

THE CRIMES OF PHILANTHROPY.¹

If this phrase appear to any reader paradoxical, a very little reflection will convince him that it is only so in appearance. For, the greatest organized wrongs which the civilized world has seen perpetrated in modern times, upon the well-being of mankind, have been committed under the amiable name of humanity. No despotic government now avows the ruthless purpose of self-aggrandizement and of the gratification of hatred and the lust of power; but its pretense is always the good of society, and the welfare of the governed. The wars of the "Holy Alliance," which drenched Europe in blood at the beginning of this century were all undertaken nominally for the peace and liberties of Europe. No demagogue confesses, in popular governments, the greedy ambition or avarice which proves to be his secret motive: but he seeks only the good of the "dear people," while he betrays them into mischievous anarchy or legislative atrocities.

The religious persecutions, which have made nominal Christianity the scourge of humanity, have all professed the same kindly purpose. When the excellent St. Augustine first exerted his influence and logic to make them respectable, he argued against the Donalists, that, as the parent chastises a wayward son to save him from the ruin of his vices; or as a physician rouses the lethargic patient by pungent cataplasms, so the church, the guardian of souls, might lovingly rescue her wayward children from the curse of heresy, by imprisonments, fines and stripes. And this is the argument of persecution in all ages. All the racks, the funeral pyres, the *autos da fe* with which the Inquisition blackened Europe, were justified by this plea of love. Men were slain with protracted and exquisite tortures, out of mere humanity, and to save their beloved souls at the expense of their sinful flesh. It was from the same amiable impulse that Simon de Monfort went from the devout participation in the Lord's supper, to the storming and sack of Abbigen-

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sian towns, and the butchery of their women and children. These enormities of a darker age are now as much deplored by enlightened and liberal Catholics as by Protestants themselves. The crusades against the Moslems also, justified their inconceivable barbarities, in part by a humane pretence: It was the protection and assistance of Holy Palmers, in their pilgrimages to the sacred places in Palestine, which moved the crusaders, along with zeal for the honor of Christ's sepulchre.

Another instance is presented by the colonial enterprises of the Spaniards and Portugese in tropical America. In all these voyages and wars, which entailed upon the feeble aborigines the untold horrors of extermination, a devout and philanthropic enthusiasm was an active cause. Columbus himself was as much a missionary as a votary of science, in his life-long dreams of discovery. He proposed to the King and Queen of Spain the extension of the blessings of the gospel, as much as of their empire, as the end of his projects; and wherever he and his successors landed upon the soil of America, they set up the cross alongside of the banner of Castile. Of the Spanish adventurers, Prescott says: "Their courage was sullied with cruelty; the cruelty that flowed equally—strange as it may seem—from their avarice and their religion; religion as it was understood in that age, the religion of the crusader. It was the convenient cloak for a multitude of sins, which covered them even from himself. The Castilian, too proud for hypocrisy, committed more cruelties in the name of religion, than were ever practiced by the pagan idolater or the fanatical Moslem. The burning of the infidel was a sacrifice acceptable to heaven, and the conversion of those who survived, amply atoned for the foulest offenses. It is a melancholy and mortifying consideration, that the most uncompromising spirit of intolerance—the spirit of the Inquisitor at home, and of the Crusader abroad—should have emanated from a religion which preached peace on earth, and good will towards man!" So, the contrast between Pizarro and his two partners, for the conquest of Peru, begins by invoking in the most solemn manner, the names of the "Holy Trinity and our Lady the Blessed Virgin."—"In the name of the Prince of Peace," says Robertson, "they ratified a contract, of which plunder and bloodshed were the objects." Of the same tran-

saction Prescott remarks: "The invocation of heaven was natural, where the object of the undertaking was, in part, a religious one. Religion entered more or less into the theory, at least, of the Spanish conquests in the new world." * * * "It was indeed a fiery cross that was borne over the devoted land, scathing and consuming it in its terrible progress; but it was still the cross, the sign of man's salvation, the only sign by which generations yet unborn were to be rescued from eternal perdition."

Thus it would seem the piety of Christendom has projected itself upon Asia and America as a flood of rapine and destruction. Nor can the Anglo-Saxon race of Protestants claim advantages over the Peninsular, in the results of their enterprises in America, as to the aborigines. They crossed the ocean professedly in pursuit of freedom, religious liberty and civilization. The consequence of their appearance has been likewise the extermination of the red man.

