

## THE UNITED STATES AS A MILITARY NATION<sup>1</sup>

Art. VI.—1. *Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, 1860.*

By Jos. C. G. Kennedy, Superintendent. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1862.

2. *Message from the President of the United States to the two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-eighth Congress; with the Reports of the Heads of Departments, and Selections from accompanying Documents.* Washington: Government Printing Office. 1864.

The ability of a people for military exploits depends, in modern times, upon two classes of circumstances, the material and the moral. Among the former, the most important are, the numbers of its population, the magnitude of its revenues, its manufactures, commerce, and agriculture, and its geographical position. The moral qualities which make a military nation are, natural bravery, love of glory, intelligence, independence, fortitude, and, above all, virtue and devout religious faith.

The authors and politicians of the North usually point, with much exultation, to the war against the Confederate States, which closed in 1865, as a splendid proof of their military prowess. Since that triumph, it has been customary with them to claim that the United States stand in the first rank, if not at the head of the great military powers of Christendom; and that they may safely venture to cope with the greatest of those powers. That war is supposed to prove that the United States are able, with ease, to place a million of combatants in the field, and a powerful navy upon the water, for any contest which affects the national heart. We propose to bring this boast to the test, by a review of some facts and figures, touching the parties to the recent war. We hope thus to reach a correct estimate of the real material resources of the United States for a great war, at this time, and of the aptitude which

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the Northern people have disclosed for military enterprises.

The first consideration is obviously a comparison of the population and production of the two parties to the late contest. According to the census of 1860 (the year before the contest began), as prepared by the North itself, the Northern States and territories had then a population of twenty-two million eight hundred and seventy-seven thousand (22,877,000). This aggregate includes a few hundreds of thousands of negroes, but none of the Indian tribes. The Confederate States had a population of eight million seven hundred and thirty-three thousand (8,733,000). But of these, three million six hundred and sixty-four thousand (3,664,000) were negroes; so that if they are deducted, we have only five million (5,000,000) whites to sustain the struggle against twenty-two million, (22,000,000). Northern politicians are bound to admit the fairness of at least such a deduction; because they uniformly say that slavery is a weakening institution, inimical to national strength. We, indeed always argued (what this war abundantly confirmed) that a slave-holding nation was stronger for war than a hired-labor State, of numbers equal to the free and slave together; because the devotion of the bondmen to productive labor both released a large number of freemen for military employments, and gave them a higher tone. But the Northern statesman cannot use this plea; because he has always denied these facts, and asserted the contrary. He is therefore obliged to count out the Southern slaves, and to compare the belligerents as five million (5,000,000) against twenty-two million (22,000,000). He is obliged, also, to estimate these five million (5,000,000) as a people far inferior to the rest of Christendom, in their *morale*; for has he not proved to his own satisfaction, in his descants on the 'barbarism of slavery,' that this institution invariably renders the masters lazy, effeminate, selfish, petulant, and insubordinate? The case which we have to inspect is, therefore, for the North, this: that twenty two millions (22,000,000) of the best people in Christendom managed somehow to beat five millions (5,000,000) of the meanest.

In this estimate of numbers, we have not counted Kentucky or Missouri as Confederate States. Both parties claimed them; the North actually possessed them, during the whole war, with their territories, resources, and population. A few thousand

from each State preferred exile to subjugation, and enlisted in the Confederate armies. These, with the recruits from Maryland, were far more than counterbalanced by the large defections from the Confederate cause in East Tennessee, Northern Arkansas, Western North Carolina, and Northwestern Virginia.

But we have not yet reached the fair comparison of material strength. The campaigns of 1861 were only tentative; the real "tug of war" had not yet come. But before May, 1862, the Northern armies were in permanent occupancy of all Western and Middle Tennessee, of nearly the whole of Louisiana, of parts of Florida, of the coast of South and North Carolina, of Eastern and Northern Virginia. This occupation continued until the end of the war. The population thus excluded from the support of the Confederate cause cannot be exactly estimated; but it was certainly more than twelve hundred thousand (1,200,000). Thus the Confederates bore all the real brunt of the struggle, with three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000) white people. The fighting men were not absolutely limited to this source, for some of them came from within the hostile lines; but, of course, no material resources, and few men, could be relied on from a territory in the permanent occupancy of the enemy. The real problem which was solved, then, was, how twenty-two million (22,000,000) of the best people in Christendom managed, in three years, to beat three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000) of the meanest.

But the material resources were even more unequal than the numbers. The Confederate States were rather planting than agricultural communities; their customary industry produced rather those things which are the basis of Northern commerce, than the wheat, the beef, the wool, the horses, which sustain large armies. The North had far the larger portion of the commerce and manufacturing arts. It retained the national army, navy, arsenals, treasury, government. The South had all these to create, in the progress of the struggle.

But, *secondly*, it is pleaded that a people inhabiting a large country, have, in their forests, rivers, mountains, and especially in the distances which armies must pass over, a defense against the invader, which almost compensates for any inferiority of

force. This argument was not true, in the case of the Confederate people. New circumstances, with their geographical position, wholly neutralized these advantages. Of these, one was the advantage which the invader had of railroads; by which he almost annihilated distance, and overcame weight and bulk, in transporting the *materiel* of war. The Confederate States were sufficiently supplied with railroads for all the military purposes of the invader. Retreating armies usually attempted, of course, to dismantle these roads; but the repair of any damage thus hastily done, was easy and quick work to a numerous people, abounding in industrious mechanics, and in machinery and materials. Thus, as an invading army was enabled by its military successes to advance, the captured railroads in its rear, quickly repaired, and easily defended, brought its base of operations practically up to its rear. It was, thus, relieved of this, formerly, the great difficulty of extended invasion.

