews, ch. 12, v. 9. Literary and Evangel. Magazine, of Dr. Jno. H. Rice, vol. iv. p. 285, &c. Watson, ch. 18, § 4. Augustine, *De Origine Animarum*.

WE have now reached, in our inquiries, the disastrous place, where sin first entered our race. Let us therefore pause, and ascertain clearly what is its nature.

The most characteristic Hebrew word for it is חַטָּאת,

Sin what? which has the rudimental idea of missing the aim. The Greek, *ἁμαρτία* is strikingly similar, expressing nearly the same idea, of failure of designed conjunction. The Latin, *peccatum* is supposed by some to be a modification of *peccatum*, brutishness, and by others, of *pellucatum*, moral adultery. These words suggest, what will be found true upon analysis, that the common abstract element of all sins is a privative one, lack of conformity to a standard. If this is so, then farther, sin can only be understood, when viewed as the antithesis to that standard, a law of right, and to the righteousness which is conformed thereto. The student may be reminded here, in passing, of that speculation which some of the Reformed divines borrowed from the Latin Scholastics, by which they made sin out a negation. Their reason seemed to be mainly this: That God, as universal First Cause, must be the agent of all that has entity; and so, all entities must be *per se* good. Hence sin, which is evil, must be no entity, a

negation. This doctrine received such applications as this: That even in adultery or murder, the action *per se*, so far as it is action only, is good; the negative moral quality is the evil. We see here, the mint, from which was coined that dangerous distinction, by which the same divines sought to defend God's efficacious *præcursor* in sinful acts of creatures. (See Lect. XXXV, end.) To a plain mind, the escape from this confusion is easy. Sins are, indeed, not entities, save as they are acts or states of creatures, who are personal entities. When we speak of sins in the abstract, if we mean anything, we speak of the quality common to the concrete acts, which we literally call sins: the quality of sinfulness. What now, is a quality, abstracted from all the entities which it qualifies? Not necessarily a negation, but a mere abstraction. As to the quibble, that God is the agent of all that has entity; we reply: Predicate the real free-agency of the sinning creature; and we shall have no philosophic trouble about that truth of common sense, that the actor is the agent of his own sinful act; and not God.

Some have supposed that the just distinction between "sins of commission and omission" must overthrow the definition of sinfulness as always a privative quality. This, say they, may be true of sins of omission; but then it cannot be true of sins of commission, which are positive. This is invalid, for the basis of that distinction is different. Both classes of sins are equally privative, and equally real. The difference is, that sins of commission are breaches of prohibitory commands, and sins of omission of affirmative precepts. In either case, the sinfulness arises out of evil motive, and this is, in either case, positive; while its common quality is discrepancy from the standard of right. And now, if any other proof of our definition is needed, than its consistency, we find it in 1 Jno. iii : 4, where the Apostle gives this as his exact definition of sin; arguing against a possible Antinomian tendency to excuse sins in believers, as venial, that all sin is lawless; *Ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*—"The sin is the discrepancy from law." (Scil. νόμος θεοῦ.)

Dr. Julius Müller, in his important work, "The Christian Doctrine of Sin," revives, in a new form, the erroneous doctrine of Jon. Edwards, resolving sin into selfishness. Seizing upon the declaration of our Savior, that love to God is the first and great command, on which the whole law depends, he resorts to the admitted fact, that sin must be the antithesis of righteousness; and concludes that the former must therefore be love of self. Why may we not conclude, from the same process, that since all duty is included in the love of God, all sin will be included in hatred of God? (instead of love of self.) This gives us a more plausibly exact antithesis.

But more seriously, the student is referred to the remarks in Lecture ix, upon Edwards' theory, and to Bp. Butler's Sermons. We now add, with especial reference to Müller's spec-

ulation, these points of objection. If all sin is resolved into self-love as its essence, then is not all self-love sinful? If he answers, No, then I reply: So there is a sinful, and a righteous self-love? He must say, Yes. Then, I demand that he shall give me the differentiating element in the sinful self-love, which makes it, unlike the other self-love, morally evil. Will he give me self-love for this differentiating element? This is but moving in a circle. Again: it would follow, that if some self-love is lawful, and yet self-love is the essence of all sin, it must become sin, by becoming too great; and thus sin and holiness would differ only in degree! Once more, if this theory is to be carried out with any consistency, it must teach, that the act which is intended by me to promote my own well-being, can only be virtuous provided I sincerely aim at that well-being (which happens to be my own) from motives purely impersonal and disinterested. In other words, to do any act aright, promotive of my own welfare, I must do it, not at all for the sake of myself, but exclusively for the sake of God and my fellows, as they are interested in my welfare. We will not dwell on the question, whether any man ever seeks his own good from so sublimated a motive; we only point to this resultant absurdity; all one's fellows, acting in this style of pure disinterestedness, are directly seeking his welfare; and in this is their virtue. How can it be then, that it is always sinful for him to seek that same end?

