

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.¹

THEY to whom the Bible is a sufficient rule of faith have this great question happily settled for themselves. For in the gospel, life and immortality are clearly brought to light. The doctrine is expressly asserted in a multitude of places, and is necessarily implied in the whole moral system which the Bible teaches. But unfortunately there are now many who hold the word of God as not authority. Christendom is infested with schools of evolution and materialism, which attempt to bring this great truth in doubt by their "philosophy, falsely so-called," and which mislead many unstable souls to their own undoing.

To such as will not look at the clear light of Scripture, we propose to offer the inferior light of the natural reason. The sun is immeasurably better than a torch, but a torch may yet save the man who has turned his back on the sun and plunged himself into darkness, from stumbling over a precipice into an unseen gulf. We claim that we are entitled to demand the attention of all such doubters to the rational argument; for as they have set up philosophy against the Bible, mere honesty requires them to listen to philosophy, the true philosophy, namely:

There is certainly probable force in the historical fact that most civilized men of all ages and countries have believed in the immortality of their souls, without the Bible. Even the American Indians have always believed in the Great Spirit, and expected a future existence in the happy hunting grounds. The ancient pagans universally believed in gods and a future state, except where they were corrupted by power and crime like the later Romans and Athenians, towards the verge of national putrescence. Their mythologies express the real forms of

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their original popular beliefs. Their philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, held the immortality of the soul free from the fabulous coloring of the myths, but upon more solid and rational grounds. The fact that the ancient Egyptians certainly expected the future existence, not only of the soul but of the body, is manifest from their extraordinary care in embalming and preserving all the corpses of their dead. The ancient and the modern Chinese believe firmly in the future existence of the dead, otherwise their ancestor-worship, which is nearly the whole of their practical religion, would be an absurdity. The Indian races are firm believers in immortality, except as the pantheism of the Buddhist doctrine modifies their hope of an individual personal consciousness beyond death. The Scythians, Goths, and Scandinavians were firm believers in a future existence. The whole Mohammedan world holds immortality and a certain form of future rewards and punishments, just as distinctly and firmly as the Christian. We are also entitled to use the fact that immortality has always been the corner-stone of the Bible religion, among both Hebrews and Christians of all ages, as the factor in this historical argument. For this religion has either a divine origin, or it has not. To those who hold the former origin the question of immortality is settled; those who deny its divine origin must, of course, teach that Christianity, like the other religions of mankind, is the outgrowth of some natural principles of reason and feeling belonging to human nature. Our argument is, that on this lower ground Christianity must still be admitted to be the most highly developed, the most beneficial and the most intellectual of human religions. So that the question which agnostics are bound to answer is this: How comes this highest and noblest development of the religious thought of mankind to grasp the doctrine of immortality most clearly and strongly of all, unless there be in the human *essentia* a rational basis necessitating such a conclusion? And here is presented the point of this logic from the almost universal *consensus* of mankind. How is it that nearly all men, of the most different ages and religions, when they think, are lead to think to this conclusion, concerning a fact purely invisible and beyond the range of all earthly experience? There must be rational and active principles in human nature controll-

ing this result of the thought of mankind. Is it not a strange fact and one entitled to give men pause, that the supposed materialistic results of recent speculations, claiming to be scientific and advanced, bring their civilized advocates precisely to that lowest and grossest ignorance concerning man's spirit and destiny which characterizes the stupidest and filthiest savages in the world, Australian Blacks, and African Bushmen? It is these wretches nearest akin to brute beasts, who do the least thinking of all human beings, who are found to have thought downward to the same blank and grovelling nescience, which this pretended advanced science glories in attaining.

Let not the followers of Auguste Comte and of Büchner and Spencer claim to be the original positivists and agnostics. The honor of their conclusions was anticipated long before precisely by those members of the human family lowest down towards the level of the ostriches and gorillas.

The proposition which soundest reason teaches us is this: that while the bodies of men after death return to dust and see corruption, their souls which neither die nor sleep have an immortal subsistence, which is continued independent of the body in individual consciousness and activity. This, of course, involves the belief that the earthly human person includes two distinct substances, an organized animal body, and an immaterial spiritual mind. It is of the continued substantive existence of this latter we are to inquire. Obviously the preliminary question must be concerning the real existence of such a spiritual substance in man. For if there is such a thing in him, it is at once a matter entirely credible that this thing may continue to exist, after the body is dissolved. It is a question for evidence; and affirmative evidence, if found, is, in the nature of the case, fully entitled to our credence. In order to determine the preliminary question it is desirable to clear away certain very shallow misconceptions, and to settle certain principles of common sense.

What do men mean by a substance? The correct answer is in general, that substance is that permanent underlying *thing* to which our minds refer those clusters of properties, or qualities which our senses perceive. What the bodily senses immediately perceive is the qualities—the mind's own power of thought always

leads it to believe in the underlying substance. Let us take a most familiar instance: A sensible child says, "I have an orange." If we ask him how he knows he has one, he will say: "I see it, handle it, smell it, and taste it." Just so; with his eyes he sees the yellow color, rough surface, and spherical shape; with his fingers he feels also its shape, its pimpled surface, and its solidity; with his nostrils he smells its odor; with the gustatory nerves in his mouth he tastes the flavor of the juice. Thus all that his bodily senses directly give him, is a cluster of qualities, yellowness, roughness, roundness, moderate solidity, fragrance, savor. But this child knows that he has in his hand something more than an associated cluster of qualities, a substantial orange. His common sense cannot be embarrassed by reminding him that he has not eyed or fingered, or smelt, or tasted, substance, but only properties. This child will answer: "That may be true, yet my mind makes me know that there is substance under all these properties." For while I see yellowness, if I should ask myself the question, Yellow what? I should try to answer, yellow nothing. This would be almost idiotic. If I know there is yellowness, then my mind makes me know there must be a *something* yellow. If I see roundness, I know there must be a something that is round, and so with all the other properties. If you forbid me to judge thus that there is a substantial orange in which all these properties abide, you will practically make me idiotic. I gave one simple instance. The same facts are true concerning every perception which rational human beings have concerning every concrete object.

This principle of common sense has also another class of applications. Whenever we see actions or functions going on, we must think an *agent* in order to account for them. It does not matter whether we see the agent or not; if we know the actions or functions are going on, our minds compel us to believe that there is an agent producing them. Let us suppose for instance, that a clear-headed country child or red man, who had never seen nor heard of a church bell, should come to a town and there hear one ringing. His mind would prompt him to ask: "What makes that sonorous noise, the like of which I never heard before?" He is compelled to believe before he sees anything, there is some substantive agent that makes the

noise, though as yet unknown to him. Try to persuade him out of this conviction; ask him: Do you see anything making the novel noise? No. Then why not conclude that nothing makes the noise? He will answer: because I am not an idiot; I hear the noise; if there were nothing there could be no noise to hear; I must know there is a substantive thing, an agent producing noise; otherwise noise could not be.

Now, these are the simple principles of common sense, which inevitably and universally regulate the thinking of every human being who is not idiotic or crazy, about every object of sensible knowledge. If the reader doubts this, let him watch the perceptions and thinking of himself and his fellow-creatures until he is fatigued and satisfied.

We come now to the simple application. Every man is absolutely conscious that he is all the time thinking, feeling, and willing; then there must be a substantial agent which performs these functions. Every man is conscious of powers and properties, of thought and feeling; then he is obliged to know there is a substance in him in which these powers and properties abide.