But the missions planted by ecclesiastics in tropical America presented a still more glaring perversion. Until the beginning of this century, in some of these missions, military expeditions were annually equipped by the holy fathers, against the neighboring pagan tribes, piously termed *casas de las almas*, "hunts for souls," for the purpose of capturing as many persons as they could, and subjecting them to a compulsory baptism and training. These involuntary converts were then distributed among the families of the priests or the Christianized Indians, to be trained by servitude to habits of industry and morality. Thus, armed men were seen, in the name of humanity and mercy, assailing and burning towns, murdering helpless families, and dragging the wretched survivors into bondage with all the ferocity of the African slave-catcher.

When the cruelties of these various forms of religious fanaticism are considered, it is not allowable to account for them by asserting the conscious hypocrisy of the perpetrators. From the days of Saul of Tarsus until these, many a persecutor could doubtless say, that they "verily thought" they ought to do these things. In many a scourge of humanity, the evidences of sincerity have been unquestionable; and the general integrity of

character has served only to enforce the rigor of their determination.

In the instances which have been now cited, other purposes have been mixed with those of philanthropy, and have perhaps been the main ones, while the humane designs were secondary. But yet more remarkable examples have occurred, where the most cruel inflictions which have cursed mankind, have sprung out of the express purpose to contribute to his welfare; and where the very apostles of humanity have shown themselves the most vindictive towards their fellow men. The reader of history will recall to mind that the African slave trade, with all its perpetual intestine wars, its burnings, massacres and rapes, its chains and dungeons, and the horrors of the "middle passage," originated in a compassionate plan of the benevolent Bartholomew Las Casas, to relieve the Indians of the Spanish Islands from the burden of slavery. It was his sympathy with their sufferings, which caused him to invent this expedient, of substituting the hardier Negro under the yoke.

But the eminent instances of the crimes of philanthropy are those of our own age. And among these, none stands higher in this bad eminence than the "*reign of terror*" under the ascendancy of the French democrats, at the close of the last century. The first revolution in France was especially the work of its infidel, humanitarian philosophers; who taught the perfectibility of human nature, the natural rights and equality of man, and the intrinsic injustice of all distinctions of rank; who traced to these all the miseries of human society, and heralded the era of political equality as a second golden age. The motto of the fiery democrats trained in their school was, *liberty, equality, fraternity*. They boasted that their mission was to restore to all orders of men, through the potency of these principles, that universal happiness and harmony, plenty and love, of which civilized societies had hitherto been cheated through the malignant cunning of priests and magistrates. Well, they overturned the throne, the nobility, the altar, the constitution; they held in their hands the naked constituent elements of the commonwealth, to remould them as they listed, and to give the fullest application to their principles; and the result was the *Reign of Terror*. *Marat* became the organ of the party of "liberty,

equality, and fraternity" through the press; and the ferocious Danton through the tribune. The former through his newspaper, *L' Ami du Peuple*, croaked his perpetual demands for blood, like a ghou, saying that it would never be well with the cause of fraternity, until two hundred and sixty thousand heads fell before it. This was the precise number of the human hecatombs, which this apostle of humanity demanded, to satiate his Moloch. Danton, on the other hand, mounted the tribune, which was the pulpit of this new gospel of philanthropy, to thunder his demands for accelerating the guillotine, or authorizing the September massacres. And it was ever in the name of this amiable cause, that Robespierre, that incarnation of snaky cruelty, devoted fresh thousands to murder. It is not necessary to repeat the pictures of this season: the very term, Reign of Terror, carries to every student of history a meaning more descriptive of misery, cruelty, crime, and agony, than any details could convey. The total of these sacrifices, as coolly given by the socialist *Proudhomme*, tells the tale better than rhetoric can do it; it was one million and twenty two thousand, made up as follows: of the guillotined in Paris, eighteen thousand; victims slain or executed in Lyons, thirty-one thousand; murdered by the ferocious Carrier at Nantes, thirty-two thousand; slain in battle, massacre, and execution, in miserable La Vendee, nine hundred and forty thousand. Of this total, about forty-five thousand were women and children!