The decisive circumstance which robbed the South of the defensive advantages of its wide territory was, the superiority of its enemies upon the water. The North retained the use of the whole national navy. While the South was chiefly a planting community, the North was manufacturing and maritime. Hence the multiplication of ships and sailors, which continued and increased her naval superiority, was easy and rapid for her. This cause also enabled her, by her blockade, to exclude the Confederates from all foreign sources of supply. The navigable water was therefore, all, the territory of the North. The ocean, and the gulf, which bounded two sides of the Confederate States, belonged to their invaders, furnishing them a cheap and swift way of approach, secure from assault. This fact rendered the whole sea and gulf shores bases of operations for Federal armies. It made all an exposed frontier, and brought the enemy upon it all, as though he had embraced these two sides, as he did the other two, with conterminous territories of his own. The reader may represent to himself the significance of this fact, by imagining the inland kingdom of Bavaria assailed at once on four sides, by Austria, Switzerland, and the German States, all united under a single will. The professional soldier will comprehend the disastrous position of the invaded country, when he considers that the invader thus had two pairs of bases of operations, at right angles to

each other; whence it resulted that from whatever interior base a Confederate army might set out to defend its frontier, its line of operations must needs be exposed, parallel to one of these Federal bases, and liable to be struck at right angles, by a force advancing from it.

But, worse than this, the Confederate territories were penetrated, in nearly every part, by navigable rivers, opening either into the sea, which was the territory of the North, or into the Northern frontier. On the east, the Potomac, the Rappahannock, the York, the James, the Roanoke, the Neuse, the Cape Fear, the Savannah, and on the south, the St. John's, the Alabama, the Brazos, stretched their navigable waters far into the interior; while the Mississippi, which is itself an inland sea, floating the greatest war-ships, passed out of the United States below Cairo, through the midst of the Confederacy, to the Gulf, which, again, belonged to its enemies. The Tennessee and the Cumberland, with their mouths opening upon the Northern frontier, in winter navigable for war-ships, as well as transports, curved inwards, near the heart of the Eastern quarter. The Arkansas and Red rivers opened the States west of the Mississippi. The difficulties of invasion were also unexpectedly removed, for the North, by the new decision given to the question, whether shore-batteries could command a channel against ships of war. Military authorities had usually answered this question in the affirmative. The answer was now reversed in favor of the North. When ships were only of wood, and propelled only by winds, a motive power gentle (except when it assumes the unmanageable violence of the tempest), variable, and uncertain, artillerists might well boast that shore-batteries would usually destroy the ships opposed to them. But when the ship has within itself an unfailing motive power, as steady as the breeze and as swift as the tempest, and when it is coated with an iron plating, which, if not absolutely impervious to cannon-shots, at least delays for a long time the ruin of the framework, all is changed; it may expect to brave the bullets of shore-batteries with impunity, and to pass them without the trouble of silencing them. Thus, the forts designed to protect New Orleans, Memphis, and Vicksburg, were, in each case, passed by the Federal steamers without being reduced; and that which they were designed to defend was seized in spite of

them; so that their retention became useless or impracticable.

Now the naval supremacy of the North having been asserted upon all these streams, it was the least part of the evil, that all their fertile valleys were exposed to ravage, and the wealthy cities on their banks, to capture. Each of the rivers became a new and secure base of operations for invading armies. Difficulties of distance were almost annihilated. No interior base from which Confederate armies could operate toward their own frontiers, to extrude the invader, remained secure from attack from one or another of these rivers. Hence it was, that defensive victories were usually fruitless of permanent results.

The justice of this view is sustained by the fact that *all the rivers were opened to the ingress of Northern armies and fleets* (save a small portion of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson) without much difficulty, and before the real "tug of war" began. By May, 1862, they were all occupied; and the illusory advantages of territory and distance for the invaded, were all lost. The extent of the Confederate territory no longer interposed any difficulty to the invaders, except the demand for a plenty of money and mechanics.

The *third* subject of comparison is, obviously, the size of the armaments which the rivals were able to put into the field. To appreciate the amazing disproportion, the reader must ponder a few figures. According to the report of the Adjutant General of the United States, two million five hundred and thirty thousand (2,530,000) soldiers were employed by land, during the course of the war. The whole population of the North subject to military duty, but not in service, had also been enrolled, and the number was found to be two million seven hundred and eighty-four thousand (2,784,000). These facts reveal the curious result (of which use will be made hereafter), that, had no foreigners been employed in their armies, the North would have had, on land, nearly half (2,530,000 against 2,784,000) of their whole male population of military age, actually under arms. But the actual strength of their armies, at the close of the war, is very accurately fixed by the returns of volunteers mustered out of service. These were one million thirty-four thousand (1,034,000). So that, adding the regular army, we find that they employed, at one time, one million seventy-two thousand five hundred (1,072,500) combatants, on land, "to crush the

rebellion." Thus, something more than one doughty warrior to every four white Confederate souls (including all the soldiers, old men, sick, women, children, babies, and cowards), and at least one fighting man to every two Confederate souls adhering in any sense to that government during the whole of the last year of the war, were required to conquer their resistance! This vast host was served by one horse or mule for every two men in the field; and it destroyed draught animals at the average rate of five hundred (500) per day. It was ministered to by one thousand and eighty (1,080) sea and river transports, at a daily cost of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars (\$120,000) for their navigation alone. It was furnished during the war with nearly eight thousand (8,000) cannons, and nearly twelve millions (12,000,000) of small arms; while the masses of cartridges, shot, shell, and gunpowder were fabulous.