But what do we mean by the notion of substance? We are so familiar by perception with material substances, that possibly thoughtless persons may conclude that we have no valid notion of substance, except that which possesses the material properties, such as color, weight, solidity, size, shape; and such a thoughtless person, though compelled to admit that where so much thinking, feeling, and willing go on there must be a substance which thinks, might conclude hence that this substance must be material, the body, namely, or some part thereof. But the use of a little grain of common sense corrects this folly. Anybody knows that air is a substance as truly as granite rock, but air has no color nor shape, nor do we find out by our senses that it has any weight. Every person not idiotic believes that light is a substance, or else a motion in a substance, ether. But this ether has no color, or shape, or weight, nor is visible or tangible, nor did anybody ever smell it, or taste it, or hear it. Yet all teachers of physics tell us they are as certain of its substantial reality as of that of granite rock. For why? Because our common sense makes us know that, if there were not such a substantive thing as ether, there could never have been any

light for anybody to see. Thus we prove that the gross qualities of matter are not necessary to the rational notion of true substance. We are bound to believe in substances which have not those material properties. Then human souls may be one real kind of substances.

Does some one ask, What, then, belongs to the true notion of substance? Our common sense answers, It is that which is the real thing, a being possessed of sameness and permanency, the enduring basis of reality on which the known properties abide. This description includes spirit as fairly as matter. We assert that we shall find spirit to be that kind of substance which has no material sensible properties, but which lives, thinks, feels, and acts.

Suppose, now, some student of material science should tell us that none of his scientific observations have detected any spirit in any human anatomy. He means the observations made by his bodily senses. Now, how idle and silly is this! Of course, the bodily senses do not detect the presence of spirit, since it is correctly defined as a true substance, which has no bodily properties. This talk is just as smart as that of the booby who should say: "I don't believe there is any such substance as air in that hollow glass globe, because my eyes don't see anything in it; and when I poke my finger into it, I don't feel anything; and when I poke my nose and my tongue into it, I neither smell nor taste anything." Of course he does not, because what is air? A gas transparent and colorless, without solidity, tasteless and odorless. Yet everybody except that booby knows that that glass globe is full of a real substance named air, for its presence there is proved by other reasonable evidences to common sense. So it is mere babble for the materialist to say that the presence of spirit is not attested to him by the observation of any bodily sense. For the question is, may there not be in man another substance not possessed of sensible, material properties, and yet as real and as permanently substance as any stone or metal?

Let our common sense now take another step in advance. When I am directly conscious of a thing, I know it as absolutely as I can possibly know anything. If I were to doubt my own consciousness, I should have to doubt everything else, because everything I know is known to me only through the medium of

this consciousness. I now assert that the reality of the spiritual substance in me, is known to me by my immediate consciousness, and must be so known, every time I know anything outside of myself. For, the reality of the self which knows, is necessarily implied in the act of knowing everything else than self.

We are here stating the simplest possible truth of common sense. Let us take the plainest instance possible. We hear a wide-awake child exclaim: "I see the mule!" Who sees it, child? I do. Then there must be a *me* to do the seeing even more certainly than there is a mule to be seen. Child, if you are certain there is a mule, then you are still more immediately certain there is a *me*, a self, an *ego*. As soon as you state this the child sees that it is and must be so, unless he is an idiot.

This is exceedingly simple. Yes, so simple that no doubt the child often looks at mules, trees, houses, etc., without stopping to think about it. But when he is stopped by the question, he inevitably thinks it. He is more certain of the existence in himself of the *ego*, the substance which thinks, than he is of the reality of any and everything else about which he thinks.

These views of common sense are so simple, so easy, so indisputable, that people are tempted to overlook how much there is involved in them. Let us pause then and review. We have found that wherever we see properties we must believe in substances to which the mind refers these properties. Wherever we see action going on we must believe in substantive agents. Sensible material properties are not necessary to a true and permanent substance. Since every man is conscious of much thinking, feeling and choosing, he must believe in the real existence in himself of a substantive agent which does this thinking, feeling, and acting. If he did not believe in the reality of the *me* which sees and thinks, he could not believe in anything he saw or thought. Therefore he knows there is in him a thinking substance, more certainly than he knows anything else or everything else in the world; and these principles of common sense are so simple, so fundamental, so regulative of all thinking and knowing that if you could really make any man deny their force you would make that man an idiot. So direct and perfect is our demonstration.

The doubter may reply: "Of course, so much is indisputable. I must know there is a substance in me which thinks; but may not that substance be body, the whole *sensorium* or nervous structure inside the bones and muscles? or the brain? or the little cluster of lobes between the top of the spinal marrow and the base of the brain? or the pineal gland in the centre of that cluster?" This is a fair question, and it shall be fairly met. We know the properties of matter pretty well through the perception of our bodily senses. The inquiry now must be, whether we cannot know through the perceptions of consciousness the essential properties of this something which thinks. When we have informed ourselves certainly of these, we can compare them with the material properties, and decide this plain question of common sense: *Whether or not the two kinds of properties are enough alike to belong possibly to the same kind of substances?*

As intimated, we learn the properties of material things by the observations of our bodily senses. We learn the properties of the something in us that thinks, chiefly by the observations of consciousness, and also by watching and comparing the acting forth of the thinking agent in our fellow-creatures. Now, we are actually told that some are silly enough to assert that no observations are valid except those made upon outward things by our senses. When a child uses his eyesight to look at an orange, he finds out correctly that it is yellow. When he uses his ears to listen to the bell, he finds out certainly that it is sonorous. But they think this child finds out nothing certain concerning the being within, which does the seeing and listening, by watching its inward consciousness, because, forsooth, this is not sensuous observation! How stupid this is may appear by a plain question: would that child's hands and ears tell him anything about the properties of the orange and the bell, unless his sense perceptions of them were reported in his consciousness? Suppose he were asleep when the bell rang. These sonorous wavelets would pass through the air and agitate the *tympanum* and inner nerves of his ear just the same, but the child would know nothing about the bell. Why not? Because his consciousness does not take in the sound. Suppose that child is awake, and you hold the orange before his eyes, but his mind is so monopolized with an entrancing vision of next

Saturday's picnic that he fails to notice it at all. Again, his eyes tell him nothing about the orange. Why not? He was not attending to it, which is to say, the perception of it did not enter his consciousness. It is only by the mediation of consciousness that the observations of the senses tell us anything certain. Then it is the testimony of consciousness which is immediate and primary, while that of the senses is secondary and dependent. If the observations of consciousness are not to be trusted, those of the senses are for the stronger reason not to be trusted.

Hence it follows, that of all the things which we certainly know, the things of the inner consciousness are the most certain. First, then, I am immediately conscious that the something in me which thinks and feels, the self or *ego*, is all the time completely identical; however I may notice it at different times, I am conscious of its complete sameness; for instance, I go to sleep, that is, my bodily senses shut themselves up and for a time remembered consciousness is suspended. I wake, consciousness revives, and immediately I know that it is the same identical self which went to sleep some hours before. Sleep has made a deep gap in my sensations and my remembered thoughts and feelings; but I am certain it has made no gap at all in the sameness of the self. For, again, I am conscious of feeling the heat of fire, then afterwards of feeling the intense cold of the north wind; or at one time of being frightened by a malignant bull, and afterwards of being charmed by a mocking-bird; now of looking at an ugly clod, then of looking at the splendid sun. Now heat and cold are opposite sensations; fear and pleasure are opposite emotions; the ugly little image of the clod extremely different from the image of the sun; but I know that the self, the *me*, which experiences these different and opposite sensations and thoughts is completely the same. I believe in its perfect continuous identity; and let the reader notice that this belief cannot be a result from any process of comparison or reflection; because I must be sure beforehand of the sameness of the mind which does the comparing, or else the comparison is worthless, and concludes nothing. For instance, suppose two pairs of two children's eyes in separate rooms were looking at two apples; could there be any comparison determining which apple was the larger? What would the dispute be worth be-