Does anyone ask, into what common type all sin may be resolved? We answer: Into that of sin. We have no other definition than this: Sin is sin. Or sin is the opposite of holiness; sin is discrepancy from an absolutely holy law. If this is so, and if the idea of moral good is one of ultimate simplicity, and so, incapable of definition in simpler terms, we are to accept the same view as to sin. All attempts to reduce it to some simpler element, as they have been prompted either by an affectation of over-profundity, or by an over-weening desire to unify the functions of man's soul, have also resulted in confusion and error.

The next question concerning the nature of sin would be, whether it is limited to acts of will, or includes also states of moral propensity and habit. The answer given by the Calvinist is familiar to you. "Sin is not being, or not doing what God requires." Not only, then, are intentional acts of will contrary to law, sinful; but also the native disposition to these acts, and the desires to commit them not yet formed into volitions. This raises the oft mooted question, whether "concupiscence is sin?" This question has been already debated from a rational point of view, in Lect. xii, § 1, and the cognate one, in the xxvi, § 2. It is only necessary now, to add a summary of the Scriptural argument. The Bible, in many places applies moral terms to the abiding habitudes of the soul, both

acquired and native. See Ps. li : 5 ; lviii : 3 ; Matt. xii : 35, or 33 ; vii : 17. James i : 15 says : "Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin." Rome, indeed, quotes this text as implying that concupiscence is not itself sin ; for it must "conceive," must be developed into another form, in order to become sin. But James here evidently uses the word sin in the sense of sins of act. So he uses "death," the mature result of "sin when it is finished," in the sense of the final spiritual death, or the second death ; for many other Scriptures assure us that a state of sin is a state of death. He would rather teach us, in this text, that concupiscence and actual sin, being mother and daughter, are too closely related not to have the same moral nature. But the most conclusive text is the 10th Commandment. See this expounded by Paul, Rom. vii : 7. He had not known coveting, except the law had said, "Thou shalt not covet." And it was by this law, that he was made to know sin. How could he more expressly name concupiscence as sin ?

There is, however, a distinction, which is needed here, for the consistent establishment of this doctrine. coveting is often defined as "desiring the possession of another." Now, it is clear, that there are such desires, and such thoughts, which are not the sin of concupiscence. The intellectual apprehension of natural good, not possessed by me, but attainable, cannot be sinful always ; for if so, I could never put forth a normal and rational effort for any good. So a certain desire for such good must also be innocent ; else I could never have a lawful motive for effort, tending to the advancement of my own welfare. A very practical instance may evince this. A godly minister needs a useful horse. He sees his neighbour possessing the horse which suits his purposes. He righteously offers, and endeavors, to buy him. But, as a reasonable free agent, he could not have proposed to part with a valuable consideration for this horse, unless he had had, first, an intellectual judgment of the animal's fitness for his uses ; and second, a desire to enjoy its utility. But he had these sentiments while the horse was still another man's ? Is it, then necessary for one to break the 10th Commandment in order to effect an equitable horse-trade ? The answer is : These sentiments in the good man have not yet reached the grade of evil concupiscence. This sinful affection then, is not merely desire for attainable good ; but desire for an attainment conditioned wrongfully ; desire still harboured—though not matured into a purpose of will—while seen in the conscience to be thus unlawfully conditioned. Thus, for instance, the moment this good man's desire to possess the useful animal verged into a craving to gain it unfairly, as by payment in spurious money, or untruthful depreciation of its market value, that moment concupiscence was born. This distinction removes all just objections to the

Scripture teaching. It is useful also, in explaining how an impeccable Redeemer could be "tempted of the devil," and yet wholly without sin. Had this holy soul been absolutely impervious to even the intellectual apprehension of attainable good, and to the natural sentiment arising on that apprehension, he would not have been susceptible of temptation. But he had these normal traits. Hence, he could be tempted, and yet feel not the first pulse of evil concupiscence..