To the efforts of this Xerxean host must be added those of the navy of the United States. This arm employed, in the course of the war, one hundred and twenty-six thousand five hundred and fifty-three (126,553) sailors and marines; besides the countless mechanics and servants about the naval arsenals and *depots*. The Report of the Secretary, under date of December 5, 1864, gives the following "General exhibit of the navy, including vessels under construction," to-wit:

| No.   |   | Guns. | Tons.   |
|-------|---|-------|---------|
| 113   | Screw steamers especially constructed for naval purposes . . . . .                    | 1,426 | 169,231 |
| 52    | Paddle-wheel steamers especially constructed for naval purposes . . . . .             | 524   | 51,878  |
| 71    | Iron-clad vessels . . . . .   | 275   | 80,596  |
| 149   | Screw steamers, purchased, captured, etc., fitted for naval purposes . . . . .        | 614   | 60,380  |
| 174   | Paddle-wheel steamers, purchased, captured, etc., fitted for naval purposes . . . . . | 921   | 78,762  |
| 112   | Sailing vessels of all classes . . . . .  | 850   | 69,549  |
| <hr/> |   |       |         |
| 671   | Total . . . . .   | 4,610 | 510,396 |
| 588   | Total navy, December, 1863 . . . . .  | 4,443 | 467,967 |
| <hr/> |   |       |         |
| 83    | Actual increase for the year . . . . .  | 167   | 42,429  |

Now against these, place the following numbers of the Con-

federate armies. The aggregate of all the levies made during the whole war, was about equal to the available force present for duty at one time with their enemies; that is to say, about six hundred and sixty thousand (660,000), or one-fourth the whole number enlisted by the North during the war. If we estimated the Confederate force effective for duty at any one time by this *ratio* we should give them less than one hundred and twenty-five thousand (125,000) soldiers in actual service, the day their armies were strongest. When we remember that many of their levies were from districts soon occupied permanently by their enemies, to which therefore no provost-marshal could ever go to reclaim absentees, we might reasonably conclude that the number of Confederates actually in the field at any one time bore a still smaller ratio to the total of levies. But the superiority of the Confederate administration, with the higher patriotism of the people, wonderfully counterpoised this disadvantage, and enabled the government to present, in May, 1864, about two hundred and sixty-four thousand (264,000) combatants to Mr. Lincoln's nine hundred and seventy thousand (970,000), the number he had under arms at that time. But it was impossible for the Confederacy to mobilize, for campaigning, as large a *ratio* as their enemy did. They had the same length of frontier to guard; they were therefore compelled to reserve for garrisons and posts a far larger part relatively to their whole force. Hence, while General Grant, as commander-in-chief, was able to put in the field, for aggressive purposes, six hundred and twenty thousand (620,000) men in May, 1864, Mr. Davis opposed him with about one hundred and twenty-five thousand (125,000) in the several active armies.

The disproportion of forces, and the relative character of the rival armies, may also be illustrated by the numbers actually arrayed against each other in several battles. At the critical turn of the first battle of Manassas, the official reports of Generals McDowell and Beauregard show that the decisive grapple for the key of the battle-field was made by six thousand five hundred (6,500) Confederates against twenty thousand (20,000) United States troops, including several regiments of regulars. The Confederates won it. At Sharpsburg, thirty-three thousand (33,000) Confederates repulsed ninety thousand (90,000) Federalists. At Chancellorsville, thirty-five thousand (35,000) Confed-

erates beat Gen. Hooker, with the "finest army upon the planet." In the Wilderness, Gen. Lee met Gen. Grant's one hundred and forty-two thousand (142,000) with fifty thousand (50,000) and without any accessions to this number, continued to breast the Federal army increased (save as the Confederate shot had thinned it) by sixty thousand (60,000) more. In the battle of Winchester, in the autumn of 1864, Sheridan only won a dearly bought victory from Gen. Early, by hurling fifty thousand (50,000) upon his twelve thousand (12,000.) In the closing struggle Gen. Lee's thirty-three thousand (33,000) were not dislodged from Petersburg and Richmond until their assailants were again increased to one hundred and eighty thousand (180,000.) And finally, the remnant of Lee's heroic army did not surrender to this enormous host until it was reduced to less than eight thousand (8,000) muskets. The aggregate of men paroled at Appomattox was made up of some twenty or more thousand (20,000) stragglers, and men on detached service, who came in, to avail themselves of the supposed pacification, after the termination of military operations.

To this disparity of forces upon land, and overwhelming superiority upon the water, must be added the advantages derived by the North from their blockade. This crippled the Confederacy, both in its military and in its financial efforts. The true basis for credit, upon which alone the "sinews of war" could have been borrowed in Europe (where alone they existed for the new government) was in the Southern cotton and tobacco. Mr. Davis's administration should have had not only the large and precious crop of 1860, but an equal crop in 1861, and successive ones in 1862 and 1863, only diminished in bulk, but enhanced in price, upon which to found, at once, a system of foreign loans, and an all-persuading motive for foreign recognition. Only in 1864, did the stress of domestic wants become so urgent as to arrest all other tillage, for the production of provisions. Now the blockade never wholly arrested shipments of cotton; but it gradually became stringent enough to impose upon them a tax in the form of losses by capture, or of bribes to Federal officials, sufficient to disappoint effectually these great purposes. The financial right arm of the Confederacy was tied up. Again, the blockade imposed such difficulties upon importations that, although they continued almost to the

last, they were limited to a few of the more compact articles which nurtured the war; and these were supplied in the most scanty and inadequate degree. Thus, the weaker combatant was kept, in a measure, unarmed and unfed, during the unequal struggle.

*Fourthly.* To give a correct estimate of Northern prowess in this war, the truth must be told—which is not pleasant to the pride of the Confederates—that their armies, apart from their deficient numbers, were never formidable in their character. The Confederate glory was dependent more on the weakness of their assailants, than on the intrinsic vigor of their defense. This assertion, true though distasteful, will be substantiated by these two facts: first, that the people of the South were never roused to what professional soldiers call a popular resistance; and secondly, that the government never had a really organized and disciplined army. As to the first, their enemies did indeed wage their war in a ruthless way, which gave abundant motive and justification for popular warfare; that is, for turning every male of the invaded country into a soldier without the formality of enlistment, and for teaching him to regard every invader as an outlaw, to be assailed by any means, and in every place. But the Southern people never availed themselves of that right. Amidst all the unutterable horrors of the raids, the burnings, the wanton and ruinous ravagings, the home people of the South maintained a singular neutrality, and submitted with an unaccountable quiescence, leaving all defense and vengeance, alike, to the organized soldiery. Federal officials came and went along vast lines of transportation; cavalymen who had given the country people every reason to regard and treat them as wolves, traversed the regions they had desolated; bummers rode away with their spoil, secure from ambuscade unless some movable column of the regular Confederate armies, under some Morgan, Quantrel, or Mosby, happened to be near. The citizens—plundered, ravaged, murdered—rarely avenged themselves by becoming *guerillas*.