tween the two little fools, each repeating that his apple was the bigger? Let one and the same pair of eyes look at both apples, then only comparison is possible deciding which is the bigger apple. I purposely make these instances perfectly simple. They are fair, they convince us that the conviction of the mind's own identity has to be presupposed in order to authorize the mind to draw any other conclusions, by any process of reflection or comparison whatsoever. So that the first and most certain truth which I am obliged to know, concerning the something in me which thinks, is its perfect identity, its absolute sameness. But I see that nothing organized has this perfect sameness. No animal body, no tree, or plant remains the same two days, every one is losing something and gaining something, growing, dwindling, changing. Even the rock and the mountain change. The rain and the frost are continually washing off or scaling off parts. But I repeat; especially is perpetual change the attribute of every living, material organism, change of size and form, and even of constituent substance. Now, none of those who deny the spirituality of the mind ever dream of saying that thought can be the function of inorganic matter. No, they try to say, thought may be the function of organized matter, of matter most highly organized. But they admit that the most highly organized material substances are those which change most quickly. I make, then, this point: the self which thinks must be immaterial, because it possesses absolute identity, and no organized body of matter ever remains the same, in that high sense, two days together. In the second place, I know that the something in me which thinks is an absolute unit. This is involved in its identity. It is impossible for me to think of this *me* as divided or divisible. I am conscious it is undergoing constant changes or modifications in the form of different successive thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and volitions; but I know that this *me* is the unit-centre in which all these meet and out of which all my volitions go. I experience a variety of mental modifications, but each one of these is qualified by the same absolute unity. If I try to think of my sensation, my idea, my feeling, my volition, divided into halves or quarters, the statement becomes nonsense to me. But with all matter the case is exactly opposite; the smallest body of matter is divisible into

smaller. Each part subsists as an aggregation of smaller parts. The properties of matter are all divisible along with its masses. The whiteness of this wall may be literally divided along with the substance of the plastering into the whiteness of a multitude of points in the wall. Let an electrified steel rod be cut in two, we have two electrified rods; so the electricity may be subdivided along with the matter itself; but each affection of the mind is as complete a unit as the mind is. Thus I am bound to think that mind is immaterial. In the third place, my perceptions make me acquainted with the attributes of matter, and I perceive that they all belong to one class; they are all attributes of extension. The smallest material bodies have some size, all must have some shape or figure, they all weigh something, though some are lighter than others, they all subsist in the form either of gasses, or liquids, or solids. Most of them have colors. But when I turn to mind and its processes, I know that none of these attributes of extension can apply to them at all. Let us make the attempt. Let us try to say that this fine mind is finer than that other, because it has a circular or elliptical shape while the inferior one is three-cornered. Attempt to explain the fact that Mr. Calhoun's mind was greater than a peasant's because it was so many inches bigger, or so many pounds heavier. Let us attempt to give figure to our thoughts and feelings, or color, saying that some are three-cornered, some square, some circular, some red, some blue, and some black. Let us try to think of the top and bottom of a sentiment or a volition as we do of the top and bottom of a brick or a house. We speak of arguments sometimes as solid, but what we mean is that they are logically valid. We know that we cannot think them solid in the material sense of stones or wooden blocks. The very attempt to fix any attribute of matter upon mind or upon its processes becomes mere idiotic nonsense. This shows that the attributes of matter are not and cannot be relevant to mind. Why? Because they are opposite substances. Mind is pure, immaterial spirit; all the bodies our senses see are extended, divisible, ponderous, figured, in a word material.

In the fourth place, when I watch myself I am immediately conscious of my free-agency. In certain respects I choose for

myself what I attempt to do; nobody and nothing outside of self make me choose what I choose. The *me*, the thinking self, has this remarkable faculty of power, of self-determination. Thus self is an original spring-head of new actions and effects. Let no one deceive himself with the shallow notion that this power of free-agency is merely unobstructed execution by the muscles and members of purposes or volitions put into the soul. This is but half of the fact; the soul is free in forming those volitions. It is not forced to them, but is self-determined in them. Minds are originators of new actions and effects. Now matter has not and cannot have such free-agency. Science pronounces absolute *inertia* to be the first law of matter. Experience shows that if a material mass was once lying still it will be still in the same place forever, unless a force from without pushes it. If it is moving in any line with any given speed it is obliged to move on thus forever, unless something outside of itself stops it. Matter can receive effects; it can transmit them; it never originates any effect. It is impossible to conceive of matter as exercising intelligent choice, endowed with rational free-agency. He who tries to think thus of matter makes himself to that extent idiotic. But mind has free-agency, it chooses, it originates. Therefore mind must be a different substance from matter, an opposite substance. Mind is spiritual, matter is corporeal.

In the fifth place, corresponding to our conscious free-agency is our consciousness of our accountability, or moral responsibility for our conduct. This is an immediate conviction of our conscience which it is impossible for us to escape. It is equally impossible for us to ascribe accountability to material bodies. If I, by a volition of my free-agency, strike and wound the head of a man without provocation, I know it is a sin for which I am morally responsible. The wounded man knows it, every spectator knows it. Another man when walking in the forest has his head struck and wounded by a falling branch which the wind blows from a tree; this is not a sin but an accident; neither the wind nor the dead branch is accountable for it. The man would be idiotic to seriously judge either of them morally responsible. Here then is the crowning contrast between mind and matter: minds are accountable because they are intelligent and free-agents;

material bodies cannot be accountable; therefore we conclude again that minds and bodies are opposite kind of substance. Minds are immaterial substances distinct from the bodies which they inhabit for a time. They are indeed combined in the animated human person in a mysterious and intimate manner. Such combinations are credible, for similar ones frequently occur. But the two substances combined must be distinct, because it is impossible that any essential attribute of the one substance can be attached in thought to the other. Now let no one say that this is but a metaphysical argument. In the sense of such charges I deny it. It is not metaphysics, but the unavoidable conclusion of common sense. I ask the reader to go over these five steps again carefully. He will find that there is not a single position assumed which every man does not know to be true by his own necessary consciousness without being a philosopher at all. Every point in my argument is one of those necessary principles of knowledge which are found universally regulating the thoughts of all the people in the world who are in their right minds, principles of thinking which no man can reject from his mind without reducing himself towards the position of a lunatic or an idiot. It is from these simple principles I have drawn the conclusion that the mind, the something in us which thinks, is not a mere function or quality of something else, but a true permanent substance in itself; and since all its essential properties are the opposites of those of material bodies, souls are distinct kind of substance, immaterial spirits. I invite the reader to break these conclusions if he can do it honestly and truthfully. The more he tries the more he will be convinced that he cannot, because the premises are the necessary first facts of knowledge, and the conclusions follow by the force of common sense.