What Turretin calls potential guilt is the intrinsic moral ill-desert of an act or state. This is of the essence of the sin : it is indeed an inseparable part of its sinfulness. Actual guilt is obligation to punishment. This is the established technical sense of the word among theologians. Guilt, thus defined, is obviously not of the essence of sin ; but is a relation, viz., to the penal sanction of law. For if we suppose no penal sanction attached to the disregard of moral relations, guilt would not exist, though there were sin. This distinction will be found important.

The first sin of our first father is found described in Gen. iii : 1—7, in words which are familiar to every one. This narrative has evidently some of that picturesque character appropriate to the primeval age, and caused by the scarcity of abstract and definite terms in their language. But it is an obvious abuse to treat it as a mere allegory, representing under a figure man's self-depravation and gradual change : for the passages preceeding and following it are evidently plain narrative, as is proved by a hundred references. Moreover, the transactions of this very passage are twice referred to as literal (2 Cor. xi : 3 ; 1 Tim. ii : 14), and the events are given as the explanation of the peculiar chastisement allotted to the daughters of Eve.

The sin of Adam consisted essentially, not in his bodily act, of course ; but in his intentions. Popish theologians usually say that the first element of the sin of his heart was pride, as being awakened by the taunting reference of the Serpent to his dependence and subjection, and as being not unnatural in so exalted a being. The Protestants, with Turretin, usually say it was unbelief ; because pride could not be naturally suggested to the creature's soul, unless unbelief had gone before to obliterate his recollection of his proper relations to an infinite God ; because belief of the mind usually dictates feeling and action in the will ; because the temptation seems first aimed (Gen. iii : 1) to produce unbelief, through the creature's heedlessness ; and because the initial element of error must have been in the understanding, the will being hitherto holy.

How a holy will could come to have an unholy volition at first, is a most difficult inquiry. And it is much harder as to the first sin of Satan, than

If Volitions are certainly Determined,

How could a Holy Being have his First Wrong Volition? of Adam, because the angel, hitherto perfect, had no tempter to mislead him, and had not even the bodily appetites for natural good which in Adam were so easily perverted into concupiscence. Concupiscence cannot be supposed to have been the cause, pre-existing before sin; because concupiscence is sin, and needs itself to be accounted for in a holy heart. Man's, or Satan's, mutability cannot be the efficient cause, being only a condition *sine qua non*. Nor is it any solution to say with Turretin, the proper cause was a free will perverted voluntarily. Truly; but how came a right will to pervert itself while yet right? And here, let me say, is far the most plausible objection against the certainty of the will, which Arminians, &c., might urge far more cunningly than (to my surprise) they do. If the evil dispositions of a fallen sinner so determine his volitions as to ensure that he will not choose spiritual good, why did not the holy dispositions of Adam and Satan ensure that they would never have a volition spiritually evil? And if they somehow chose sin, contrary to their prevalent bent, why may not depraved man sometime choose good?

The mystery cannot be fully solved how the first evil choice could voluntarily arise in a holy soul; but we can clearly prove that it is no sound reasoning from the certainty of a depraved will to that of a holy finite will. First: a finite creature can only be indefectible through the perpetual indwelling and superintendence of infinite wisdom and grace, guarding the finite and fallible attention of the soul against sin. This was righteously withheld from Satan and Adam. Second: while righteousness is a positive attribute, incipient sin is a privative trait of human conduct. The mere absence of an element of active regard for God's will, constitutes a disposition or volition wrong. Now, while the positive requires a positive cause, it is not therefore inferrible that the negative equally demands a positive cause. To make a candle burn, it must be lighted; to make it go out, it need only be let alone. The most probable account of the way sin entered a holy breast first, is this: An object was apprehended as in its mere nature desirable; not yet as unlawful. So far there is no sin. But as the soul, finite and fallible in its attention, permitted an overweening apprehension and desire of its natural adaptation to confer pleasure, to override the feeling of its unlawfulness, concupiscence was developed. And the element which first caused the mere innocent sense of the natural goodness of the object to pass into evil concupiscence, was privative, viz., the failure to consider and prefer God's will as the superior good to mere natural good. Thus natural desire passed into sinful selfishness, which is the root of all evil. So that we have only the privative element to account for. When we assert the certainty of ungodly choice in an

Answer.

evil will, we only assert that a state of volition whose moral quality is a defect, a negation, cannot become the cause of a positive righteousness. When we assert the mutability of a holy will in a finite creature, we only say that the positive element of righteousness of disposition may, in the shape of defect, admit the negative, not being infinite. So that the cases are not parallel: and the result, though mysterious, is not impossible. To make a candle positively give light, it must be lighted; to cause it to sink into darkness, it is only necessary to let it alone: its length being limited, it burns out.