This singular quietude of a spirited people was to be accounted for by several causes. Perhaps the most operative of these was the quixotry of the government; which, in its eager desire for the reputation of a civilized and honorable belliger-

ent, uniformly neglected and discouraged such citizens as proposed to resort to those rights of nature which the outrages of the invaders justified. The people, moreover, were strangers to war and bloodshed. Two generations of profound peace at home, had made ease pleasant, and personal vengeance abhorrent to their habits. Their character was quiet, law-abiding, kindly, in the highest degree. Their high civilization, and the standard of material comfort and safety to which they were accustomed, had disqualified them for seeking the rough and turbulent vengeance of the *guerilla*. And then, the men of hardihood and spirit had responded at first to the call of their country, and were in the regular armies. So it was, that the Northern invader was almost wholly free from that species of annoyance which, when combined with the resistance of organized armies, becomes so terrible—popular warfare.

Next, when we asserted that the armies of the Confederacy, inadequate in size as they were, never showed themselves truly good armies in quality, we did not impugn the gallantry of the bulk of the men composing them. The *morale*  $\text{ə} \text{d} \text{ɔ} \text{d} \text{ə} \text{d} \text{ } \nu \text{ } \text{j} \text{ɔ}$  is a thing of comparative estimate. It may be very true (as this discussion will evince) that, compared with that of the North, the *morale* of the Confederacy was lofty and brilliant. But it must be confessed that, compared with the historic standard, the Confederate people and soldiery were not, as a whole, a heroic body. The war found them in a transition state. Very many, perhaps the most of the reputable men (with nearly all the women) still cherished the hardy virtues and ennobling spirit of Revolutionary grandsires. Yet the corrupting copartnership with the North had continued just a generation too long. The leaven of a sensualistic morality and civilization was at work all through the South; the contagion had already tainted multitudes. Hence, although in the moment of first enthusiasm the people seemed to rally almost as one man to the call of liberty raised by the undebauched spirits, yet when the stress of danger and toil came, many proved themselves craven. The Confederate armies certainly included a class of patriot soldiers the noblest which this age can produce, under any clime. This class was numerous; it embraced, perhaps at all stages of the war, a majority of the levies. But there was also a large element of baser metal; men who begrudged their sacrifices for

liberty, and shirked danger. And as death thinned the ranks of the original armies, this worse material became relatively larger.

But the fact, that the Confederacy never had a really good army, can be explained abundantly, without depreciating the gallantry of the Confederate people. It never had the leisure, nor the skilled officers, to organize a thorough army. The population, though gallant, was ignorant of war, by reason of two generations of peace. The fewest men are born soldiers, like the Jacksons, the Ashbys, the Sterling Prices, the Forrests. For ordinary mortals, it is a hard and long lesson, to learn that untiring self-denial, that devotion to duty, that study of detail, that carefulness, that self-government, that talent of command, that intelligence in the arts of attack and defense, which must be added to personal courage, to make the good officer. Nothing can teach that lesson to them, except long experience in actual service. Now the Confederacy was compelled to organize into armies a larger portion of its men than any modern nation has been able to keep in the field. It was obliged to employ thousands of officers, where it had only a few score—the graduates of West Point, and veterans of the little army of Mexico—competent. There was not in the country a tithe of the practical knowledge of military duties which was necessary to organize and instruct the armies raised. That so much was done, to approximate such bodies of unwarlike men towards the character of regular armies, shows an extraordinary gallantry and aptitude for war, in the Southern people. But the armies never had enough competent officers to make them, as wholes, well drilled or well organized forces. At the beginning of the campaigns of 1862, they had more nearly attained this character: thenceforward, while individuals acquired the experience and hardihood of veterans, the regiments gradually lost their regularity of movements, and tactics were more and more at a discount. Southern officers and soldiers uniformly testified that the drill of the Northern regiments (except when confused by attack) was better than their own. But the Northern army must have been but a sorry standard of comparison in this particular, since they had a part of the same difficulties to overcome in extemporizing their forces. The most experienced Southern officers confessed that it was the

rarest spectacle to see their advancing regiments preserve such an *alignment* in their onset as to deliver anything like a collective shock again the enemy. Usually, the onset was the rush of an impetuous mob, in which the quick men were one or two hundred yards in advance of the slow. It was the testimony of the soldiers, that the front line, if supported by a second line of battle in the rear, must always make its account, when fired into by the enemy, to receive also at least a partial fire from their own friends; because no Confederates were ever sufficiently under the control of their officers, to hear Northern bullets whistle, without returning them. In the best Confederate regiments, during the excitement of battle, eager suggestions from privates were as loud, and as influential, as commands from their officers.

This lack of drill was the necessary result, not only of a deficiency of officers, hut also of the cruelty of the emergency. Troops must needs be hurried to the front before their training was completed; often, before it was begun. Cavalry horses were taken from pasture or plough to-day, and employed in action to-morrow. Recruits were sent to the front the day they were enrolled, and were merged at once in active forces, whose exacting duties in the march, the picket, and the line of battle, left them not one moment for drill, during a whole half year. Troops ceased to go into winter quarters; for the campaigns extended through winter and summer alike. The very lack of instruction and drill necessitated a four-fold exposure of the efficient officers; so that the army was at length almost wholly deprived of its more capable and experienced leaders, by death or capture. And, to crown all, the government had laid a foundation for defective discipline, by making the officers elective. From all these causes it came to pass that the Confederate armies, while displaying great gallantry on the part of a majority of their men, had scarcely enough discipline and drill to entitle them to the name of regular armies. This deficiency was confessed by the highest possible authority, that of Gen. Lee himself. This consummate soldier, speaking of the advantage of perfect drill and unity of action, and declaring that he believed this advantage so great, as against either of the forces then engaged, as to be almost incapable of exaggeration, pointed to it as the natural remedy for his inferiority

of numbers. But then, pausing, he added, with accents of significant sadness: "But I cannot give this drill to my army, because the enemy has my officers in his prisons."