From that day to this, the Jacobin party have unfailingly exhibited the same frightful combination of philanthropic cant, with a truculent ferocity of spirit. "With their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips." And this manifestation is, if possible, only the more conspicuous, amidst the professed Christianity of Old and New England. Do these pretended assertors of the rights of man organize themselves as Chartist clubs? Then we see them wielding, as their chosen instruments, against all who presume to question the safety and wisdom of their plans, fiery invective and denunciation, the incendiary's torch, and secret assault or assassination. Or does the Jacobin creed embody itself again in the professed "Liberal Party" of Bright on the other side of the Atlantic, and of his cousin-germans—the progressives—on this side? Then the same contrast is displayed between the atrocity

of their spirit, and the humanity of their pretensions, by the zest with which the latter have perpetrated, and the former have applauded, the recent horrors in the late Confederate States. Humanity, in their mouths, means, favor to those who assist their overweening and headstrong projects, with ruthless injustice and violent persecution, robbery, arson and murder, to all who presume to doubt their propriety.

This recent type of Jacobinism illustrates the cruelty of humanitarian philanthropy in our day, by two of its favorite schemes, abolition of negro slavery, and the Peace Society. The former, in the British colonies, has just glorified its zeal for human welfare, by converting a number of thousands of prosperous fellow citizens into paupers and exiles, and a race of contented, useful, and improving peasantry, into savages; while it is now, on this side of the ocean, "in the full tide of successful experiment," advancing towards the same benevolent result. The former have been engaged for thirty years, in painting the horrors of war, in describing with moving words, the prodigal waste of human happiness and life which attends it, and in denouncing even defensive war, as an invention of the devil, utterly unworthy of a Christian nation. It is also the same men usually, who declaim against the harshness and barbarity of the capital punishments denounced against the chief crimes by our criminal laws. Now the plain people amongst us, who draw their maxims of common sense from the Bible, have questioned, from the first, the genuineness of this humanity; it appeared to them a little queer, that those special advocates of forbearance, were almost always peculiarly overbearing in their temper towards dissentients, that they were very intolerant in their advocacy of tolerance, and very belligerent in the tone in which they urged peace. The true *animus* of the party was correctly foreshadowed by the spirit of one of its members, who appeared, a quarter of a century ago, to advocate the Peace Principles, at the bar of a dignified ecclesiastical assemblage in America, and to enlist its support for them. In his bustling labors in the lobby, he declared that Christianity forbade to the individual, and to society, all violent resistance of injury; that to retort the intended suffering on the aggressor was inconsistent with true humanity: and that all which was necessary to disarm assault, was, for everybody to practice a determined passivity and non-

resisting love. The members of the body which he addressed were then characterized by a sturdy, old-fashioned sense, for which it has unfortunately not been since so conspicuous. They attempted to induce the ardent man to bring his principles home to his own person, in such a case as the following: "Suppose that some son of Belial should attack you without provocation, in the absence of all legal protection, and with evident purpose of injury to life or limb: what would you do?" "I should declare my purpose of non-resistance," he replied, "and appeal with confidence to his conscience. It is the sight of resistance, which gives resolution to the rising impulses of aggression; a thoroughly peaceful attitude will surely awaken the better nature of an assailant, and make him relent, before he strikes." "Yea, but," said they, "there are men in whom conscience and the better nature are effectually seared, who would only be encouraged by the prospect of non-resistance." "Still," answered he, "I would retain my passive attitude, and display the majesty of meekness, so that it would be impossible for him actually to strike." And these boastful words he uttered with an air of angry assumption, as foreign from his professed meekness as it was evidently adapted to provoke assault. The next day, the ecclesiastical body agreed, out of respect for the cause of humanity which he professed to advocate, to hear his views. He urged them with much warmth and self-confidence, to adopt resolutions committing themselves to his theory; and when the objections of sober good sense were urged, flew into a furious passion, denounced his opponents, and flung himself out of the house in true fighting temper.