Adam's fall resulted in two changes, moral and physical.

Effects of Sin in Adam—Self-Depravation. The latter was brought on him by God's providence, cursing the earth for his sake, and thus entailing on him a life of toil and infirmities, ending in bodily death. The former was more immediately the natural and necessary result of his own conduct; because we can conceive of God as interposing actively to punish sin, but we cannot conceive of Him as interposing to produce it. It has been supposed very unreasonable that one act, momentary, the breach of an unimportant, positive precept, should thus revolutionize a man's moral habitudes and principles, destroying his original righteousness, and making him a depraved being. One act, they say, cannot form a habit. We will not answer this, by saying, with Turretin, that the act virtually broke each precept of the decalogue; or that it was a "universal sin;" nor even by pleading that it was an aggravated and great sin. Doubtless it was a great sin; because it violated the divine authority most distinctly and pointedly declared; because it did it for small temptation; because it was a sin against great motives, privileges, and restraints. There is also much justice in Turretin's other remarks, that by this clear, fully declared sin, the chief end of the creature was changed from God to self; and the chief end controls the whole stream of moral action directed to it; that the authority on which all godliness reposes, was broken in breaking this one command; that shame and remorse were inevitably born in the soul; that communion with God was severed. But this terrible fact, that any sin is mortal to the spiritual life of the soul, may profitably be farther illustrated.

Note, that God's perfections necessitate that He shall be the righteous enemy and punisher of transgression. Man, as a moral and intelligent being, must have conscience and moral emotions. One inevitable effect of the first sin, then, must be that God is made righteously angry, and will feel the prompting to just punishment. (Else not a holy ruler!) Hence, He must at once withdraw His favour and communion (there being no Mediator to satisfy His justice.) Another inevitable effect must be, the birth of remorse in the creature. The hitherto healthy

How Accounted for by One Sin?

action of conscience must ensure this. This remorse must be attended with an apprehension of God's anger, and fear of His punishment. But human nature always reciprocates, by a sort of sympathy, the hostility of which it knows itself the object. How many a man has learned to hate an inoffensive neighbour, because he knows that he has given that neighbour good cause to hate him? But this hostility is hostility to God for doing what He ought; it is hostility to righteousness! So that, in the first clearly pronounced sin, these elements of corruption and separation from God are necessarily contained in germ. But God is the model of excellence, and fountain of grace. See how fully these results are illustrated in Adam and Eve. Gen. iii: 8, &c. Next; every moral act has some tendency to foster the propensity which it indulges. Do you say it must be a very slight strength produced by one act; a very light bond of habit, consisting of one strand! Not always. But the scale, if slightly turned, is turned: the downhill career is begun, by at least one step, and the increase of momentum will surely occur, though gradually. Inordinate self-love has now become a principle of action, and it will go on to assert its dominion. Last, we must consider the effects of physical evil on a heart thus in incipient perversion; for God's justice must prompt Him to inflict the bodily evils due to the sin. Desire of happiness is instinctive; when the joys of innocence are lost, an indemnification and substitute will be sought in carnal pleasures. Misery develops the malignant passions of envy, petulance, impatience, selfishness, revenge. And nothing is more depraving than despair. See Jer. ii: 25; xviii: 12.

What a terrible evil, then, is Sin! Thus the sentence, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," carried its own execution. Sin, of itself, kills the spiritual life of the soul.

The true tempter of Adam and Eve was undoubtedly the evil angel Satan, although it is not expressly said so in the narrative. A serpent has no speech, still less has it understanding to comprehend man's moral relations and interests, and that refined spiritual malice which would plan the ruin of the soul. It is said, "the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field," as though this natural superiority of animal instincts were what enabled it to do the work. A moment's thought, however, must convince us that there is a deeper meaning. Moses, speaking for the time as the mere historian, describes events as they appeared to Eve. The well known cunning of the serpent adapted it better for Satan's use, and enabled him to conceal himself under it with less chance of detection. The grounds for regarding Satan as the true agent are the obvious allusions of Scripture. See Jno. viii: 44; 2 Cor. xi: 3; 1 Thess. iii: 5; 1 Jno. iii: 8; Rev. xii: 9, and xx: 2. The doom of the serpent is also allusively applied to Christ's triumph over Satan. Col. ii: 15; Rom. xvi: 20;