This fact that our spirits are naturally monads, shows that they will never cease to exist, by a powerful analogical argument. They may be justly called spiritual atoms, single and indivisible, in the same high, absolute sense with the ultimate atoms of matter. All science teaches us that no such atom of substance, once brought into existence by the Creator, is ever annihilated. This is the fixed conclusion of the material sciences themselves, as astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology. None of these

sciences know of any kind of destruction of beings except dissolution and separation of their parts. The parts still exist as really as before in new states and places. When a piece of fuel is consumed in the fire, it is only ignorance which supposes that any of its substance is annihilated. All educated persons know that though the fuel is consumed, every atom of it still exists; science is able to catch and weigh every one of them. The mineral atoms remain in the ashes; the watery atoms have floated upward as vapor; a part of the carbon particles are sticking in the chimney-flue in the form of soot; another part is floating off in the form of smoke, as volatilized matter, and a part in the form of transparent carbonic acid gas; not an atom ceases to exist. Every fact in the whole range of experience goes to prove that not an atom of existing substance is annihilated in the greatest changes known to man; they only change places and states. Why then should people suppose that any change can annihilate the spiritual atoms—rational souls? He who ignorantly thinks that death does so, has the whole analogy of human science and knowledge against him. On which side then does the burden of proof lie? Manifestly on the side of the unbeliever. Every probability is against him: he must bring us positive proof on the opposite side demonstrating that souls are annihilated at death; otherwise the whole powerful probability arising out of this analogy remains in force in favor of immortality, and I assert there is not a spot in all the realms of human knowledge where the materialist can find one real ray of rebutting evidence. Every fact of physical science is against him; every doctrine of mental science is against him. He discredits the resurrection of Moses, Lazarus, Jesus, and Tabitha as fabulous. Then according to him, not a single witness has ever come back from the invisible region beyond the grave to testify whether men's souls live there or not.

I admit that I have not yet proved the immortality of the spirit positively and affirmatively. But I have shown that this proposition is credible and may be capable of proof. For, since spirits are substantive beings, and distinct kind of substances from bodies, the destruction of the bodies they inhabit no longer presents any necessary evidence that the spirits are destroyed by bodily death. It is just as possible and credible that the

death of the bodies may have no more influence on the continuing existence of the spirits than the stripping off of a child's clothing has upon his personal life. I am ready to admit that the first impression made on our sensations when we witness a death is different. The death of a human body is very impressive and awful. When we see the marble complexion, the glazed eye, the absolute and final arrest of sense and motion, the irreparable change from visible activity to dissolution and dust, it is not surprising that the first impression should be, with us sensuous creatures, This is the end of the whole being. The fact that the spirit of the deceased never returns in the ordinary course of nature to tell us whether it is still alive and active, awes the imagination, and suggests to the fancy the negative. But here we must remember how frequently the first sensible impressions are entirely delusive, and how they are contradicted by reason and fuller observation. The first impression with the child when he sees the acorn drop from the tree and lie frozen in the wintry earth, is that the acorn is dead. It is hard for him to believe that this little dry fragment of matter is the germ of a tree which will live for centuries a monarch of the forest. Nearly all the actual exploits of chemistry and electricity are equal surprises, wholly contrary to first impressions. Who supposed at first that gas tar, a thing black, stinking, and filthy, contained all the glories of the aniline dyes, until Hoffman proved it? How hard is it to believe that all the planets except two are much larger than this huge globe of ours, when they appear to us nothing but minute points of light in the nocturnal sky! Yet the astronomers prove by strict mathematics that they are larger than the earth. All intelligent persons see so many instances of the falsehood of these first impressions on sensation and fancy, that they cease to regard them as any tests of truth. We know that we must look beyond them for more reasonable proofs, and the question for us is, whether facts and reason do not prove that the immaterial spirit survives the death of the body.

The answer is, Yes.

For, *first*, strong probable proof appears in this fact, that the identity of the living spirit does certainly remain unchanged throughout sundry great changes undergone by the body. We

know that every human body changes from a living *fœtus* to a living infant. It then changes into a grown man in his full vigor. It then passes into the decrepitude of age. But these impressive changes in the conditions of the body result in no change in the identity of the spirit which inhabits it. This is conscious of its own sameness throughout the changes. Hence there is a clear probability that the next change, bodily death, also may not interrupt the being of the living spirit. The body not only grows, but it may lose half its substance by emaciation from sickness; it may lose a whole limb by wounds or amputation; but the spirit consciously lives on without change or diminution of spiritual powers. This shows it to be probable that the final amputation, cutting off all its limbs from its use, will not interrupt the spirit's life. Indeed, we are assured by physiologists that there is a constant change in the material molecules which make up our bodies at any one time. Every tissue experiences wear and tear and nutrition. Particles which yesterday were vital parts are now "*necrosed*," and are expelled out of the system as alien matter, while their places in the living tissues are taken by new particles which yesterday belonged to a different vegetable or animal. It is every way probable that there is not one single molecule at this time in our bodies which was there some years ago. But while, between these two dates, our bodies have undergone this sweeping change, and those of that previous year have as literally and absolutely returned to their dust as will the corpse of the friend whom we bury to-day, our spirits are certain of their unchanging life and identity. In one word, every man's body is daily undergoing gradual death; this makes no change in the life and identity of the spirit. Hence the summary death of such a body presents no real evidence of the destruction of the spirit.

Second, Every time we go to sleep and awake we have probable proof that the spirit remains awake after the sleep of death. We are familiar with this nightly change. It does not frighten us or impress the imagination. But let us consider it as a rational man would, should it have come to him as an entire novelty. When we grow drowsy we are conscious of approaching insensibility. The senses are all ceasing to act and closing up. If the mind had no experience to teach it better and listened to the first

impression it would doubtless conclude: "This insensibility will be final; this last moment of consciousness is the last I shall ever experience." But every morning serves to correct this awful impression. Every awakening teaches us that this mimic death of the body has not in the least interrupted the life and conscious identity of the spirit. Hence the probability grows strong that the deeper sleep of death will not interrupt it, that this also will have its sure awakening.

Third, It is urged by materialists that so far as all experience goes the thinking being is dependent for all its perceptions upon its bodily sense organs and for the execution of all its volitions upon its nerves and muscles; hence they would have us infer that the soul is entirely dependent on its body for all its knowledge and activity, which is practically being dependent on the body for its existence, since without either knowledge or activity the soul would be practically non-existent. But how does the soul use its bodily organs of sense and motion? Obviously in the same general mode in which it uses external instruments.

The soul feels external bodies with its arms as it would feel bodies somewhat more distant with a stick. The soul sees luminous objects with its eyes just as it sees with a telescope or opera-glass. It hears sounds with its ears, much as it hears them with an ear-trumpet. The blind man does not lose his power of feeling by dropping his stick. The huntsman does not lose sight by breaking his field-glass nor the sense of hearing by losing his ear-trumpet. We know perfectly well that these bodily organs are not our minds but only instruments which our minds employ; therefore the loss of the instruments does not imply the destruction of the mind: it only leaves us in ignorance as to the other instruments of knowledge and action which the mind will learn how to employ when it shall lose these bodily ones. But more correct thought shows us that the spirit in its disembodied state will most probably not need or employ any organic instruments of perception. The only reason why she needs them now is probably because she is immured in an animal body. Her case is that of a state prisoner, who is confined for a time within the walls of a castle. He has been allowed five loop-holes in these walls in order to hold some intercourse with the outer world. At death the liberator comes

and proposes to demolish the roof and walls of his prison. Shall the prisoner be so thoughtless as to complain and object that in destroying his walls they are depriving him of his loop-holes, in consequence of which he will be able to see nothing of the outer world? The answer is plain: the only reason he needed loop-holes was that the wall imprisoned him; now that it is gone he needs none. He has free unobstructed light and vision all around him.