This incident gives a correct type of the combined ignorance of their own hearts and of other men's, and errors of reasoning, by which this sect is infested. And it foreshadowed precisely, the fiendish temper with which they have themselves met the shock of real resistance. When they found a people who begged to be excused from the intrusions of their unauthorized meddling, and the propagation of their pet schemes of philanthropy, these peace-society men, who denounced even defensive war an inhuman crime; who—shuddered, sweet souls!—at the sight of a drop of the criminal aggressor's blood, and preferred that it should be spared even at the cost of the blood of the innocent; who were busy sending committees to the Czar as the

head of the first military monarchy of Europe, to teach him how wicked bayonets were, and remonstrating with the King of Dahomey against his royal slave-hunts; these opponents of capital punishments, who, more merciful than the "Father of Mercies," declared that it was quite cruel that he who sheds man's blood should have his blood shed by man; these superfine sentimentalists, paused in their sanctimonious pastimes, and, almost to a man, passionately joined the clamor of the party, who demanded the extermination of their fellow citizens, for the high crimes of daring to have opinions of their own, and asserting their own prescriptive rights. It was precisely from this quarter that the loudest howl for plunder, murder, famine and conflagration came! Abundant proof this, that the ruling motive of such philanthropy is not love, but an intensely selfish love of power, mental conceit, and hunger for applause.

This phenomenon is as curious as it is mortifying to the true friend of humanity. Hence the explanation of it is interesting, and, if it can be accomplished, profitable to all such. An attempt will be made towards the explanation, by setting worldly philanthropy in contrast with true Christianity. Although the former is perpetually borrowing the name and language of the latter, it will appear that they are contrasted in their principles, and the principles of godliness will help to explain those of the counterfeit.

Philanthropy proposes as its end, *advantage to man*. Christianity declares that *man's chief end is to glorify God, and enjoy Him forever*. Its doctrine is that "God hath made all things for Himself; yea, even the wicked also for the day of evil"; that "of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things; to whom be glory for ever and ever." Its one precept is: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and soul, and mind, and strength; and thy neighbor as thyself."

It is very true that the humanitarians, clamorously reject this great proposition as an odious dogma. Just here, then, they and God join issue. They say that since disinterestedness is the property of every virtuous act, and selfishness is the hateful root of vice, in all other beings, it would be immoral in God, thus to propose Himself as His own supreme end, and to arrogate to Himself the services of all creatures, exhausting their well-being upon Himself. They urge that this would be selfish-

ness more enormous than that of sinful men, just as its claims are more vast. They exclaim that this scheme makes God the great egotist of the universe. On the contrary, they display their own scheme in enviable contrast for its disinterestedness, as making the welfare of our fellow men the chief end.

These cavils against the Christian law assume that it is intrinsically wrong for a being to direct his aims to his own well-being. But this is not true. There is a sense in which self-love is lawful, even for a creature; yea, the absence of it may be positive sin. There is another reason why the selfishness of fallen man is criminal: It is because a question of prior right intervenes. Our Creator puts in claims to the fruits of our existence, which are superior to all others; and therefore it is sin to be supremely selfish, because it robs our Maker of that which we received of Him. But God is indebted to none for His existence and powers. He alone is eternal, uncaused, and independent. Obviously then, it is invalid to reason that, because, in a creature, supreme egotism would be an odious crime, therefore it would be a vice in the uncreated God. That regard for one's own well-being which, even in the creature, may be a proper subordinate end, may be in the Creator a most righteous supreme end.

But Christianity can defend itself with more positive arguments upon this point. God, being immutable, is ever actuated by the same motives. But when His eternal purpose of creation and providence subsisted in His mind, "before He had made the highest part of the dust of the earth," or laid the foundations of the heavens, He must have been self-moved thereto; for the irrefragable reason, that nothing else existed besides Himself, to be a motive. Is it said that creatures, the future recipients of His beneficence, were present in thought, and were the motives of His purpose? The reply is at hand, that they existed as yet, only in His purpose; which purpose was the expression of His own subjective desire and impulse alone, seeing nothing but Himself existed. Hence the very purpose to create creatures to be the recipients of His bounty, was simply the result of self-gratification, because the perfections of nature thereby indulged were infinitely benignant. But whatever was God's motive in the earliest eternity, is His motive still; for He is without "variableness, or shadow of turning."

When it is remembered that we are creatures, it is easily concluded, that our highest duty is to God. He is the author of our existence, our powers, our happiness, and supporter of our nature. He is our proprietor, in a sense so high that all other forms of ownership almost vanish away, when set beside God's. He is, moreover, by His own perfections, the properest object of all reverence, homage, and suitable service. So that, manifestly, it is the highest virtue in the creature, that he should offer to God the supreme tribute of his being and service. But if it is obligatory on the creature to offer this, it cannot be wrong in God to accept it.