Heb. ii: 14; Is. lxv: 25. It is also stated in confirmation, by Dr. Hill, that this was the traditionary interpretation of the Jews, as is indicated, for instance, in Wis. ii: 23, 24; Eccclus. xxv: 24, and the Chaldee paraphrast on Job xx: 4, 6. Turretin supposes that God's providence permitted the employment of an animal as the instrument of Satan's temptation, in order that mankind might have before them a visible commemoration of their sin and fall.

I propose to state the Pelagian theory with some degree of fulness, and more methodically than it would perhaps be found stated in the writings of its own early advocates, in order to unfold to the student the *nexus* between original sin and the whole plan of redemption. The Pelagian believes that Adam's fall did not directly affect his posterity at all. Infants are born in the same state in which Adam was created, one of innocence, but not of positive righteousness. There was no federal transaction, and no imputation, which is, in every case, incompatible with justice. There is no propagation of hereditary depravity, which would imply the generation of souls *ex traduce*, which they reject. Man's will is not only free from coaction, but from moral certainty, i. e., his volitions are not only free, but not decisively caused, otherwise he would not be a free agent.

(b.) If this is so, whence the universal actual transgression of adult man? Pelagianism answers, from concupiscence, which exists in all, as in Adam before his sin, and is not sin of itself, and from general evil example.

(c.) If man has no moral character, and no guilt prior to intelligent choice, whence death and suffering among those who have not sinned? They are obliged to answer: These natural evils are not penal, and would have befallen Adam had he not sinned. They are the natural limitations of humanity, just as irrationality is of beasts, and no more imply guilt as their necessary cause.

(d.) Those, then, who die in infancy, have nothing from which they need to be redeemed. Why then baptized? Pelagianism answered, those who die in infancy are redeemed from nothing. If they die unbaptized, they would go to a state called Paradise, the state of natural good, proceeding from natural innocence, to which innocent Pagans go. But baptism would interest them in Christ's gracious purchase, and thus they would inherit, should they die in infancy, a more positive and assured state of blessedness, called the Kingdom of Heaven.

(e.) All men being born innocent, and with equilibrium of will, it is both physically and morally possible that any man might act a holy character, and attain Paradise, or "eternal life," without any gospel grace whatever. The chances may be bad, on account of unfavourable example, and temptation, amidst which the experiment has to be made. But there have

been cases, both under the revealed law, as Enoch, Job, Abel, Noah (who had no *protevangelium*); and among Pagans, as Numa, Aristides, Socrates; and there may be such cases again. Nor would God be just to punish man for coming short of perfection unless this were so.

(f.) Now, as to the theory of redemption: As there can be no imputation of Adam's guilt to his people, so neither could there be of Christ's people's guilt to Him, or of His righteousness to them. But sins are forgiven by the mercy of God in Christ (without penal satisfaction for them), on the condition of trust, repentance, and reformation. The title of the believer to a complete justification must then be his own obedience, and that a sinless one. But this is not so exalted an attainment as Calvinists now regard it. Concupiscence is not sin. Moral quality attaches only to actual volitions, not to states of feeling prompting thereto; and hence, if an act be formally right, it is wholly right; nor does a mixture of selfish and unselfish motives in it make it imperfectly moral; for volition is necessarily a thing decisive and entire. Hence, a prevalent, uniform obedience is a perfect one; and none less will justify, because justification is by works, and the law is perfect. But as equilibrium of will is essential to responsibility, any shortcoming which is morally necessitated, by infirmity of nature, or ignorance, thoughtlessness, or overwhelming gust of temptation, contrary to the soul's prevalent bent, is no sin at all. See here, the germ of the Wesleyan's doctrine of sinless perfection, and of the Jesuit theory of morals.

Since a concreated righteousness would be no righteousness, not being chosen at first, so neither would a righteousness wrought by a supernatural regeneration. The only gracious influences possible are those of co-operative grace, or moral suasion. Man's regeneration is simply his own change of purpose, as to sin and holiness, influenced by motives. Hence, faith and repentance are both natural exercises.

(g.) The continuance of a soul in a state of justification is of course contingent. A grace which would morally necessitate the will to continued holy choices, would deprive it of its free agency.