The Federal authorities were exempt, in the task of forming their armies, from the most of these difficulties. They had, first, the whole standing army of the United States, as a nucleus and model for their military crystallization. They had the major part of the instructed officers. They were able to draw mercenary officers from all the armies of Europe. They, as the aggressors, could choose their own time for the initiative, and needed not to move their new armies until they thought them ready, while the defendants must, perforce, move to meet them, prepared or unprepared. And especially, the invaders, having their own populous country and all the world to furnish numbers, were able to keep their new levies in the *depots*, until they were drilled. It was easy for them to have enough men at the front, and enough also in the camps of instruction.

The work which the North had to do, therefore, was only to beat forces of one-fourth their own number, or less; and these untrained to war. They should have found the Confederate armies almost as little formidable in their quality as in their size.

*Fifthly.* The credit of the North for this exploit must also be affected by this fact, that while they had at the outset twenty-two millions (22,000,000) against five millions (5,000,000), and during the real crisis of the war, twenty-two millions (22,000,000) against three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000), they did not deem these odds sufficient, but eagerly sought the aid of the rest of the world. They believed themselves, if we may infer from their actions, unable to crush this feeble adversary, without drawing from the Southern slaves armies as large as all those of the Confederacy, and from Europe hundreds of thousands of her proletarians. The Federal Secretary of War tells us that he mustered out of service about one hundred and seventy thousand (170,000) negro combatants. These were recruited almost exclusively from the slaves of their enemies. When Gen. McClellan, during the Presidential canvass of 1864, ashamed of so savage and disgraceful a dependence, promised that he, if made President, would disband the negro troops, Lincoln himself ridiculed his

promise; saying that this would deprive the Union cause of the aid of two hundred thousand (200,000) men, and would thus render its success hopeless. That is to say, the head of the Federal Union judged that its twenty-two millions (22,000,000), backed by all the mercenaries of Europe, would be unable to conquer these three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000) Confederates, without the aid of two hundred thousand (200,000) partially reclaimed, black savages!

It would, perhaps, be hard to find documentary *data*, from which to learn the exact number of foreign recruits in the Northern armies. We can show that this element was very large. All well-informed persons know that every country of Western Europe was canvassed by "emigration-agents," who, under this thin disguise, were recruiting officers for the North; and that a large part of that human stream, which flows annually into the United States, was, during the war, directed into the Union armies. Not only were foreigners found in every regiment; whole brigades, as that of Meagher, and even divisions, as that of Blenker, were composed exclusively of Irish men or of Germans. In the prison *depots* of the Confederates, half, at least, of the captives gave evidence of foreign birth. The Secretary of War at Washington gives us the nationalities of fifteen thousand seven hundred (15,700) men buried in the military *Golgotha* of that capital. Of these, he tells us, four thousand nine hundred (4,900) were native white soldiers, four thousand one hundred and eighty (4,180) were negroes, and six thousand six hundred (6,600) were foreign-born. Either the native-born must have been more chary of exposure to wounds and disease, than the foreign-born; or else, in the armies which sent their disabled men to Washington, there must have been more foreigners than native whites in the ratio of nearly seven to five. Once more. The reports of the war and navy departments of the Washington Government show an aggregate of two million six hundred and fifty-six thousand (2,656,000) men, actually engaged, at different times, in the military and naval service of the war. But the whole number of men capable of military duty, in the "loyal" States, who had not been drafted, was two million seven hundred and eighty-four thousand (2,784,000.) Whence, if those States had done their own fighting, it would follow that nearly half their men must

have been for a time in service. But the uniform testimony of travelers and citizens was, that the walks of civil life in the North exhibited a very slight depletion of their customary throngs. While, in the South, every assemblage, at church, at the seats of justice, in the streets of towns which were not military posts, gave striking evidence of the absence of nearly all the arms-bearing men, at the North, a very small part of the home population was absent in the camps. Now, the only solution of this riddle is, that their levies were filled chiefly with foreigners. Putting these data together, it seems very plain that less than half in the Northern armies were native citizens. In other words, these twenty-two million (22,000,000), after recruiting their armies with two hundred thousand (200,000) negroes, were not able to conquer the three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000), until they had associated with them half a million of foreigners. The North found it necessary to call all the world to its help, in order to overpower its feeble adversary!

But, *sixthly*, the whole story is not yet told. Even this whole people, with the negroes and all the world to back them, acknowledged themselves unable to subdue the resistance of their little foe, by any ordinary methods of warfare recognized among civilized nations. They were compelled to add to these the most ingenious combination of savage and illegitimate expedients, to undermine the adversary whom they could not meet in fair and equal battle. One of these was the incarceration of unarmed citizens, captured in the pursuits of civil life, who might perchance either become Confederate soldiers afterwards, or might aid some soldier or soldier's family with their industry. Another was the exclusion by blockade of medicines for the sick; a barbarity unheard of before among polite nations. The calculation was, that the stroke of cold steel or disease, in the body of the gallant adversary, might be aggravated unto death in the more instances; and that the pestilence might ravage the home population, unchecked by the skill of the physician. Another was the destruction of food and the implements of industry, among the peaceful citizens of the South. It was cunningly calculated, that by these means, some brave enemies at the front might be recalled home by the harrowing news of famine at their beloved hearth-