Fourth, The independence of the separate thinking substance is more strongly proved by this fact: that a number of its higher functions are performed without any dependence upon any bodily organ. Our eyes are the instruments with which we receive visual perceptions; through the ears we receive the acoustic; through the fingers the tactual; through the nostrils the olfactory; through the palate the gustatory. But our abstract general ideas, our cognitions of God, of time, of space, of infinity, of subjective consciousness, are ministered by no sense organ. Every avenue of sense may be locked up or disused, and yet these highest functions of spirit are in full activity. The animated body is still there, but it is contributing nothing to these most important functions of soul. Especially does the spirit assert its essential independence in its self-prompted volitions. We will rest this argument more especially upon that well known class of volitions whose object is not to move any bodily organ or member, but to direct the mind's own attention at will to its own chosen topic of inward meditation; and whose impulse does not come at all from any outward impression, but from the preference and purpose of the mind itself. Every man knows that his mind frequently performs these acts of voluntary attention prompted by nothing outside the mind, and directed to nothing outside of it. Here are cases of the mind moving itself, with which the body has nothing to do. The mind in these actions is as virtually disembodied as it will be when it shall have passed at death into the spirit world.

Some recent physiologists do indeed assert, in the interest of materialism, that we are partly mistaken in these facts. They say that every action, even the most abstract and subjective, in the mind is attended with brain action in the form of some molecular changes or readjustments in the nerve filaments and the

particles of grey matter forming the outer surface of the cerebrum. They would have us believe that when a man, meditating with closed eyes, revives the mental idea of the horse or the tree which he saw a year ago, there is as real nerve action, and indeed the same nerve action, in the brain as that by means of which he first got his visual perception of that object. They would have us believe that when we think our most abstract cognitions of God or eternity, there must be as real brain action as when we are hearing the sound of a trumpet. Thus they would make out our premises to be false, denying that the mind performs any functions of thoughts or volitions independently of brain motions.

When we ask them how they prove all this, we find there is no valid proof, and the theory remains a mere wilful, idle guess. We ask them, Has anybody ever *seen* these motions of nerve matter and changes of relative position between filaments and particles of grey matter? They confess, Nobody. They confess that they will be too minute to be perceived by the human eye. They know that no human eye ever had, or ever can have, an opportunity to watch them, because no vivisection could uncover the ganglia at the base of the brain, where they imagine these things go on, without instantly killing the subject of the experiment. Their indirect arguments are nothing but vague suppositions. The only real source of the fancy is the stubborn determination to reject the teaching of common sense that there is a separate spirit in man, and to make him no more than a material animal. Their real logic amounts only to this worthless argument in a circle: We do not choose to admit the existence in man, no matter how strong the proofs, of anything except animated matter. We are conscious that a great deal of thinking goes on in man; therefore animated matter does it all; therefore nothing exists in man except animated matter. This theory of universal molecular brain actions has never been proved, it is only guessed; it never can be proved.

But were it necessary, we might admit that coördinate nerve actions in the brain attend and wait upon every, even the most wholly abstract, process of mind, without in the least weakening our fourth argument. There are three remarks to which we ask the close attention of the reader, either one of which is sufficient

to prove this. First, the wonderful faculty of memory must be accounted for, whatever theory is adopted. This materialistic theory must teach, as it avowedly does, that the brain is literally and materially the storehouse of memory. It must teach that the way ideas are retained in memory is this: A new mark is imprinted on a portion of the brain matter when the idea first comes through sense-perception; and the reason why the idea remains in memory, and may be revived in recollection, is that the mark remains permanently on the brain matter, like a scratch, for instance, made by a diamond upon a pane of glass; and the immediate cause why the idea revives again in recollection is this, that the portion of brain matter has moved again with a counter-movement, the exact reaction of that which took place when the mark was first printed on it.

Some of them give us descriptions of what they suppose the action and counter-action of the mark to be which are all as imaginative and as truly without proof as the history of Jack the Giant-killer and his beanstalk. The most popular guess is this, that when the sense-impression first came into the brain it caused a change of adjustment between the ends or tips of certain nerve filaments and certain little masses of grey matter. So when the idea is revived in recollection, this results from the reactionary change of position between those little masses and nerve filaments. We care not to discuss the particular shape of any of this idle dreaming. According to its authors every idea received into memory and stored up is represented by a distinct material mark upon a material mass. Now one remark breaks all this down into hopeless folly, viz., that the brain is a limited body while the power of human memory is indefinite and unlimited. The more ideas an educated man has the more new ideas he can acquire. Some great men know a hundred or a thousand times as much as other stupid and thoughtless people. But their brains if they differ in size at all are only larger by a few ounces at most. Voltaire had a multitude of ideas and a marvelous memory. His brain was one of the smallest found in a grown person. What is the use of saying that the mark printed on the brain by each idea may be very small? When the number that may be printed is absolutely unlimited the surface must get full no matter how small each mark, long before

the stock of ideas in memory is completed. Now add another fact, that it is most probable no idea once gained by the mind is ever lost wholly from the memory, but that all remain there unconscious and latent, and capable of being revived by some mental stimulus of suggestion during our future existence: this theory of material nerve markings becomes worthless and idle.

Second, Every man's mind knows that it usually directs its own attention by its own will. When he is lying in darkness with closed eyes he thinks of absent and abstract ideas of God, of duty, of eternity, and not because he is made to do so by physical causes, but *because he chooses*. He directs his own attention to these supersensuous thoughts. We know that sometimes men's minds do drift in involuntary reverie, but we know that men can stop this when they choose. We know that in most cases the mind directs its own thoughts, that it is not led by the nose, by exterior physical causes, but guides itself by its subjective will. Now let it be granted that all our mind processes, even the most supersensuous, are *accompanied by* molecular movements in the brain. Consciousness gives the highest of all evidence. This assures us that if there are any such molecular movements they are only consequences and not causes of the supersensuous actions of the mind. It is the mind that starts the process, it is the brain which responds. Let us suppose that never having seen horses and mounted men until recently it so happens that every time that we have seen the men they were mounted upon their horses; thereupon some chopper of logic like these materialists begins to argue: Gentlemen, you have never seen those men except upon their horses; you have never seen the men move but what you saw the horses move with them; therefore you are bound to believe that the man and the horse are the one and the same being, that each is the literal Centaur. We should reply to him: Nay but oh fool! have we not seen that it is the men who govern the horses, that the horses only move when the men spur them; therefore we know without waiting to see the man dismount that the horse is not one and the same being with the man but an inferior being and the servant of the man.

Third, We know that we are free-agents better than we know

any physiology, false or true. We know that we are free-agents even better than we know that we have vitalized brains inside our skulls, for we know our free-agency by immediate consciousness; but we know every fact of outward observation only as it is reported through this consciousness. Now if this materialistic theory of thought were true, we could not be free-agents. Every thought, feeling, volition, which arises in us would be the effect of a material movement. But matter cannot have any free-agency; and if matter thus governed us we could have none, our very nature would be a lie. Our own hourly experience gives us a perfect illustration of this argument. Our minds do have a class of ideas and a class of feelings whose immediate causes are found in certain movements of our corporeal nerve organs; they are what we call sensations. And about having them, when once those nerve organs are impressed by any external body beyond our control, we have no free-agency at all. If the norther has struck us, we have no more free-agency about feeling chilly, if a stone thrown by a bully has struck us, we have no more free-agency about feeling pain, if another man holds a rose under our nostrils, we have no more free-agency about smelling fragrance than if we were machines or blocks of stone. The knowing subject, mind, has indeed gotten the idea, the feeling; but it has gotten it from a material nerve organ; hence the mind wields no freedom in having it. So, if this materialistic theory of thought were true, if all our supersensuous thoughts, feelings and volitions were propagated from material nerve organs, we could have no free-agency anywhere. But we know we are free-agents to a certain degree.