(h.) God's purpose of election, therefore, while from eternity, as is shown by His infinite and immutable wisdom, knowledge and power, is conditioned on His foresight of the way men would improve their free will. He elected those He foresaw would persevere in good.

The whole is a consistent and well-knit system of error, proceeding from its *πρωτότων ψεύδους*.

Among those who pass under the general term, Arminians, two different schemes have been advanced; one represented by Whitby, the other by Wesley and his Church. The former admit

Arminian Theories.  
1. Lower.

that Adam and his race were both much injured by the fall. He has not indeed lost his equilibrium of will for spiritual good, but he has become greatly alienated from God, has fallen under the penal curse of physical evil and death, has become more animal, so that concupiscence is greatly exasperated, and is more prone to break out into actual transgression. This is greatly increased by the miseries, fear, remorse, and vexation of his mortal state, which tend to drive him away from God, and to whet the envious, sensual and discontented emotions. These influences, together with constant evil example, are the solution of the fact, that all men become practically sinners. This is the state to which Adam reduced himself; and his posterity share it, not in virtue of any federal relation, or imputation of Adam's guilt, but of that universal, physical law, that like must generate like. In that sense, man is born a ruined creature.

The Wesleyans, however, begin by admitting all that a Moderate Calvinist would ask, as to Adam's loss of original righteousness in the Fall, bondage under evil desires, and total depravity. While they misinterpret, and then reject the question between mediate and immediate imputation, they retain the orthodox idea of imputation, admitting that the legal consequences of Adam's act are visited upon his descendants along with himself. But then, they say, the objections of severity and unrighteousness urged against this plan could not be met, unless it be considered as one whole, embracing man's gracious connection with the second Adam. By the Covenant of grace in Him, the self-determining power of the will, and ability of will are purchased back for every member of the human family, and actually communicated, by common sufficient grace, to all, so far repairing the effects of the fall, that man has moral ability for spiritual good, if he chooses to employ it. Thus, while they give us the true doctrine with one hand, they take it back with the other, and reach a semi-Pelagian result. The obvious objection to this scheme is, that if the effects of Adam's fall on his posterity are such, that they would have been unjust, if not repaired by a redeeming plan which was to follow it, as a part of the same system, then God's act in giving a Redeemer was not one of pure grace (as Scripture everywhere says), but He was under obligations to do some such thing.

The view of the Calvinists I purpose now to state in that comprehensive and natural mode, in which Calvinistic theory. all sound Calvinists would concur. Looking into the Bible and the actual world, we find that, whereas Adam was created righteous, and with full ability of will for all good, and was in a state of actual blessedness; ever since his fall, his posterity begin their existence in a far different state. They all show, universal ungodliness, clearly proving a native, prevalent, and universal tendency thereto. They are born

spiritually dead, as Adam made himself. And they are obviously, natural heirs of the physical evils and death pronounced on him for his sin. Such are the grand facts. Now Calvinists consider that it is no unauthorized hypothesis, but merely a connected statement, and inevitable interpretation of the facts, to say: that we see in them this arrangement; God was pleased, for wise, gracious, and righteous reasons, to connect the destiny of Adam's posterity with his probationary acts, so making him their representative, that whatever moral, and whatever legal condition he procured for himself by his conduct under probation; in that same moral and that same legal condition his posterity should begin to exist. And this, we say, is no more than the explanation necessarily implied in the facts themselves.

But before we proceed to the detailed discussion of this, an inquiry, a subject of the greatest intricacy and interest, arises as a preliminary: How is this connection transmitted; what is the actual tie of nature between parents and children, as to their more essential part, the soul? Are human souls generated by their parents naturally? Or are they created directly by God, and sent into connection with the young body at the time it acquires its separate vitality? The former has been called the theory of Traducianism; (*ex traduce*,) the latter, of creation. After Origen's doctrine of pre-existent human souls had been generally surrendered as heretical (from the times of Chrysostom, say 403,) the question was studied with much interest in the early Church. Tertullian, who seems first to have formally stated Adam's federal headship, was also the advocate of the *ex traduce* theory. But it found few advocates among the Fathers, and was especially opposed, by those who had strong tendencies to what was afterwards called Pelagianism, as favouring original sin. Gregory of Nyssa seems to have been almost alone among the prominent Greek Fathers who held it. So perhaps did Ambrose among the Latins; but when Jerome asserts that the *ex traduce* view prevailed generally among the Western Christians, he was probably in error. Augustine, the great establisher of Original Sin, professed himself undecided about it, to the end. It may be said however, in general, that in history, the *ex traduce* theory has been thought more favourable to original sin, and has been usually connected with it, till modern times; while Creationism was strenuously advocated by Pelagians. If the Traducian theory can be substantiated, it most obviously presents the best explanation of the propagation of sin.