Hence, we repeat, God's most proper ultimate end, in all His creation and government, is the gratification of His own adorable perfections in His acting. And the creature's highest duty is not chiefly to seek his own good, or that of his fellow-creatures; but the glory of God. He is the center, in whom originated all beings, and to whom all should tend. His will and glory is the keystone of the whole moral order of the universe. As it was the gratification of His infinite activity which originated all creature existences, with all their powers of doing and enjoying, so it is His self-prompted desire to diffuse His infinite beneficence, which is the spring of all the well-being in the universe. And here is the conclusive answer to the cavil which we have been discussing: How can it be selfishness in God to make the gratification of His own nature His supreme law, where that nature is infinitely unselfish and benevolent? In this light, the objection is seen to be of a piece with that wretched philosophizing which argues, that, because the loving mother, the sympathizing benefactor, are actuated by their own subjective impulse, in succoring the objects of their kindness, and find pleasure in the act, therefore it is not disinterested. Common sense, as true philosophy, replies: aye, but is not the pleasure itself a pleasure in disinterestedness? What higher definition of a disinterested nature can be given, than to say that its most instinctive pleasure is in doing good?

Thus, as God's own most suitable end is the satisfaction of His own excellent perfections; so the creature's chief end is to glorify and enjoy Him. This benevolent God has, of course, given the duties of benevolence to man a large place in the law which he has enacted for men; but even in our freest acts of

beneficence to our fellows, we are required to have a reference supremely to Him whose creatures they are. Love to our neighbor is to be a corollary from love to our God. We are chiefly to seek His glory in their good, as in our own; and these are always in complete harmony. Hence it follows that whenever man makes his own, or his fellows' good his chief end, he necessarily comes short of that good; and the only way to gain it, is to seek the higher end. Nor is there a paradox, when we thus say, that in order that man may truly attain his own well-being, he must truly prefer something else to it. Is it not a parallel, and an admitted truth, to say, that it is only when the virtuous man prefers some better end than applause, in his actions, that they are truly virtuous and deserving of applause? An instructive instance of this great law of our well-being is found by every one in common life. Who has not experienced this: that the days and the efforts which have been especially devoted to our own enjoyment, have usually disappointed us of enjoyment, while the days, which we devote primarily to duty, are thickly strewn with wayside flowers of unexpected pleasure?

Christian philanthropy derives its efficiency, no less than its purity, from this, that it all flows from the Christian's love of his God. He is an object, who never disappoints us, who never changes nor forgets; who never shows Himself forgetful or neglectful of our affectionate service; who never disgusts our efforts by unworthiness; and who has pledged the most generous reward to every true act of humanity. But if we make man our chief end, he usually shews himself, soon, unworthy to be our end. He alienates our love; he disgusts us by the follies and crimes which cruelly counteract our efforts for his good; he renders us indignant by his ingratitude. Such an idol as this can never animate us with a devotion, which will rise to the pure and enduring self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Hence, if for no worse reason, worldly philanthropy is ever feeble, unsteady, evanescent.

But it is time to pursue, in turn, this part of the contrast. The latter scheme proposes as our most proper and virtuous end, not God's glory; (this would be, say they, to make God the infinite egotist) but man's good. *Advantage to man* is its highest aim. And this, the humanitarian claims, is true disinterestedness. This *forbids* selfishness as the ruling motive to man,

as it disclaims it for God. (Might they not as well say at once, *forbids* it to God, also; and thus disclose their real impiety?) This, therefore, they urge, is the true, the morally beautiful and amiable theory of life.

Let us see. By what logic can it be justly denied that whatever is made our highest ultimate end is practically made our God? It is nothing to the purpose that names and titles are politely exchanged, and man is still called the creature, and Jehovah the God. Virtually, the aggregate of humanity is made our true divinity, by being made our moral end; and Jehovah is only retained (if retained at all) as a sort of omnipotent expediency and Servitor to this creature-God. Further, this result is immediately seen to be involved; that, inasmuch as the philanthropist is himself a part of this aggregate humanity, "by nature equal" to any other part, he is a part of his own God! He himself is, in part at least, his own supreme end! Is there no inkling of a supreme egotism here?