At this point the solution becomes easy with those cavils against the spirituality and immortality of the soul, which are drawn from the results of concussions of the brain, suspending consciousness, and of lunacy and dotage. If the reader has attended to the remarks last made he will easily see that these facts do not prove the soul to be the brain. They only prove that in our present life the soul uses the brain as its instrument for a part of its processes. In dotage it is the bodily organs which are growing dull and decaying; this is the reason that recent impressions made through the senses are weak and consequently transient. But the facts impressed by sensation in

previous years, when the old man was in his bodily prime, are as strong and tenacious as ever. The old man forgets where he laid his pipe half an hour ago, but he remembers the events of his youth with more vividness than ever. This proves that the decay is only organic. Were it spiritual it would equally obliterate early recollections and recent ones. Again, in the infirm old man, while the memory of recent events seems dull, the faculties of judgment and conscience are unimpaired. His advice is as sound as ever, his practical wisdom as just. The best scientific men now regard all cases of mental disease as simply instances of disease in the nerve-organs, which the mind employs while united to the body. Borrowing the language of pathology, cases of lunacy are but "functional derangements" of the mind. There is no such thing as "organic disease" of the spirit. Whenever the wise physician can cure the nervous excitement by corporeal means, sanity returns of itself to the mind. If lunacy continues until death, it is because the disease of the nerve organ remains uncured. The mind is not released from the disturbing influences of the incurably morbid action of its instrument until the mysterious tie which unites mind to body in this life is finally sundered.

Another objection may here be noted: that a parallel argument may be constructed to prove the spirituality and immortality of the souls of brutes. The higher animals seem to have some mental faculties, as sensation, passions, memory, and a certain form of animal spontaneity. It is asked: Why do not the same arguments prove that the cause in brutes which perceives, feels, remembers and acts, is a distinct spiritual substance, and therefore capable of separate and independent subsistence without the body? One answer is, suppose they did! This would be no refutation. The conclusion might clash with many of our prejudices, might surprise us greatly, might perhaps dictate a change in much of our conduct towards the animals. If the premises of a given reasoner are found to prove another conclusion in addition to that which he had asserted from them, this is no proof at all that his argument is invalid. Let us suppose that a prosecutor of crime has argued that certain established facts prove John and Thomas to be guilty. It is no answer to cry that the same facts would also prove Richard to be

guilty. What if they do? It is still proved that John and Thomas are guilty. The only change in the case is that we now find the guilt extends further than was at first asserted. But in the second place, an argument for the spirituality and immortality of the higher animals will be found very defective when compared with the full argument for man's immortality. The heads of argument which we shall hereafter urge for the latter, are found to have no application to the brutes. But they are far the strongest arguments. The real nature of that principle in them which feels and remembers, is very mysterious to us; the medium of speech is lacking between us and them. The real nature of the brute's faculties is extremely obscure to us, and for this reason we are ignorant of what becomes of that principle when their bodies die. But the nature of the human faculties we can know thoroughly, and therefore we are able to infer what becomes of that spiritual substance endowed with those high faculties when men's bodies die. But obscure as is the nature of the sentient principles of brutes to us, it seems very clear that they lack those faculties and powers on which our argument, as to man, is chiefly founded.

Brutes have sense-perceptions, sensibilities, and memory. But there is every reason to believe that their memory is only of individual ideas of particular material objects. They never form rational, general concepts; they cannot reason concerning collective classes of things. They think no abstract, general truths; they have no judgments of taste or of conscience. Of all these, which are the truly spiritual functions of mind, of all notions and judgments of the beautiful, of the sublime, the obligatory, the morally meritorious, the regulative principles of logic, the rational purposive volition, they seem as incapable as is a vegetable. But these are precisely the functions of human minds, which, we are conscious, go on independently of corporeal organs. These are our crowning proofs of the spiritual independence of human minds.

Fifth, Our argument for man's immortality must now involve as a premise another great truth, the existence of a rational, personal God. We shall not pause to argue this, because it needs no argument. Men can only deny it at the cost of outraging every principle of common sense. The very existence of

a temporal universe proves an eternal God. The universal order of this universe, the appearance of design and contrivance everywhere in it, prove the existence of an intelligent and wise Creator. Every function of conscience within us recognizes a righteous, divine Ruler above us. Since the Creator is wise, we know that he had rational purposes for all that he has created. Therefore we know that if man had been made only for a brute's destiny, God never would have given man capacities and faculties so much above the brute's, so useless and out of place in a temporal and corporeal existence. The brute's instincts, animal sensibilities, and partial memory of particular ideas, coupled with his lack of reason, lack of forecast, lack of conscience, incapacity for religious and abstract knowledge, and lack of all desire for them, qualify him exactly for a temporary, corporeal life. But man's rationality, his unavoidable forecast concerning the future, his moral affections and intuitive judgments of duty, merit, and guilt, his religious nature, his unquenchable hopes and desires for unlimited moral good, are utterly out of place in a creature destined to only an animal and temporal life. No sensible man who believes in a God can believe that the Creator has made such a mistake. Does a rational man furnish sails to his ploughs, destined only to turn the soil of his fields, or cart-wheels to his ships, destined only to navigate the water, or eagles' wings to his gate-posts, planted fast in the soil?

Human experience fully confirms the verdict of Solomon, that the rational man who seeks his chief end in the enjoyments of the mortal life always finds it "vanity of vanities." Did not the wise Creator know that? Did he also perpetrate a vanity of vanities in creating a being thus needlessly endowed for a mere mortal existence, or dare we seriously charge upon him the reproach which the human anguish, in view of this futility and the death which ends it, only suggested: "Lord, wherefore hast thou made all men in vain"? Nay, this were blasphemy. To assert man's mere mortality is a parallel outrage upon all that is noblest in his nature. This outrage evolutionism, the recent and fashionable form of materialism, attempts to perpetrate. We ask it, whence man's mind with its noble and immortal endowments? It has to answer that it is only a function, evolved from mere matter, through the animals. Just as Dr. Darwin accounts for the

evolution of the human hand from the fore paw of an ape, so all the wonders of consciousness, intellect, taste, conscience, volition, and religious faith, are to be explained as the animal outgrowth of gregarious instincts and habitudes cultivated through them.

To any man who has either a single scientific idea touching the facts of consciousness, or a single throb of true moral feeling, this is simply monstrous. It, of course, denies the existence of any substance that thinks, distinct from animated matter. It utterly misconceives the unity which intuitively must be found underlying all the processes of reason in our minds. It overlooks utterly the distinction between instinctive and rational motives, thus making true free-agency, virtue, moral responsibility, merit and moral affection, impossible. It supposes that as the sense-perceptions and instincts of the beast have been expanded by association and habit into the intellect of a Newton, so the fear and habit of the beast cowering under his master's stroke, or licking the hand that feeds and fondles him, are the sole source of the noble dictates of conscience and virtue. The holy courage of the martyr, who braves the fire rather than violate the abstract claims of a divine truth, is but the outgrowth of the brutal tenacity of the mastiff, when he endures blows, and torments rather than unlock his fangs from the bloody flesh of his prey. The heroic fidelity of the patriot, in the face of the grimest death, is but the quality of the dog which will fetch and carry at his master's bidding. The disinterested love of Christian mothers, the heavenly charity which delights to bless an enemy, the lofty aspirations of faith for the invisible and eternal purity of the skies, the redeeming love of Jesus, all that has ever thrilled a right soul with deathless rapture of admiration and elevated man towards his divine father, are destined to have neither a future nor a reward, any more than the fragrance of a rose, or the radiance of the plumage of the bird, or the serpent's scales. After a few years, all that shall forever be of the creature endowed with these glorious attributes, will be a handful of the same dust which is left by the rotting weed. The spirit which looked out through Newton's eye, and read through the riddles of the phenomenal world the secrets of eternal truth and the glories of an infinite God, went out as utterly in everlasting night as the light in the eye of the owl or bat, that could

only blink at the sunlight. These are the inevitable conclusions of evolutionism, and they are an outrage to the manhood of our race. What foul juggling fiend has possessed any cultivated man of this Christian age, that he should grovel through so many gross sophistries in order to dig his way down to this loathsome degradation? The ancient heathens worshipped brute beasts, but still they did not forget that they were themselves the offspring of God. It remained for this modern paganism to find the lowest deep, by choosing the beast for his parent, and casting his God utterly away.