I shall state the usual arguments, *pro* and *con*, indicating as I go along my judgment of their force.

1. The Traducianists assert that by some inexplicable law of generation, though a true and proper one, parents propagate souls, as truly as bodies; and are thus the proper parents of the whole

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persons of their children. They argue, from Scripture, that Gen. ii : 2 states, "on the seventh day God ended the work which He had made, and He rested on the seventh day from all His work," &c. Hence, they infer, God performs since, no proper work of immediate creation in this earth. This seems hardly valid; for the sense of the the text might seem satisfied by the idea, that God now creates nothing new as to species. With a great deal more force, it is argued that in Gen. i : 25-28, God creates man in His own image, after His own likeness, which image is proved to be not corporeal at all, but in man's spirituality, intelligence, immortality, and righteousness. In Gen. v : 3, "Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image." How could this be, if Adam's parental agency did not produce the soul, in which alone this image inheres? Surely the image and likeness is in the same aspects. See also Ps. li : 5; Job. xiv : 4; Jno. iii : 6, &c. The purity or impurity spoken of in all these passages is of the soul, and they must therefore imply the propagation of souls, when so expressly stating the propagation of impurity of soul.

They also argue that popular opinion and common sense clearly regard the parents as parents of the whole person. The same thing is shown by the inheritance of mental peculiarities and family traits, which are often as marked as bodily. And this cannot be accounted for by education, because often seen where the parents did not live to rear the child; nor by the fact that the body with its animal appetites, in which the soul is encased, may be the true cause of the apparent hereditary likeness of souls; for the just theory is, that souls influence bodies in these things, not bodies souls; and besides, the traits of resemblance are often not only passional, but intellectual. Instances of congenital lunacy suggest the same argument. Lunacy is plausibly explained as a loss of balance of soul, through the undue predominance of some one trait. Now, these cases of congenital lunacy are most frequently found in the offspring of cousins. The resemblance of traits in the parents being already great, "breeding in and in" makes the family trait too strong, and hence derangement. But the chief arguments from reason are: if God creates souls, as immediately as He created Adam's or Gabriel, then they must have come from His hand morally pure, for God cannot create wickedness. How, then, can depravity be propagated? The Bible would be contradicted, which so clearly speaks of it as propagated; and reason, which says that the attachment of a holy soul to a body cannot defile it, because a mere body has no moral character. Creationists answer: the federal relation instituted between Adam and the race, justifies God in ordaining it so that the connection of the young, immortal spirit with the body, and thus with a depraved race, shall be the occasion for its depravation, in consequence of

imputed sin. But the reply is, first, it is impossible to explain the federal relation, if the soul of each child (the soul alone is the true moral agent), had an antecedent holy existence, independent of a human father. Why is not that soul as independent of Adam's fall, thus far, as Gabriel was; and why is not the arrangement, which implicates him in it, just as arbitrary as though Gabriel were tied to Adam's fate? Moreover, if God's act in plunging this pure spirit into an impure body is the immediate occasion of its becoming depraved, it comes very near to making God the author of its fall. Last: a mere body has no moral character, and to suppose it taints the soul is mere Gnosticism. Hence, it must be that the souls of children are the offsprings of their parents. The mode of that propagation is inscrutable; but this constitutes no disproof, because a hundred other indisputable operations natural of law are equally inscrutable; and especially in this case of spirits, where the nature of the substance is inscrutable, we should expect the manner of its production to be so.