But now, if humanity is our supreme end, and if this humanity is as truly embodied in one individual of the race, as in all, and if each individual is "by nature equal"; by what valid argument shall that man be refuted in the interests of philanthropy, who shall choose to say, that he recognizes in that humanity embodied in himself, his own nearest, and most attainable end? He may plausibly add, that nature herself sanctions this conclusion, by the powerful and instinctive principle of self-love which she has implanted; and yet more forcibly, that since man's finite powers can only serve this aggregate humanity, by serving some individual or individuals within it, and efforts directed equally to the whole must be wholly nugatory; and since nature has given to each man more efficient means to influence his own destiny than that of any other man, and more direct responsibility therefor, it is obvious that his truest virtue will be to seek his own personal good, in preference to that of any, or of all others? Such is precisely the process, stated with analytic precision, which passes in an involved and semi-conscious form, through the minds of myriads of the children of this world, determining them to the supreme indulgence of selfishness. Is not this but an expansion of the process by which Hobbes, that "Leviathan" of infidel philoso-

phers, concluded, that the normal state of man was a contest of each individual's supreme self-love against each other's?

And now, by what argument shall it be refuted, from the humanitarian premises? Will men attempt it, by adopting the scheme of Jonathan Edwards, which defined virtue as "love to being in general," and required the first love to be given to the greatest aggregate of being? Will they say that one should prefer the good of mankind to his own, because the race offers a larger aggregate of humanity than the individual? This will hardly be ventured at this day, after the extravagant deductions of Godwin's Political Justice have displayed the absurdity of the theory. But besides, since the devil and his angels are exceedingly numerous, and creatures majestic in natural endowments compared with man, it is probable that they present a greater aggregate of being than mankind; whence it would follow, that we are morally bound to prefer the welfare of demons to that of men. Shall the theory be amended, then, by saying that it is the largest aggregate of virtuous being, only, which claims our preference, and first love? Then, first, suffering humanity would share least; because ours is a guilty and depraved race; and usually, men's miseries (and so their need of philanthropic aid) are in proportion to their sins. And second: since God presents immeasurably the largest aggregate of virtuous being, this leads us back to God as our supreme end; precisely the result which the humanitarian desires to shun.

Or will the refutation of inordinate selfishness be sought from the more harmless theory of Jouffroy; that, as the human reason, educated by experience, compares the instinctive desires of its fellow men for their personal good, with its own, it recognizes their equality, and generalizes the law of the golden rule, as the proper moral order of the whole? The ready answer is, that if this is the moral order, then it is recognized by the pure reason as the obligatory order. But obligation implies an obligator; so that, by this process again, we are led back to God; and our virtue is made to consist in conformity to his supreme will. But, if the moral is rightfully the dominant faculty in man, does not this also make God our supreme end?

We re-affirm the charge, that on humanitarian grounds, an absolute selfishness is a logical conclusion; so that the boast of disinterestedness which they make, is found hollow; and the

reproach they attempt to cast upon Christianity is retorted upon themselves. It is a significant confirmation of this charge, that this egotistical conclusion has been expressly avowed by one school among those most subtle of anti-Christian philosophers, the German Idealists. This party, asserting that the whole materials of human thought are to be found in the data of our consciousness alone, then declare, that consciousness gives us naught but our own ideas, that what we delusively call the objective sources of our sensations and perceptions, are nothing more than the necessary limitations of our own thought and feeling. Thus no evidence remains for the existence of an outer world of either mind or spirit distinct from the conscious self; and the only universe which remains is the something which thinks. Self, God, the world, are reduced to one; and that one is not a personal being, but an eternal impersonal power of thought. "Now," says the German Pantheist, in the last refinements of his frightful theory; "since I, God, humanity, are one, let either God or humanity be the proper end of existence, since these are only developed consciously to me in myself, self is the nearest and properest object to receive this supreme homage; and absolute self-gratification is my highest rational end. Whatever I happen to prefer is to me, the truest and chiefest good; whatever I happen to will, is the highest right."

Hence the reflecting man need not be surprised to find these humanitarians, who set out with the proudest boasts of benevolence, end with the most engrossing selfishness. The highest professors of this creed have ever been the most cruel of men.