Sixth, Pursuing this argument from the wisdom of God, we prove yet more clearly that he designs man for immortality by this marked human trait, that the faculties of man's spirit are so formed as to be capable of unlimited improvement and progress. The case of the brutes who are not designed for immortality is opposite. They can be trained and improved up to a certain very narrow limit, but there the progress stops. Some of their instincts are very wonderful, but the earliest generations had them just as fully as the latest. Neither individual animals nor races are capable of making continuous progress, and doubtless the bees of Abraham's day built their honey-comb just as mathematically as those of our enlightened century. We presume that the literary pigs of the ancients were just as well educated as those of the modern showmen. The mahouts of King Porus of India, trained their elephants to be precisely as sagacious as those of Barnum, and the ancient Hindoo jugglers managed their snakes and dancing monkeys so as to present the same surprising tricks exhibited by the moderns. But with man it is wholly otherwise. He also like the animals has a body and a few animal instincts. These are capable of improvement, precisely like those of the brutes, within certain narrow limits. Gymnastic exercises enable the athlete to run somewhat faster, jump somewhat higher, lift somewhat heavier burdens, and wrestle or box somewhat better than common men; but his advancement in all these particulars is cut short by very narrow boundaries. He cannot pass beyond these any more than the ancient Greek. No corporeal dexterity is acquired in our day beyond that of the ancient jugglers and gymnasts. When we pass to the faculties of man's spirit, we find all different.

These can be improved indefinitely and without any limitation whatever. The more the mind learns the more it can learn. When an Aristotle or a Cuvier has extended his knowledge beyond that of the peasant a thousand fold, he is better able than ever before to make further acquisitions. The same fact is true of the race. Each generation, may, if it chooses, preserve all the acquisitions both of faculty and knowledge made by parent generations, and may add to them. When we compare the powers of civilized man with those of savages, the former appears almost as a demigod to the latter; but civilized society is now prepared by virtue of these acquisitions to advance from its present position with accelerating speed. Recent events prove this; for the last forty years have witnessed an advancement in knowledge and power equal to the previous hundred years.

Why does an all-wise Creator endow our mental faculties with capacity for endless advancement unless he designs us for an endless life? Observation teaches us that wherever God placed a power in the human *essentia*, he has appointed some legitimate scope for its exercise. It is incredible that he should have given this most splendid power to man had he intended to make it futile by cutting short man's existence. When we visit a nursery farm, where the little scions of apple trees and the great shade trees are cultivated for sale, we see that the nurseryman has planted them one foot apart in rows not more distant than corn-rows; but we see by experience that it is the nature of these trees to grow continually until each one occupies an area of forty feet in diameter. How is this? This nurseryman is surely cultivating these scions with express view to their transplantation into another and wider field of growth, otherwise he is a fool.

Seventh, The argument is crowned and made unanswerable by considering man's moral faculties. These centre in the following intuitive and necessary rational judgments, which are universal among right-minded men, and more indisputable if possible than the axioms of logic and geometry. We have an intuitive notion of moral good and evil, of the distinction between virtue and vice, right and wrong, which cannot be explained by or reduced into any other notion. Every man, not insane or idiotic, knows self-evidently that he is under obliga-

tion to do the right and avoid the wrong. Every man knows that there is good-desert in doing the right and ill-desert in doing the wrong. Every man feels the satisfaction of a good conscience when he does the right disinterestedly, and the sting of remorse when he does evil. Take this set of judgments and sentiments out of a man's spirit and he ceases to be a man.

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, gives us this ingenious argument for immortality from this moral principle, "We know that it is our duty to practice all virtue and avoid all vice, as well as we know it is our duty to practice any virtue." That is to say, our judgment of obligation commands us to be morally perfect. Every sincerely good man is sincerely striving to be better and better, and no enlightened conscience will ever be satisfied short of moral perfection. This is then the voice of God, our maker, in our reasonable souls; and it is a voice of divine command. But experience teaches us that nobody has ever attained moral perfection in this mortal life.

Then surely there must be a future life in which progress in virtue may be made unto perfection. If God has not provided such a future state for us, he would never have laid this high command upon our souls. What should we think of his justice and equity if, after limiting our bodily growth to twenty-five years and fixing our bodily decay at three-score and ten, he had then commanded us every one to grow to be twenty feet tall? Nobody grows to much more than six feet in seventy years. How can we be commanded to grow to twenty feet if seventy years are the limit of our existence?

In the next place, our necessary judgment of demerit for sin and our sentiment of remorse make us all know that punishment ought to follow sin. Everybody expects that punishment will follow sin. We know that God is the fountain-head of moral obligation and the supreme moral ruler. We know that he wields a providential government over us. This is a truth so obvious as to force itself upon the dark mind of the pagan emperor Nebuchadnezzar, that God doeth his will among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of this earth; and that there is none that can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou? On the one hand it is entirely agreeable to reason and conscience to regard the miseries of this life as the punish-

ments, or at least the chastisements, of sin; but on the other hand, if there is no future life reason and conscience ought to pronounce these earthly punishments the whole punishments of sin.

Our intuitions ought to make us believe that, as this mortal life terminates, our penal debt is fully paid off, the ill-desert of sin satisfied and extinguished, and the creature, lately a transgressor, cleansed of its ill-desert and guilt. As the mortal approaches death, remorse ought to decline, and relax its pangs, so that in the moment of death the soul should be absolutely freed from death and fear and self-rebuke, and quit existence in a state of perfect moral peace.

But such is never the case with dying men, unless their intellects are oppressed by delirium or coma, or their consciences seared as with a hot iron. The soul of the dying man, if in a rational state, knows that its debt of punishment for sin is not fully paid. It knows that earthly sufferings are only the beginning of that payment. Conscience is not satisfied, but denounces the ill-desert of the soul more clearly and awfully than ever before. Fear and remorse are not assuaged, but increase their torments, and culminate in the last dreadful period of exit from this world. Such is the experience of every rational soul in dying, who has not drugged himself with some deadly delusion, unless he is calmed by the hope of pardoning mercy in the Divine Judge whom he knows he is to meet beyond the grave. These moral convictions of dying men are dictated by the most universal, the most necessary, the most fundamental judgments of human reason. Were there no such fact of a future existence to ground them, reason itself would be a lie, and man incapable of moral conclusions.

It is very well known how materialists endeavor to break this testimony of nature itself to immortality, by crying that this fear and remorse are merely the results of superstitious fictions working upon the ignorant imagination. This explanation is as silly as it is false to rational consciousness. It is but the same which is advanced by the pagan atheist Ovid: *Timor fecit deos*. Mr. Edmund Burke sufficiently exploded the miserable sophism by the scornful question, *Quis fecit timorem?* No one is afraid, unless he believes there is an object to be afraid of.

The belief in the reality of the object must be present beforehand, in order to generate the fear. Every man who is not trying to cheat himself knows that these moral judgments, which are so solemnly reinforced by death, are functions of the reason and not of the fancy. The imaginings of superstition with its morbid terrors are the abuse and travesty of these moral sentiments, and not their source.