2. On the other hand, the advocates of creation of souls argue from such texts as Eccl. xii : 7 ; Is. lvii : 16 ; Zech. xii : 1 ; Heb. xii : 9, where our souls are spoken of as the special work of God. It is replied, and the reply seems to me sufficient, that the language of these passages is sufficiently met, by recognizing the fact that God's power at first produced man's soul immediately out of nothing, and in His own image; that the continued propagation of these souls is under laws which His Providence sustains and directs; and that this agency of God is claimed as an especial honour, (e. g. in Is. lvii : 16,) because human souls are the most noble part of God's earthly kingdom, being intelligent, moral, and capable of apprehending His glory. That this is the true sense of Eccl. xii : 7, and that it should not be strained any higher, appears thus: if the language proves that the soul of a man of our generation came immediately from God's hand, like Adam's, the antithesis would equally prove that our bodies came equally from the dust, as immediately as Adam's. To all such passages as Is. lvii : 16 ; Zech. xii : 1, the above general considerations apply, and in addition, these facts: Our parents are often spoken of in Scripture as authors of our existence likewise; and that in general terms, inclusive of the spirit. Gen. xlvi : 26, 27 ; Prov. xvii : 21 ; xxiii : 24 ; Is. xlv : 10. Surely, if one of these classes of texts may be so strained, the other may equally, and then we have texts directly contradicting texts. Again, God is called the Creator of the animals, Ps. civ : 30, and the adorer of the lilies, Matt. vi : 30; which are notoriously produced by propagation. In Heb. xii : 9, the pronoun in "Father of our spirits," is unauthorized. The meaning is simply the contrast between the general ideas of "earthly fathers," and "heavenly father."

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For if you make the latter clause, "Father of spirits" mean Creator of our souls, then, by antithesis, the former should be read, fathers of our bodies; but this neither the apostle's scope permits, nor the word *σάρξ* which does not usually mean, in his language, our bodies as opposed to our souls; but our natural, as opposed to our gracious condition of soul.

Again: Turretin objects, that if Adam's soul was created, and our's propagated, we do not properly bear his image, 1 Cor. xv: 49, nor are of his species. The obvious answer is, that by the same argument we could not be of the same corporeal species at all! Further, the very idea of species is a propagated identity of nature. But the strongest rational objections are, that a generative process implies the separation of parts of the parent substances, and their aggregation into a new organism; whereas the souls of the parents, and that of the offspring are alike monads, indiscrptible, and uncompounded. Traducianism is therefore vehemently accused of materialist tendencies. It seems to me that all this is but an *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. Of course, spirits cannot be generated by separation of substance and new compoundings. But whether processes of propagation may not be possible for spiritual substance which involve none of this, is the very question, which can be neither proved nor disproved by us, because we do not comprehend the true substance of spirit.

The opponents might have advanced a more formidable objection against Traducianism: and this is the true difficulty of the theory. In every case of the generation of organisms, there is no production of any really new substance by the creature-parents, but only a reorganizing of pre-existent particles. But we believe a soul is a spiritual atom, and is brought into existence out of non-existence. Have human parents this highest creative power? With such difficulties besetting both sides, it will be best perhaps, to leave the subject as an insoluble mystery. What an *opprobrium* to the pride of human philosophy, that it should be unable to answer the very first and nearest question as to its own origin!

The humble mind may perhaps find its satisfaction in this Bible truth: That whatever may be the adjustment adopted for the respective shares of agency which the First Cause and second causes have in the origin of an immortal, human soul; this fact is certain (however unexplained) that parents and children are somehow united into one federal body by a true tie of race: that the tie does include the spiritual as well as the bodily substances: that it is *bona fide*, and not fictitious or supposititious. See Confession of Faith, ch. vi, § 3. "Root of all mankind." Now, since we have no real cognition by perception, of spiritual substance, but only know its acts and effects, we should not be surprised at our ignorance of the precise

agency of its production, and the way that agency acts. It may not be explained; and yet it may be true, that divine power, (in bringing substance out of *nihil* into *esse*) and human causation may both act, in originating the being and properties of the infant's soul!

May not this insoluble question again teach us to apprehend a great truth, which we are incompetent to comprehend; that there is such a reality as spiritual generation, instanced in the eternal generation of the Word, in the infinite Spirit, and in the generation of human souls from the finite? The analogy must, indeed be partial, the lower instance being beneath the higher, as the heavens are lower than the earth. In the eternal generation, the generative spirit was sole; in the human, the parents are dual. In the former, the subsistence produced was not an individual numerically distinct from the producer, as in the latter. But it may be added, that familiar and fundamental as is our notion of our race unity, we know only in part what is connoted in it. It is possible that when "we know even as also we are known," we shall find, that Adam's creation "in the image and likeness" of God has still another meaning, not apprehended before; in that omnipotence endued man with a lower, though inscrutable form of that power by which the eternal Father forever generates the eternal Son.