stones, or that, at least, their arms might be paralyzed by the anguish; and that some others might be starved out by lack of rations. What did it matter that helpless women, little children, old men who had shed their blood for the flag of the United States, the poor negroes, innocent in every sense, of the war, might perish of the dire but undeserved doom of famine? No matter, if there was a chance thereby of weakening some of those few brave arms, which they so much dreaded in battle. History will never disclose the ruthless and universal diligence of the North in this work of destruction. It was for this it needed its million (1,000,000) of destroyers. Its only hope was to make the dearth as wide as the hostile country. Its politicians boasted with an amiable wit, that if the prowess of neither Gen. McClellan, nor Burnside, nor Hooker, nor Grant, could prevail to "crush the rebellion," they had enlisted one, more all-conquering than the whole of them, *general* starvation. Scarcely a county in the interior of the largest Southern State escaped this systematic ravage. Wherever the Northern troops went, work-animals were stolen or slaughtered, with all other live stock; all ploughs and other implements of husbandry broken; mills and factories burned; tanneries destroyed, with their hides; and the blessed bread, sacred gift of divine Providence to man, either burned or trampled under the horses' feet. The sweeping ravages of Sheridan, in Virginia, under the express orders of the commander-in-chief, and of Sherman in South Carolina and Georgia, will never be forgotten while history has a verdict to utter. The flatterers of these men boasted that the desolation was to be so utter that the crow flying across the wastes would be compelled to carry his own rations! And if it was not so complete, the only reason was, that the industry of even Northern malice wearied of the work of destruction.

These methods, and not the Federal arms, were, in truth, the weapons which wrought the ruin of the Confederacy. Its little armies never were beaten; they were, in fact, dispersed by the difficulties of subsistence. They did not yield to the force of arms, but to the efficacy of these savage and cowardly means.

One more artifice of barbarism remained, by which the gigantic enemy could supplement his lack of prowess; the violation of the *cartle* for the exchange of prisoners. As soon as

the Washington Government came to understand the task it had undertaken, and to perceive its advantage in wearing out the adversary which it could not meet in a fair field, it began to seek pretexts for evading its own engagements for this exchange. Ultimately, it came to act upon the policy of holding every dreaded Confederate, whom it captured. It mattered not to it, that a larger number of its own men were left to pine or die in captivity. At last, when, early in 1865, the arguments or the frank concessions of the Confederate Government had removed the last pretext for delaying the general exchange, "Butler the Beast" was selected by the Federal Generalissimo, as a fitting tool, to write a letter so insolent, and so unworthy of a soldier, that it was calculated all intercourse must, perforce, be interrupted, and thus, the doors of the prisons be finally closed upon the captured Confederates, until their aid would be too late for their cause. "The Beast," disgraced a little after by his master, expressly disclosed this design! And the commander-in-chief, with equal candor, declared, that if the fifty thousand (50,000) Confederate soldiers, whom he held, were released, and added to the armies of their country, its conquest would be impossible. He manifestly counted it for nothing, that this exchange would restore to his ranks fifty thousand (50,000) of his own braves! This, he felt, would be no equivalent; the conquest of that number of Confederates would require an addition of three hundred thousand (300,000) negroes, or mercenaries, or native Northerners.

Here, then, is the exploit of the Northern people; that twenty-two million (22,000,000), possessed of every material advantage, aided by two hundred thousand (200,000) negroes filched from the South, and by all the mercenary adventurers of the world besides, were able to overpower three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000), after three years, and after they had added to all the legitimate appliances of civilized war, all the savage expedients of bad faith, ravage, sack, and disease. In the sober light of these facts and figures, the claim of prowess for the North, in this war, is infinitely preposterous. That it did not crush its puny antagonist within the first six months, is subject of burning reproach. That it admitted itself unable to crush him at all single-handed, and was compelled to invoke

the aid of all Europe, of the poor negro, of savage artifice, and barbarities long discarded by civilized man; this should make it silent forever, as to the glories of this war. It is, for it, the most mortifying exhibition of national impotency, which modern history discloses, anywhere this side of China.

But still it is pleaded, that if the North failed to display signal prowess in the field, it did nevertheless carry through this great war with spirit and determination; and did actually overcome, somehow, a great resistance. Even European observers, ignorant of facts, seem to admit that, if for nothing else, the North is to be dreaded for its perseverance, its mechanical industry, and its financial resources. The plain statement of a few truths will also remove this conclusion. It will be seen, that the cost at which the victory over the Confederates was won is a financial burden, which effectually incapacitates the United States from again fighting with money; that the Northern people, in a moment of reckless phrensy, purchased their revenge by crippling themselves; and that the ruinous price paid for their triumph leaves their financial credit in as ugly a condition as their military. They, more than any other people, account money to be 'the sinews of war.' On that calculation, the ability of the people for future wars is to be measured by its ability to pay additional taxes, and to contract further loans in the money-markets of the world, for military enterprises. If the United States can get as much more money (and can find among Southern negroes and foreign emigrants another seven hundred thousand (700,000) of 'gudgeons,' to be befooled), then, perhaps, they are competent to the conquest of another spirited little nation of four or five million souls. Such seems to be the measure of their promise for military exploits in the future. There is something impressive to the bystander, in the exhibition of tremendous effort. If it be granted that the *athlete* can do again and again what we have just seen him do, he is invested in our eyes with a very portentous aspect; we feel that he would be a terrible fellow to have upon our hands. But when we discover that the present efforts (than which none less would have saved him from being beaten by his little adversary) are so far beyond nature, that they have ruptured a blood-vessel or an intestine, and crippled him for life, we degrade him from a formidable

antagonist to a broken down champion. Our panic is effectually cured.

To appreciate, then, the financial resources of the United States for further military enterprises, the experienced public man will examine the following points: the existing burdens of debt, which must still be provided for, whatever new one may be incurred; the cost of the existing administration, to the people; the ability and disposition of the people for tax-paying; the economy and efficiency of the present administration; the present state of the national credit, with the probable influence upon it of a great increase in the national indebtedness; the unity and patriotism of the popular feeling; and all these, compared with similar elements of strength in the nations which are to be the probable antagonists.