There is another broad moral fact which completes the demonstration, both of a future life and of future rewards and punishments. When we compare our fellow-men together we see that they do not all receive their equal deserts in this life. Here wickedness often triumphs and innocence suffers. The wicked "spread themselves like the green bay tree," their strength is firm and there are no bands even in their death; but the righteous are afflicted every morning and chastened every evening. Not seldom the purest human lives are darkened during their larger part by unkindness, calamity, or bereavement, and are terminated by a painful disease culminating in yet more painful death. No compensation comes to them, but the existence which was continued under the twilight of suffering ends in darkness. When we set these afflicted lives over against the prosperity of the wicked there remains a moral mal-adjustment abhorrent and frightful to every moral sentiment, unless there is to be a more equitable settlement beyond. These facts are impregnable. Righteousness deserves reward, and sin deserves punishment. There is a righteous God who rules this world by his providence. His benevolence and equity make it impossible that he should visit earthly miseries upon any moral agent except as the just punishment of his sins. Since all of us suffer more or less, all of us are more or less sinners, as our own consciences fully testify; but men are not punished in this life in due proportion to their relative guilt. Therefore it must be that God completes the distribution of penalties in a future life. To deny this then is to impugn the existence or the holiness and justice of God; it is a burning insult to him, near akin to blasphemy.

Such is a moderate statement of the rational arguments which prove the immortality of our spirits and our accountability beyond death for our conduct. The course of the proof also shows that the denial of our conclusion would make mankind

practically brutes; for when we have proved that there exists in the human person a rational and spiritual substance, the spirit, we have virtually proved man's immortality. Prove successfully that man does not possess this distinct spiritual substance and *he is made a mere beast*. He may be a more refined beast than an elephant, a pointer dog, or a monkey, but still he is only a beast. That which alone differentiates him from brutes is gone.

It is known that there is a vain philosophy, which avows itself materialistic and which yet pretends to find something in this evolved and improved animal to which to attach a temporary moral personality, moral sentiments, and moral accountability. We assure such vain thinkers that their attempt is futile. When we try it at the bar of common sense and sound philosophy, it meets these crushing refutations. Our mind is nothing but a refined function of a material organism, and its highest sentiments are nothing but animal instincts grounded only in organic sensibilities, evolved into some advanced forms; then it is impossible there can be any valid concept of the moral good higher than that of mere animal good. It is also impossible that there can be any moral motive directing and restraining actions. Where there are no moral motives there can be no just responsibility. Again, if all man's high sentiments are but advanced evolutions from animal instincts there can be no rational free-agency. Has the hen, for instance, any rational free-agency when impelled by her instinct to incubate her eggs? But where there is no rational free-agency there can be no just moral responsibility.

An all perfect God is the only adequate standard of righteousness, as his preceptive will is the only sufficient practical source of obligation. Without an omniscient administrator and a future life no adequate administration of justice is possible. Thus the logic of philosophy proves that when God, spirit, and immortality are expunged morality becomes impossible.

The great sensuous masses of mankind will reach the same result by a simpler and shorter path. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." We may be assured this will be the logic of the average man when taught materialism: "The scientists teach me that I am only a refined beast. Then if I choose, I

may act as a beast; there is no hereafter for me. Then I shall be a fool to deny myself anything I desire out of a regard for a hereafter. Experience teaches me that what they call wicked men may live very prosperously in their wickedness provided they are a little politic in observing a few cautions. Then there is no penalty for that sort of wickedness in this life, and as there is no future life, there is no penalty for it anywhere. Why should I not indulge myself in it? There is no such thing as an omniscient God, consequently I am free to do anything and everything I desire, provided these short-sighted men do not 'catch me at it.' Indeed, why should your materialists stop short of this unanswerable logic? "The scientists tell me that I am only a refined beast, and that my fellow-men are the same. A beast cannot be guilty of crime, and it is no crime to kill beasts; why then may I not kill any human beings whom I find it convenient to murder? Why may I not kill any of these scientists who have taught me this instructive lesson, provided I gain anything by it?" Practically, the result of this materialism always has been, and always will be, to disorganize human society, to let loose the flood-gates of crime, and to destroy civilization. In imperial Rome skepticism and materialism became the prevalent doctrines. With what result? History answers: The butcheries of Nero and his successors, the death of public virtue, and the utter putrescence of the once glorious Roman republic, which left it like a rotting behemoth to be torn to pieces by the Goths and Huns. Again, materialism became the dominant creed of the ruling faction in France in 1790. With what result? The fruit was the "Reign of Terror," which in five years annihilated fifty-two billions of francs of French wealth, made the streets of her cities run with the blood of judicial murders, perpetrated in the name of liberty more outrages and crimes against human rights than the autocratic Bourbons had wrought in five hundred years, and plunged Europe in two decades of causeless wars. Again in 1871 the International Communists, a faction of materialists, gained temporary possession of Paris. The consequence was a carnival of plunder and murder, until President Thiers crushed them out by force. Surely it is time then to learn that the tendency of this doctrine always has been, and always must be, by turning men into brutes, to

turn earth into a hell. There is no adequate restraint upon the wicked tendencies of man's fallen nature short of the authority of an omniscient, almighty God, and the fear of the righteous awards of immortality.

Shall all these stern lessons of history and of common sense be rebutted by the assertion that quite a number of our scientific evolutionists and materialists are quite nice, decent gentlemen? No doubt. But what makes them such? The traditional influences and habits of action resulting from that very Christianity which they are seeking to destroy. Their good citizenship is a temporary impulse communicated to them from God-fearing ancestors. Let them succeed in obliterating the belief in God and immortality, society will find too late that the whole source of the restraining impulse has been lost. The intellectual progeny will tend to become monsters, with the irresponsible ferocity of beasts energized by the powers of perverted rationality. Does a George Eliot, for instance, tell us that she still leaves an adequate object for the moral homage of her materialists in the noble concept of the "aggregate humanity," the worthy object of the humanitarian virtues? What is aggregate humanity? Where is it? According to her doctrine that huge part of the idol, which is composed of the past generations, is nowhere, is rotting in annihilation. According to her, the part of the idol which is to come in future generations is only an aggregate of beasts, a suitable object truly for moral homage! And worse still, this part is as yet a non-entity; and when it shall have become an actuality her votaries, whom she invites to worship it, will have become non-entities. Bah! Can the insolence of folly go further than this? Or are we told that these most decent scientists are doing nothing but following the lights of inductive science and bowing loyally to the truths of nature, wherever they meet them? We know that, so far as they array their zoölogy and histology as proofs of materialism, they are not paying loyal homage to the truths of natural science, but misconstruing and perverting them. We know that their attempt to disprove the existence of our rational spirits by means of the very exercise of the rational faculties can only turn out a logical suicide. It is as though one said to us, we have now proved experimentally that there are no eye-balls in human

heads. We ask, gentlemen, by what species of experiments do you prove that assertion? They answer, By a series of nice experiments made with our visual faculty. But if there are no eye-balls there is no visual faculty. Such experiments would be impossible. The analogy is exact. If these scientists did not possess a mind, endowed with supersensuous rational faculties, impossible to be the functions of mere material organism, faculties which are the indisputable signatures of distinct spiritual substance, the experiment of his biology would mean nothing to him. He thinks he is sacrificing at the altar of pure scientific truth. He deceives himself. He is sacrificing to an intellectual idol. Solomon tells us of men, who, while "scattering fire-brands, arrows and death," said, "Are we not in sport?" Ghastly sport it is! By what title can these mistaken interpreters of nature flatter themselves, that they are not scattering the fire-brands, arrows and death which their doctrine has always hitherto strewn among the nations?