The impotency of this system for good is farther explained by comparison with another law of Christian benevolence. As the latter is founded on the love of God, for its motive, and looks to a future recompense for its personal reward, so it requires the Christian who "would go about doing good," to resemble his Saviour in his spirit of self-sacrifice. Says the Apostle John: "Hereby perceive we the love (of God) because He laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren"—and Paul, suffering for God's people, "filled up that which was behind of the afflictions of Christ, in his flesh for His body's sake, which is the church." It is true that to purchase atoning merit, or make satisfaction to Divine jus-

tice for others' guilt is a high prerogative, in which the sufferings of the Son of God must be forever unapproachable. But in the lower sense, there is a true analogy between the work of the "Man of Sorrows," when he "bare our grief, and carried our sorrows," and the beneficence of his followers. In all their efforts to relieve human suffering Christians must suffer vicariously: they can only lift off the burden of a fellow man, by bearing a part of it themselves. Their philanthropic ministry is destined to be, like the humiliation of their Redeemer, essentially a season of trial; although cheered by not a few of those glimpses of solace drawn by hope from "the glory that should follow," which caused Christ, in the midst of His toils to "re-joyce in spirit." The glory and blessedness are chiefly future, and are with God. Now these are the conditions of a life of true philanthropy; and the Christian's faith arms him with forces which enable him to fulfill them. But not so the philanthropy of the humanitarian. Its good element is nothing more than the natural law of sympathy. As this word indicates, this reflected emotion shares the pain by which it is excited; but the effort to relieve that pain is also succeeded by an instinctive pleasure, which in man's imperfect heart is never wholly disinterested, but involves some elements of self-love, and appetite for applause. So it appears that the *calculated end* of all such acts of beneficence is this personal pleasure. Does one say, that sympathy also acts by an instinctive and involuntary impulse? True; but can an uncalculating instinct be relied on, to produce and regulate a systematic life of benevolence? *Nay verily—man will never be nerved to the habitual, sustained endurance of suffering, by an impulse to personal pleasure: it is contradiction.

One other fact remains to be mentioned, which the humanitarian studiously ignores, but which the Bible asserts. None but God can truly elevate fallen and suffering humanity. Death, and all the ills which are its foretastes, came by sin; and sin reigns in human hearts, with a dominion which nothing but omnipotent power can break. All that human love can do is to labor with God, as humble instruments, looking and praying that He may give "the preparation of the heart," and lift up the sufferers by a true and permanent restoration. Moreover, if our toils are a failure as to their objects, by reason of the withhold-

ing of this sovereign agency, they cannot be a failure as to God's glory and our recompense. These are sure, whether the sufferer rise or sink, if our efforts are made in love and faith. But now, it is manifest from this great truth, as it is shown by actual experience, that *failure* must be the result of all unbelieving philanthropy, in the end. Its objects refuse to be rescued thoroughly; or they sink again. In asserting this, we take our stand upon the field of history, and boldly ask: where is the human device for the amelioration of man's sin and misery, which has not terminated, sooner or later, in failure? Where is the form of liberal government, the moral reform society, the temperance society, the agency of civilization, which has accomplished its work, and preserved it? But when this worldly philanthropy fails, as fail it must, what is to solace its mortification, its disappointed self-love, its indignation at the unworthiness of its objects?

Another application of the fact of human depravity remains; it affects the philanthropists themselves, as well as their objects. Their justice, benevolence, and sympathy are imperfect fragments amidst the ruins of their fallen nature. These ruins, none but God can reconstruct; and this He does through the grace revealed in Christianity. The discussion has hitherto been conducted upon the assumption claimed by the humanitarians, that the motives prompting their intervention were innocent; and all that has been hitherto urged is their insufficiency. But this is not the whole of the argument. God's infallible truth declares that all men, the philanthropists and the sufferers, the philosophers and their pupils, are fallen creatures; that true righteousness is overpowered in them by sin, that the partial good impulses which remain as the reliques of paradise are inferior and weak, and that the various elements of selfishness are in the ascendant in every unregenerate will. Partial impulses of social affection, of generosity, of sympathy, of honor, illuminate in different degrees the natures of these men; and far be it from us to deny their sincerity, but they are not in the permanent ascendant. Sin is the ruler and tyrant of all natural hearts. Now, if these things are indeed so, and the humanitarians obstinately refuse to admit them, their blindness to the nature of their own motives only aggravates their recklessness, and the danger of mischief. Is their intervention for

their suffering fellow men prompted by genuine sympathy? Let it be admitted; but this principle is unstable; and so surely as they are men, the other principles, love of power, love of applause, conceit, pride, ambition, self-righteousness, or some of them, are mingled in some ratio, in every beneficent action. Let the unworthiness or ingratitude of the objects, or mortification of failure, or opposition concerning the methods of benevolence, supervene, and how easily, how naturally, do the movements of philanthropy slide into those of the malignant emotions. Thus is generated the monster, fanaticism; in which all that remains of the beneficent purpose is a pretext, to blind the mind of the fanatic to the true nature of his emotions, and to sanctify to himself all their enormities. The cold and glittering enthusiasm of the imagination is combined with the malignant passions of self-display, lust of power, and hatred; and the whole, borrowing the sacred name of philanthropy, goes forth upon its destroying career.