What then are the existing burdens of debt, which the United States must carry through any future wars? At the end of 1868, the recognized debt of the Federal Government was three thousand and eighty-six and a half millions of dollars (\$3,086,438,635). Nearly the whole of this accrued in the four years of the Confederate war. This total includes the current treasury notes, called greenbacks (which are the Government's promises to pay), and the certificated debt not yet bonded. The annual interest upon this debt, which must be raised by taxation, is one hundred and forty and a half millions (\$140,424,000); of which the larger part is paid in coin, although the loans were received by the Government in depreciated paper. To pay this debt, the United States have thirty-four and a third millions of souls (in 1866, 34,288,870). Let this debt be compared with that of the leading Powers of Christendom, especially those of Western Europe. England owes a national debt of three thousand six hundred and forty-two millions of dollars (\$3,642,000,000), and pays upon it an annual interest of one hundred and twenty-six millions of dollars (\$126,000,000). To bear these burdens, there are in the British Isles about twenty-nine millions (29,000,000) of souls; but they have, in the remainder of the British Empire, one hundred and fifty-four millions (154,000,000), who are commercially tributary to them, and thus supply the ability to pay taxes sixfold above their numbers. It must be remembered, also, that while the British debt is the gradual result of a

number of great wars and glorious enterprises, continued for generations, which have added vast territories and untold wealth to the Empire, the debt of the United States was nearly all incurred in four years, as the price of the desolation of the fairer half of their home domain.

The Empire of Austria has thirty-five and a half millions (35,500,000) of souls. Its national debt is about one thousand four hundred and nineteen millions of dollars (\$1,419,000,000). Austria is usually regarded as the most burdened and paralyzed of the great Powers of Europe. France, with its dependencies, has a population of forty-four and a half millions (44,500,000). Its national debt is two thousand two hundred and forty-seven millions of dollars (\$2,247,000,000). All these great Powers feel that, in the burdens of their debts for former wars, they have given caution to mankind for a pacific behavior in the future.

But the real burdens of the people of the United States have not yet been disclosed. The Governments of the several States acknowledge an aggregate of debt, amounting to about three hundred and fifty-seven millions (\$357,000,000). This should be added, because it is a part of the load the people have to carry; the payment of interest and principal must be provided from the taxes of the same tax-payers who pay the Federal debt. So, in comparing the burdens of the United States with those of its neighbors, fairness requires the same addition to be made; because here, this Federal, and these State Governments only perform, together, the same functions which in Europe are rendered to the people by the central governments. The State debts, then, must be added.

But this is not all. It is very well known that the Northern people were so averse to military service, that enlistments were, in most cases, procured only by high bounties. When the Central Government began to draw imperative requisitions for men on the States, the local authorities, instead of simply drafting the required numbers from among their own militia, almost universally made arrangements for purchasing mercenaries to supply their *quotas*; thus relieving their own citizens from the dreaded service. The price usually paid, towards the end, for the human cattle for Confederate shambles, was not less than fifteen hundred dollars each. A sorry commentary,

by the way, upon the courage and patriotism of that people, that so large a bribe was needed to persuade them to "save the life of the nation." But thus it came to pass, that not only the States, but cities, counties, country towns, and even the rural subdivisions called, among that people, townships, raised loans, and purchased substitutes. Laws were passed to authorize them to make such loans, and to levy the taxes necessary to provide for their interest. Money had indeed been raised, in many cases, for internal improvements, in the same mode; and similar loans for canals and railroads remain as a part of the popular burdens. The aggregate of these bounty-debts cannot be estimated by us, from any evidences in our reach; but some *data* will be given to enable the reader to approximate it. The city of Philadelphia alone, it is believed, owes a debt of forty-four millions (\$44,000,000), chiefly for bounties. It was a very "loyal" city. It claims about six hundred thousand (600,000) souls. The State of New York admits a bounty-debt of its own of twenty-six millions (\$26,000,000). But cities, counties and townships, within the State, have also their own little debts for this and similar objects, in addition. The Comptroller of the State Treasury received incomplete returns of these local debts, from which he made an aggregate, at the end of last year, of eighty-three and a half millions (\$83,500,000). The State of New York claims a population of three million eight hundred thousand (3,800,000). The two instances of this city and this State, may indicate how the local burdens have accrued.

A few other items may aid in our approximation. The Federal Secretary of War informs us that, in the latter part of the war, there were one hundred and thirty-six thousand (136,000) re-enlistments of the veterans honorably discharged. It is well known that these usually received the highest bounties. If we place them at fifteen hundred dollars each, these cost the Northern people two hundred and four millions (\$204,000,000). The system of bounties was general from May, 1863, until the end of the war. The Government itself fixed the *minimum* price of a man at three hundred dollars, by appointing that sum as the cost of an exemption from the draft. But it is well known that few substitutes were purchased at so cheap a rate. The Secretary of War informs us that after May 1, 1863, there were one million six hundred and

thirty-four thousand (1,634,000) enlistments. Placing the cost of each of these enlistments at three hundred dollars, which is far below the average bounty, somebody had to pay for them four hundred and ninety millions (\$490,000,000). The "bounty-jumpers," as is well known, perpetrated immense frauds; and the number of bounties paid them was far larger than that of the enlistments.

We are thus convinced that this huge "unknown quantity" in the problem, the local and State bounty-debt, cannot be less than many hundreds of millions of dollars. But in estimating the actual financial burden which the people of the United States must carry, through any future war, all this must be added. It was a part of the cost of the Confederate war. The interest and principal of it must be paid by the same people who have the Federal debt to pay. If the policy, pursued by the Government as to the local obligations incurred in the war of the Revolution, is again to prevail, all these bounty-debts should be assumed and funded by the United States. Already this claim is heard in many quarters. The recognized State and Federal debts, as we have seen, amount to three billion four hundred and forty-three million dollars (\$3,443,195,000). It is most manifest, that the total mass of public debt now resting on the American people (nearly the whole incurred in the late war), for the payment of which provision must be made by taxation, must be at least four billions of dollars (\$4,000,000,000). Mr. Andrew Johnson, late President of the United States, and an ardent advocate of the war, always affirmed constantly, that the total cost of the war, to the taxpayers, would prove to be five billions (\$5,000,000,000). He, of course, is good authority. And the interest on this debt is from *five to seven and one fifth per centum!*

Some may be so thoughtless as to suppose that *repudiation* would lift this vast *incubus* off the shoulders of the nation. The fatal objections to reaching that deliverance by that mode, are, first, that nobody would lend his money for the second war to a debtor who so treacherously rid himself of his obligations for the first; whence the national credit would at once succumb; and, secondly, that the annihilation of so many securities of public debt would immediately produce a financial convulsion, at which the private wealth of immense numbers at the North,

already to a very large extent speculative and factitious, would collapse, like a soap bubble pierced with a straw. The overburdened credit of the government cannot be lifted up by repudiation.

Another burden which the people of the United States must carry, through any future war, along with the interest of its existing debt, is the cost of its present administration upon the peace establishment. In the year 1868, the Federal income was about three hundred and seventy-six and a half millions (\$376,500,000), and the expenditures were about one million (1,000,000) more. We have seen that one item of this expenditure was the annual interest upon the debt, one hundred and forty millions and a half (140,500,000). This left something more than two hundred and thirty-six millions (236,000,000) as the cost of the military, naval and civil service. But the governments of the States, which are an unavoidable part of the public burdens, cost last year nearly seventy-six and a half millions (76,500,000). Adding this sum, we find that the American people actually paid to their governments, the last year, four hundred and fifty-three millions of dollars (\$453,000,000). And this was exclusive of the support of religion (with which the governments, State and Federal, profess to have nothing to do), and exclusive also of the costs of municipal administration, and of the larger part of the cost of the national education, which are paid for by the people separately. Nor is the interest on the vast bounty debts included.

Let this burden be compared with those borne by the leading nations of Europe, which are usually believed to tax the strength of their subjects as severely as nature can well endure. Austria, with a million (1,000,000) more of people than the United States, pays her government annually two hundred and thirty-eight and a half millions of dollars (\$238,500,000). The forty-four millions (44,000,000) of Frenchmen are taxed, in all, three hundred and eighty-five millions (385,000,000). The British Empire collects a national revenue of three hundred and thirty-seven millions (337,000,000). It appears, therefore, that the people of the United States now have the most costly and onerous system of government to sustain, and the heaviest taxation, in a season of profound peace, of any people in Christendom. But the most startling fact is, that their money goes

so very short a way towards defending the country. While Austria, out of the revenues above mentioned, pays the interest on her debt, and the whole cost of government, she sustains also two hundred and forty-four thousand (244,000) armed men, as her peace establishment; France, four hundred and fifty-eight thousand (458,000), and England, two hundred and six thousand (206,000). But the United States, with an income larger by one-fourth than the largest of them, and a home population whose government should cost little, seeing the people in theory govern themselves, sustains only fifty-six thousand eight hundred and eighty-one (56,881) soldiers, sailors, and marines, to defend the country! The comparison of this military establishment with that of Great Britain, is especially damaging, because that empire, like the United States, has no conscription, and raises its armies by enlistment and pay. How frightful must be that incompetency, disorder, and peculation, which, out of revenues so immense, effects so little for national defense!

In the United States a smaller population actually pays a larger sum than in any of the old despotisms of Europe. It is thus demonstrated that the taxation must be more onerous here than in any of them. Let this be illustrated in a few particulars. The municipal government of the city of New York, with about nine hundred thousand (900,000) people, costs twenty-two millions of dollars (\$22,000,000) annually, in addition to the State and Federal imposts. The taxes of the citizens of the State of New York exacted by State laws, amount to twelve dollars (\$12) annually for every soul. There are townships in that State where the Federal, State, and local taxes make six *per centum* upon the total values of all the property of every species, rated at a full valuation. The income tax of Great Britain is now (if we mistake not) two and a half pence on the pound sterling of clear income, which is but little over one *per centum*. The income tax of the United States is five *per centum*. This tax in Great Britain yielded, last year, not quite thirty millions of dollars (\$30,000,000); in the United States, thirty-three millions (\$33,000,000). But the former country, with its hundred and fifty-four millions (154,000,000) of commercial tributaries, is five times as able to pay an income tax as the United States.

It may be objected to this surprising picture, that it cannot be consistent with the elastic prosperity of this teeming, new country. The reply is, that the country is not now either elastic or prosperous. The burden of taxation is actually crushing it into a collapse. All industrious classes, who do not make their gains at the expense of others, are sensibly overburdened. The traffic of the country is unhealthy, and the circulation of commodities is extravagantly costly. Notwithstanding nominal high wages, the laborer is more and more depressed; and in our great metropolis every tenth human being is a pauper in midsummer!

Now if the people of the United States, with inferior numbers and ability for enduring taxation, are, in this time of peace, burdened with a larger debt, heavier taxes, and a more costly, prodigal, and inefficient government, than any of their great neighbors, it is plain they are financially helpless for great military enterprises against those neighbors.

But let this argument be enhanced by a view of the present state of the national credit. The only currency of the people is a depreciated paper, based, not on a capital stock of specie, but on the promises to pay of this overburdened debtor, the Government. And meantime the bonds of the United States, bearing six *per cent.* interest in specie, fluctuate in London from seventy-two to eighty-three in the hundred; while the scrip of the British national debt, paying an interest of only three and a half *per cent.*, sells almost at *par*! The present burdens of the people so obviously tax their utmost strength, that the credit of the Government staggers under those burdens in the hour of peace, and in the glow of recent victory. Let a grave danger arise, bringing the certainty of another great addition to this monstrous load, and the whole fabric of public credit would dissolve at once into ruin.

The Washington Government, if it is wise, will therefore cultivate a very pacific demeanor towards all its powerful neighbors. And it will be further inclined to this prudent policy, if it considers the tendency of its methods for conquering the South, and for treating it when conquered, to make the ex-Confederates trustworthy and staunch supporters of its flag under the burdens and trials of another war. The lesson to be drawn from this review of the "situation" is, therefore, obviously one of peace.