The true character of this fanaticism may be disclosed by easy tests. If love were the true spring of its pretended zeal, that benignant emotion ought to display itself consistently, in the general life, and especially in the daily practiced duties of home and family, which should hold the first place in every healthy conscience. But when the private life of your fiery declaimer against social wrongs is examined, it is usually found to be characterized by domestic harshness, injustice and selfishness; his wife, his children, his servants, feel little of that abounding beneficence which he delights to ventilate abroad concerning the wrongs of the distant and unknown. On the other hand, the men of practical kindness, who actually exercise a generous and self-denying benevolence, in that home-sphere, where benevolence is most practicable, are seldom found among these self-constituted assertors of the wrongs of humanity. Moreover, let any individual among the pretended objects of his sympathy be brought to their own door, and thrown upon this actual help; he will be very likely to find it a most unsubstantial dependence. The fiery philanthropist will speedily teach him that while he is very willing to gratify his malice by scolding his opponents, or his pride by parading his benevolence, he has little thought of sacrificing either his own money or convenience for the sufferer,

From this position, the mischievous and corrupting effects of preached crusades against organized social systems which are supposed to be evil, receives a facile explanation. Christianity and its true ministers make it their main business to address the individual; and their topics are his own duties and sins. They separate him, they tell him his spiritual necessities; they say: "Thou art the man"; they teach him to make his own spiritual amendment his chief care. Thus, by sanctifying each individual, human society is effectually regenerated; and organic evils easily disappear. But when once the pulpit is perverted to declaim habitually against the public sins of communities, and to agitate for their reform, the individual is encouraged to lose sight of his own errors (the only ones he is responsible for, or able to reform), and to occupy himself with the wrong-doings of others. But these are of course, painted in constant contrast with his own rectitude; so that this preaching, instead of inculcating humility and sanctity, is nothing but a ministration of spiritual pride, arrogance, and hatred. And hence its popularity. It is much more agreeable to an evil heart, to be reminded of its own superior excellence, and to be invited to the work of reviling its opponents, than to be summoned to the toils of self-discipline, the mortifications of personal contrition, and the crucifixion of carnal affections.

REPLY OF R. L. DABNEY, D. D.,

To the Letter of General Joseph E. Johnston, Criticising
Dr. Dabney's Narrative of the First Battle
of Manassas.

To the Editors of Richmond Dispatch, June 21, 1867.

Gentlemen: Accident recently brought to my attention the remarks published in your paper of March 24th by General Joseph E. Johnston upon the narration of the part borne by the Stonewall brigade in the battle of Manassas contained in my life of General T. J. Jackson. So far as these corrections have revealed error in my statements, I receive them thankfully, and shall not fail to employ them, as soon as it is in my power, for the perfecting of the accuracy of my narration. The high position and services of General Johnston, which none honor and appreciate more cordially than myself, do indeed render it almost a presumptuous attempt to question the correctness of any of his representations, especially when made by one in my obscure place. But even to such a one the reputation for integrity of purpose, at least, is very precious. I therefore beg leave to exhibit in your columns some of the testimonies by which I suppose myself to be sustained in the statements made. I hope every reader will be charitable enough, when he examines these witnesses, to conclude that, if I have been misled, it was without evil intentions, and was not unnatural with such guides before me. I shall take up the points which I purpose to notice mainly in the order of General Johnston's letter.

1. But first, I must endeavor to acquit myself of the charge of disparaging some of General Jackson's comrades, whom, if I knew my own thoughts, I was only seeking, in my bungling way, to honor. General Johnston says: "This account of the battle does great injustice to General Beauregard, and to Bee's and Early's brigades and their commanders. General Jackson's great fame is in no degree enhanced by such disparagements of his associates." The reader is requested to bear in mind the following general caution against such impressions contained